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Abstract
I study how asymmetric information affects the financial market in three papers. In the
first paper, I study the joint determination of optimal contracts and equilibrium asset prices
in an economy with multiple principal-agent pairs. Principals design optimal contracts that
provide incentives for agents to acquire costly information. With agency problems, the agents’
compensation depends on the accuracy of their forecasts for asset prices and payoffs. Com-
plementarities in information acquisition delegation arise as follows. As more principals hire
agents to acquire information, asset prices become less noisy. Consequently, agents are more
willing to acquire information because they can forecast asset prices more accurately, thus
mitigating agency problems and encouraging other principals to hire agents. This mechanism
can explain many interesting phenomena in markets, including multiple equilibria, herding,
home bias and idiosyncratic volatility comovement.
In the second paper (co-authored with Yao Zeng from Harvard University), we investi-
gate how firms’ cross learning amplifies industry-wide investment waves. Firms’ investment
opportunities have idiosyncratic shocks as well as a common shock, and firms’ asset prices
aggregate speculators’ private information about these two shocks. In investing, each firm
learns from other firms’ prices to make better inference about the common shock. Thus,
a spiral between firms’ higher investment sensitivity to the common shock and speculators’
higher weighting on the common shock emerges. This leads to systematic risks in investment
waves: higher investment and price comovements as well as their higher comovements with the
common shock. Moreover, each firm’s cross learning creates a new pecuniary externalities on
other firms, because it makes other firms’ prices less informative on their idiosyncratic shocks
through speculators’ endogenous over-weighting on the common shock.
In the third model, we study the effect of introducing an options market on investors’
incentive to collect private information in a rational expectation equilibrium model. We show
that an options market has two effects on information acquisition: a negative effect, as options
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act as substitutes for information, and a positive effect, as informed investors have less need
for options and can earn profits from selling them. When the population of informed investors
is high because of the low information acquisition cost, the supply for options is larger than
the demand, leading to low option prices. Low option prices in turn induce investors to use
options instead of information to reduce risk, while informed investors have little opportunity
to earn profits from selling options to cover their information acquisition cost. Introducing
an options market thus decreases investors’ incentive to acquire information, and the prices of
the underlying assets become less informative, leading to lower prices and higher volatilities.
A dynamic extension of this analysis shows that introducing an options market increases the
price reactions to earnings announcements. However, when the information acquisition cost
is high, the opposite effects arise. Further analysis shows that our results are robust for
more general derivatives. These results provide a potentially unified theory to reconcile the
conflicting empirical findings on the options listing of individual stocks in both the U.S. market
and international markets.
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Chapter 1
Delegated Information Acquisition
and Asset Price
Shiyang Huang
Abstract: This paper studies the joint determination of optimal contracts and equilibrium
asset prices in an economy with multiple principal-agent pairs. Principals design optimal con-
tracts that provide incentives for agents to acquire costly information. With agency problems,
the agents’ compensation depends on the accuracy of their forecasts for asset prices and payoffs.
Complementarities in information acquisition delegation arise as follows. As more principals
hire agents to acquire information, asset prices become less noisy. Consequently, agents are
more willing to acquire information because they can forecast asset prices more accurately, thus
mitigating agency problems and encouraging other principals to hire agents. This mechanism
can explain many interesting phenomena in markets, including multiple equilibria, herding,
home bias and idiosyncratic volatility comovement.
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1.1 Introduction
The asset management industry has experienced tremendous growth with current assets under
management comparable to global GDP. Not surprisingly, institutional investors now dominate
trading activities in all financial markets.1 While institutions assist their clients in making in-
vestment decisions, agency problems may simultaneously arise. In particular, potential moral
hazard emerges when institutions’ efforts are largely unobservable, raising the issue of optimal
contract design. Given institutions’ superior capabilities to acquire information, it is common-
place for clients to delegate information acquisition to them and provide incentives for them
through optimal contracting. However, the joint determination of optimal contracts, informa-
tion acquisition delegation and equilibrium asset pricing has not yet been fully explored in the
literature.2
This paper contributes to the literature by solving for optimal contracts characterized in a
general space and equilibrium asset prices in an economy with multiple principal-agent pairs.
I show that the optimal contracts for delegated information acquisition depend on agents’
forecasting accuracy for asset prices and payoffs: agents receive high compensation when they
produce accurate forecasts. Moreover, I find strategic complementarities in the delegation of
information acquisition: the more principals hire agents to acquire information, the more others
are willing to do so. As more principals hire agents to acquire information, asset prices become
less noisy. As a result, agents are more willing to acquire information because they can forecast
asset prices more accurately. Thus, the agency problems are mitigated and other principals
are encouraged to hire agents. Such strategic complementarities yield multiple equilibria, and
can explain many phenomena, including asset price jumps, herding behaviour, home bias and
1French (2008) documents that financial institutions accounted for more than 80% ownership of equities in
the U.S. in 2007, compared to 50% in 1980. TheCityUK (2013) estimates the size of assets under management
is around $87 trillion globally, which is equal to global GDP. Meanwhile, Jones and Lipson (2004) reports that
institutional trading volume reached 96% of total equity trading volume in NYSE by 2002.
2Papers studying optimal contracts without any asset pricing implications include Bhattacharya and Pflei-
derer (1985) and Dybvig et al. (2010). Papers studying institutions’ impacts on asset pricing without asymmetric
information or information acquisition include Vayanos and Woolley (2013) and Basak and Pavlova (2013). The
most relevant papers are by Kyle, Ou-Yang and Wei (2011) and Malamud and Petrov (2014). However, they
only consider restricted contract space. More importantly, my research has new asset pricing implications, such
as strategic complementarities.
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idiosyncratic volatility comovement.
The model of this paper features delegated information acquisition, optimal contract de-
sign, and equilibrium asset pricing, introducing a two-period economy with one risky asset and
one risk-free asset. The risky asset’s payoff has two components: the first can be learned by
agents and is called fundamental value, while the other cannot be learned and produces residual
uncertainty. This economy has a market maker, noisy traders and a mass of principal-agent
pairs. The principals are risk neutral while the agents are risk averse. Different principals
cannot share agents, and different agents cannot share principals. Before trading, the princi-
pals choose whether to hire agents to acquire information regarding fundamental value. When
deciding to hire agents, principals design optimal contracts that provide incentives for agents
to acquire costly information, after which agents provide forecasts to their corresponding prin-
cipals. The feasible contracts are general functions of agents’ forecasts, the asset price and the
payoff. I model agency problems by assuming that agents take hidden actions when acquir-
ing information. When the market opens, the principals submit market orders to the market
maker based on agents’ forecasts. Having received all orders from the principals and the noisy
traders, the market maker then sets the price.
The generality of this model relies on its broad interpretations. The principal-agent pairing
can be interpreted as either that between fund managers and in-house analysts, or that between
the pension fund trustees/board of directors (within funds) and fund managers. This model
can unify both, because the optimal contract problems in the two contexts are essentially
equivalent given that agents construct portfolios based on forecasts and principals can directly
observe agents’ portfolios. Therefore, the assumption regarding who invests is not crucial, and
the aforementioned parsimonious model is a natural setting to study information acquisition
incentives.
I show that the optimal contracts depend on the agents’ forecasting accuracy for the as-
set price and the payoff. Agents can forecast the asset price and payoff accurately only if
they acquire information. Thus, the agents’ efforts are related to their forecasting accuracy,
which determines their compensation. Specifically, agents receive high compensation when
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they forecast accurately - in contrast to an economy without agency problems, in which the
compensation is constant. As an incentive for accurate forecasting, the bonus decreases with
price informativeness and increases with residual uncertainty. When the price becomes more
informative or residual uncertainty decreases, it is easier for agents to use information to fore-
cast accurately and then receive high compensation. Consequently, agents are more willing to
exert efforts and principals can accordingly provide fewer incentives. These results predict that
the bonus is larger for professionals who trade small/growth stocks featuring greater residual
uncertainty.
Furthermore, I find that the delegation of information acquisition exhibits strategic com-
plementarities. Price informativeness has two counteractive effects: the first is to lower trading
profit; and, the second is to mitigate agency problems. Whereas the first effect leads to stan-
dard strategic substitutability due to competition in trading, the strategic complementarities
in information acquisition delegation originates from the effect of price informativeness on mit-
igating agency problems. When more principals hire agents to acquire information, the asset
price becomes less noisy. As a result, agents are more willing to acquire information because
they can forecast the asset price more accurately, and thus agency problems are mitigated.
Clearly, strategic complementarities in information acquisition delegation emerge when price
informativeness has a larger impact on mitigating agency problems than that on lowering trad-
ing profits. This only occurs when the residual uncertainty is large and compensation must
consequently rely largely on agents’ forecasts for the asset price. This mechanism causes prin-
cipals to coordinate information acquisition delegation, therefore introducing the possibility of
multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria may lead to the economy switching between
low-information and high-information equilibria without any relation to fundamentals, leading
to jumps in asset price and price informativeness.
This model, to my knowledge, is new to the literature to combine optimal contracts char-
acterized in a general space, equilibrium asset pricing and delegated information acquisition.
Meanwhile, it shows that the agency problem in information acquisition delegation is a new
source for strategic complementarities. In particular, my model yields closed-form solutions
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for both optimal contracts and equilibrium asset pricing. Although this model is intention-
ally stylized to focus on information acquisition delegation, it captures realistic institutional
features. Moreover, it has a number of implications as follows.
The first implication relates to home bias, a long-standing puzzle.3 A plausible explana-
tion is that investors have superior information on home assets. However, Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2009) argue that investors can easily acquire information about other assets,
which could eliminate the information advantage of home investors and mitigate home bias.4
Although investors can freely acquire information, I show that agency problems lead to home
bias: investors tend to acquire more information about assets for which they have an informa-
tion advantage. I extend the model to consider two groups of principals (A and B) and two
risky assets (X and Y ); group A (B) is endowed with private information only about asset X
(Y ). I show that group A has higher incentives to acquire information on asset X relative to
asset Y , and vice versa. Group A can use the endowed information to monitor agents, and thus
group A’s agency problems are less severe when hiring agents to acquire information about
asset X relative to asset Y .5 Consequently, group A is encouraged to hire agents to acquire
information and trade more on asset X. This result is in direct contrast to that of the economy
without agency problems, in which the decreasing marginal benefit of information discourages
group A from acquiring information about asset X. Interpreting group A as home investors
on asset X implies that agency problems can explain home bias.
The mechanism above for home bias can also explain industry bias: investors trade more on
the assets within their expertise. This prediction is consistent with Massa and Simonov (2006),
who document that Swedish investors buy assets highly correlated with their non-financial
3Home bias is well documented by Fama and Poterba (1991), Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001). Despite large benefits from international diversification, Fama and Poterba (1991) find
that households invest nearly all of their wealth in domestic assets. For example, they find that U.S households
invest around 94% of their equity portfolio in the domestic market, while this number is 82% in the UK.
4Constraint on international capital flow may explain home bias. However, it is not a major concern cur-
rently. In particular, the recent studies (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010 and Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) find that
households/fund managers also have a strong home bias in the U.S. market, which suggests this explanation is
not satisfactory.
5Normally, the principals can use their private information in the subjective evaluation of agents. Even
if the private information is not verifiable, some mechanisms, such as reputation concern, could reveal these
information.
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income. Moreover, because endowed information is more valuable in monitoring agents when
the assets have greater residual uncertainty, the home/industry bias is stronger for these assets.
This prediction is consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999),
who find that the home bias of U.S. fund managers is stronger when they trade small stocks.
The next implication relates to herding, defined as any behavioral similarity caused by
interactions amongst individuals (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). I extend the model to assume
that each principal can choose to hire his agent to acquire either an exclusive signal or a common
signal: the former is only accessible to his agent and is conditionally independent of others,
while the latter is accessible to any agent. Under agency problems, I show that principals
herd to acquire the common signal when the residual uncertainty is sufficiently large. Herding
makes the price sensitive to the common signal itself. Thus, agents are willing to obtain the
common signal because this allows them to easily forecast the asset price. In particular, when
the residual uncertainty is large, herding emerges because its impact on mitigating agency
problems is larger than that on lowering trading profit. This result is in clear contrast to that
of the economy without agency problems, in which principals prefer the exclusive signals due
to the substitute effect.
Moreover, my model has additional applications. For example, I show that idiosyncratic
volatility comovement occurs in a multi-asset extension, in which principals incentivize agents
to acquire information on each asset through their forecasting accuracy for the prices of assets
with correlated fundamentals. An increase on one asset’s idiosyncratic volatility, perhaps due
to more noisy traders, discourages information acquisition and consequently leads to higher
idiosyncratic volatilities on other correlated assets.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to literature
regarding the optimal contracting in delegated portfolio management, such as Bhattacharya
and Pfleiderer (1985), Stoughton (1993), Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010) and Ou-
Yang (2003). However, the asset prices play no roles in the aforementioned contracting work.
My work on the contracting is most related to Dybvig et al. (2010). They study the optimal
contract problem in a complete market, in which the asset price has no informational role;
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they find that the optimal compensation involves a benchmark. In contrast to their work, I
consider the optimal contracts in general equilibrium and the asset prices play informational
roles. I find that the compensation depends on agents’ forecasting accuracy for the asset prices
and the payoffs.
My paper is also related to recent studies on the institutional investors, such as Basak,
Shaprio and Tepla (2006), Basak, Pavlova and Shaprio (2007, 2008), Basak and Makarov
(2014), Basak and Pavlova (2013), Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008), Dasgupta, Prat and Ver-
ardo (2011), Dow and Gorton (1997), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), He and Kondor (2013),
Garcia and Vande (2009), Kaniel and Kondor (2013), Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley (2013), Kyle,
Ou-Yang and Wei (2011) and Malamud and Petrov (2014). In particular, Buffa, Vayanos and
Woolley (2013) study the joint equilibrium determination of optimal contracts and asset prices
in a dynamic and multi-asset model. They focus on how the inefficiency of benchmarking arises
endogenously and amplifies stock market volatility. However, these authors do not model moral
hazard problems in information acquisition. The most relevant works are by Kyle, Ou-Yang
and Wei (2011) and Malamud and Petrov (2014). Kyle, Ou-Yang and Wei (2011) consider a
moral hazard problem between one principal and one agent in the Kyle (1985) model. They
restrict the contract space and solely consider the linear contracts. Furthermore, Malamud and
Petrov (2014) also focus on the restricted contract form, which consists of one proportional fee
and one option-like incentive fee. My model differs from these papers in the following regard.
First, I place no restrictions on the contract space. Second, I find that the agency problems
generate strategic complementarities in information acquisition delegation, which is new to
this literature.
Last, my paper is related to recent studies on the strategic complementarities, including
Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2011), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), Garcia and Strobl
(2011) and Veldkamp (2006b). Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) find that short-term in-
vestors herd to acquire similar information. Because they must liquidate assets before payoffs
are realized, the short-term investors can profit on their information only if their informa-
tion is reflected in future prices by the trades of similarly informed investors. Garcia and
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Strobl (2011) find that relative wealth concern can generate complementarities. Because the
investors’ utilities are negatively affected by others, they tend to hedge others’ impacts by
following others’ information acquisition decision. Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2011) show
that information acquisition complementarities emerge when the asset prices affect the firms’
investments. Veldkamp (2006b) finds that when the information production has a scale effect,
the selling price of information decreases as more investors buy information. In contrast to
their work, the strategic complementarities in my model originates from the effect of price
informativeness on mitigating agency problems in delegated information acquisition.
The paper is organized as follows. I introduce the model in Section 2 and solve the optimal
contracts in Section 3. Section 4 shows the strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria.
Section 5 studies three applications. Section 6 discusses the robustness. In particular, I solve
a fully-fledged model with non-linear REE to show that the main results are robust in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Economy
My model is built on Kyle (1985), in which investors submit market orders and a market maker
sets the price according to the total order. My model deviates from Kyle (1985) in the following
features: there are a mass of investors and each one has trading constraints.6 Investors in my
model trade in a competitive market, and no single individual investor has any price impact.
My economy has a mass of principal-agent pairs. The principals trade the risky asset
and have incentives to acquire information for profits. However, these principals are unable
to acquire information alone, perhaps because of large information acquisition or opportunity
costs. Before trading, principals choose whether to hire agents to acquire information. Because
agents’ efforts are unobservable, a moral hazard problem arises within each pair. When deciding
6The assumptions of a mass of investors in which each one has trading constraints is not new (see Dow,
Goldstein and Guembel, 2011, Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan, 2013 and Malamud and Petrov, 2014).
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to hire agents, principals design optimal contracts that provide incentives for agents to acquire
information. In particular, the population of principals who hire agents is endogenous in
my model. My analysis of optimal contracting is similar to that of Dybvig et al. (2010). In
particular, I solve optimal contracts without any restriction on the contract space. The optimal
contracts will induce agents to make costly efforts and truthfully report signals.
Timeline and Assets. My economy has three periods t = 0, 1, 2 and two assets. The
first asset is risk-free and the second is risky. The risk-free asset is in zero supply and pays
off one unit of consumption good without uncertainty at time t = 2. The payoff of the risky
asset is denoted by D with two components: V and . V and  are independent. I call V
the fundamental value and  the residual uncertainty. I assume that V depends on equally
likely states, h and l, realized at time t = 2. V takes Vω (where ω ∈ {h, l}). Without a loss
of generality, I assume that Vh = θ and Vl = −θ, where θ > 0. The residual uncertainty  is
uniformly distributed on [−M,M ], where M > 0.7 At time t = 0, principals choose whether
to delegate information acquisition to agents. When deciding to hire agents, principals write
contracts with their agents. The contract is denoted by pi. Otherwise, the principal does
nothing at time t = 0. At time t = 1, the market opens and the principals submit market
orders.8 After receiving the total orders, a competitive market maker sets the price. I denote
the risky asset’s price by P .
Players. There are four types of players. The first type is principals, who choose whether
to hire agents, design optimal contracts at t = 0, and trade the risky asset at t = 1. The
second type is agents, who decide whether to accept the contracts and exert costly effort to
acquire information about the fundamental value V . The third type is noisy traders, and the
last type is a risk-neutral competitive market maker.
There are a mass of principal-agent pairs. Each pair is indexed by i ∈ [0,∞). Within each
pair i, I denote its principal by principal i and denote its agent by agent i. To simplify the
7The assumptions about θ and  are made only to obtain an analytical solution and make the mechanism
clear. I will show numerically that the mechanism is robust when θ and  follow more general distributions.
8The assumption about market orders is to obtain closed-form solution without losses of any economic
insights. In the extension, I allow principals to learn information from the price and then submit limit orders.
The numerical results show that the main results are robust.
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analysis, I assume that different principals can not share agents, and vice versa. Each pair
can be interpreted as one mutual/hedge fund. There can be many interpretations of principal-
agent pairs, such as principals as board directors of funds and agents as fund managers/in-house
analysts. Moreover, I assume that the total demand from noisy traders is n, which follows a
uniform distribution on [−N,N ], where N > 0.
Agency Problem. Agent i’s effort is denoted by ei ∈ {0, 1}. When agent i exerts effort,
ei = 1; otherwise, ei = 0. After exerting effort, agent i generates a private signal si ∈ {h, l}
regarding the risky asset’s fundamental value V . I denote the probability with which a signal
is correct by
pei +
1
2
(1− ei) = prob(si = h|V = θ)
= prob(si = l|V = −θ),
where si is conditionally independent across agents and p >
1
2 . If agent i shirks, his signal is
pure noise. If agent i exerts effort, his signal is informative. If I let prob(si) be the unconditional
probability of signal si, I obtain prob(si = h) = prob(si = l) =
1
2 . Let prob
I(V |si) be the
probability of V conditional on signal si if agent i exerts effort, and let prob
U (V |si) be the
probability of V conditional on signal si if he shirks. I then have the following:
probI(V = θ|si = h) = probI(V = −θ|si = l) = p, (1.1)
probU (V = θ|si = h) = probU (V = −θ|si = l) = 1
2
. (1.2)
To acquire information, each agent bears a utility loss. I assume that all agents have the
same CARA utility function − exp(−γapi + γaC), where pi is compensation, C is information
acquisition cost and γa is risk aversion.
9 All agents have zero initial wealth. Due to hidden
actions, there are moral hazard problems followed by truth telling problems between principals
and agents.
9When I model agents’ utility nesting cost as − exp−γapi −C, the results do not change. In particular, when
I consider general HARA utility function for agents, the main results are robust as shown later.
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Information Acquisition and Trading. At time t = 0, some principals hire agents to
acquire information. The population of these principals is denoted by λ, where λ is endogenous.
I call these principals informed principals; others are referred to as uninformed principals.
While deciding to hire agents, informed principal i writes a contract pii with agent i. At time
t = 1, all contracts and λ become public information. Upon receiving report si from his agent,
informed principal i submits a market order Xi conditional on the report to maximize his utility
over final wealth Wi,1, where Wi,1 = W0 + Xi(D − P ) − pii, and Xi ∈ [−1, 1]. This limited
position is due to frictions, such as leverage constraint or limited wealth. Then, uninformed
principals submit market order XU , where XU = 0 due to symmetric distributions of the
asset payoff or price. Given the contracts beforehand, the informed principal i’s optimization
problem in trading is the following:
max
Xi
E(W0 +Xi(D − P )− pii|si). (1.3)
The total orders received by the competitive risk-neutral market maker are
X =
∫ λ
i=0
Xidi+ n. (1.4)
The market maker sets a price equal to the risky asset’s expected payoff conditional on X:
P = E(D|X). (1.5)
Contracting Problem. With agency problems, principals design optimal contracts pi that
provide incentives for agents to acquire information at time t = 0. In accordance with Dybvig
et al. (2010), this type of contract induce agents to exert effort and report the true signals.
Because Dybvig et al. (2010) assume that the market is complete, there is no informational
role of the price. However, the market is not complete in my model. Moreover, the asset price
plays an informational role in monitoring agents because it aggregates information from all
principals. The contracts in my model are general functions of agents’ reports, the asset price
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and payoff. The agents either accept or reject the contracts. If agents accept the contracts,
they exert costly efforts in information acquisition. After acquiring information, they report
their signals to the corresponding principals. The specific contract provided by principal i is
a general function pii(s
R(si), P,D), where s
R(si) is agent i’s report conditional on his realized
signal si.
To formalize my analysis, I consider two problems: the first-best and the agency problem.
The first-best problem assumes that each agent’s costly effort and signal can be observed by
his principal. This problem may not be realistic, but is useful for further comparison. In the
agency problem, agents’ efforts and signals are unobservable. There is a moral hazard problem
followed by a truth telling problem. The revelation principle guarantees that I can focus solely
on the contracts that induce agents to truthfully report signals after exerting efforts. The
detailed analysis of the two problems follows:
First-best. Principal i chooses pii(s
R(si), P,D) at time t = 0 and submits demand Xi at
time t = 1 to maximize his expected utility:
max
pii(si,P,D),Xi(si,pii)
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[W0 +Xi(D − P )− pii(si, P,D)]f I(P,D|si)dPdD, (1.6)
where f I(P, V |si) is the conditional joint probability density function when agent i acquires
information. In the first-best problem, principals design contracts subject to agents’ partici-
pation constraint,
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(si,P,D)+γaC ]f I(P,D|si)dPdD = − exp(−γaWa), (1.7)
where LHS of Equation (1.7) is agent i’s expected utility given the premise that he exerts
costly effort and reports the true signal. Moreover, Wa is the reserve wealth of agents, which
can be interpreted as the agents’ outside options.
Agency Problem. In the agency problem, the contract satisfies two type of ICs, including
the Ex Ante IC, which is the incentive-compatibility of effort exerting
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∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(si,P,D)+γaC ]f I(P,D|si)dPdD
≥ ∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(sR(si),P,D)]fU (P,D|si)dPdD,
(1.8)
and the Ex Post IC, which is the incentive-compatibility of truth reporting(∀si and sR(si) :
s→ s)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(si,P,D)]f I(P,D|si)dPdD ≥
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(sR(si),P,D)]f I(P,D|si)dPdD,
(1.9)
where fU (P, V |si) is the conditional joint probability density function when agent i shirks.
The RHS of Equation (1.8) is agent i’s expected utility when he shirks. Then, fU (P, V |si) =
f(P, V ), which is the unconditional joint probability density function. Equation (1.9) induces
agents to truthfully report their signals. For any realized signal si, the LHS of Equation (1.9)
is agent i’s utility if he reports the truth signal, whereas RHS of Equation (1.9) is the agents
i’s utility if he misreports.
Principal i’s choice variables are contingent fees pii(si, P,D) and a demand schedule Xi(si).
Each principal i maximizes his utility through simultaneous decisions over trading and optimal
contracting. The trading decisions and optimal contracts depend on the population of informed
principals. In the equilibrium, the population of informed principals λ renders the expected
utility of informed and uninformed principals equal; the difference in utilities between the two
types of principals is the expected net benefit of information. I denote the expected net benefit
of information by B, where B is the difference between the maximum value of optimization
problem in Equation (1.6) and the initial wealth W0. It is clear that B is difference between
the trading profit for informed principals and the expected compensation to agents.
1.2.2 Discussion
Before proceeding, I discuss the assumptions of my model. First, I assume that the principals
trade by alone and only agents acquire information. Although this assumption is stylized, my
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model has broad interpretations. The most direct interpretation is that the principals are fund
managers and the agents are in-house analysts. The in-house analysts collect information and
report forecasts to fund managers, who trade based on the forecasts. However, the assumption
about who invests is not crucial, as is evident if I assume that agents trade instead of prin-
cipals and that principals can observe or infer agents’ contractible portfolios. Because agents
construct portfolios based on forecasts, the contracts written upon agents’ portfolios, the asset
price and the payoff can be transformed into the contracts directly written on agents’ forecasts,
the asset price and the payoff. In practice, the pension fund trustees/board directors of funds
can observe the fund managers’ portfolios. Therefore, an alternative interpretation is that the
pension fund trustees/board directors of funds, who maximize the households’ interests, hire
fund managers to simultaneously collect and trade on information. Another interpretation is
that the principals are households and the agents are fund managers. Because mutual/hedge
funds must disclose their holdings regularly, households could infer the beliefs of fund man-
agers through holding data, although they are noisy(see Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2007,
Cohen, Polk, Silli, 2010 and Shumway, Szefler and Yuan, 2011). Although households can not
choose the management fee, they can use fund flow to provide incentives for fund managers.
The fund flow can be viewed as a form of implicit contract.
Furthermore, in accordance with the literature, I assume that the principals are risk-neutral.
This assumption simplifies my analysis, while capturing the features of the practice. In practice,
principals, such as households or mutual/hedge funds can diversify risks alone. For example,
households can allocate money to different assets to diversify risk. In particular, if principals
are risk averse, the contracts include a risk-sharing component. However, this risk-sharing com-
ponent does not overturn my mechanism: an increase in the population of informed principals
makes the price more informative and mitigates the agency problems.
The third assumption is that the principals submit market orders and do not learn informa-
tion from the asset prices. This assumption is not crucial in my model. Introducing learning
enables uninformed principals to free ride informed principals by learning information from
the price; this affects principals’ incentive to acquire information. However, this free-riding
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problem only affects the strength of the driving force, and will not overturn my mechanism.
In particular, this assumption captures my idea in a more complicated dynamic framework,
in which there are multiple rounds of trading and principals solely observe current and past
prices. It is obvious that such settings will only complicate the model, leading to a loss of
tractability, without adding much economic insight. In particular, the numerical results in
one extension show that the strategic complementarities are robust when principals can learn
information from the asset price.
1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
I formally introduce the equilibrium concept in this section. I focus on symmetric equilibrium
with identical contracts. Before trading, principals choose whether to hire agents to acquire
information and the population of these principals is endogenous. These principals design
optimal contracts that provide incentives for their agents to acquire information and report
truthfully. Given these contracts, all principals submit optimal demands when the market
opens and a risk-neutral market maker sets the price after receiving the total orders.
Definition 1.3.1. A symmetric equilibrium is defined as a collection: a price function P set
by a risk-neutral competitive market maker, P (X) : R→ R; an optimal demand schedule for
each principal i, Xi(si) : R→ R; an optimal contract designed by each principal i, pii(si, P,D) :
R3→ R; and an equilibrium population of principals hiring agents to acquire information, λ.
This collection satisfies the following:
(1) Given the price function solved in Equation (1.5) and the demand schedule solved in
Equation (1.3), principal i designs optimal contract pii(si, P,D) and the optimal contract prob-
lem is equivalent to the problem in Equation (1.6) subject to constraints (1.7), (1.8), and(1.9),
(2) Given contract pii(si, P,D), agent i decides whether to accept or reject this contract,
(3) Given the price function in Equation (1.5) and the optimal contract pii(si, P,D), prin-
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cipal i submits demand Xi to solve Equation (1.3),
(4) A risk-neutral competitive market maker sets the price as the risky asset’s expected
payoff conditional on total orders. The pricing function is solved in Equation (1.5),
(5) If there exists a positive solution to B(λ) = 0, an equilibrium with information acquisi-
tion is obtained. Otherwise, an equilibrium of no information acquisition is obtained (λ = 0).
(6) All contracts are identical in this economy.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
I characterize the equilibrium as one featuring trading strategies and optimal contracting by
principals, and a pricing rule by the market maker. I follow a step-by-step approach to illustrate
this idea.
Step 1. I first solve for the principals’ trading decisions and the market maker’s pricing rule
given the contracts designed beforehand and the population of informed principals. When the
market opens at t = 1, the informed principal i submits Xi to maximize W0 +Xi(D−P )−pii,
which is his final wealth. Furthermore, uninformed principals submit XU = 0. Because the
principals are risk-neutral, there is no hedging demand, and the informed principal i submits
Xi = 1 after agent i reports si = h and submits Xi = −1 after agent i reports si = l. Following
the large number theorem, when fundamental value V = θ, the total number of buy orders
from informed principals is λp and the total number of sell orders is λ(1− p). Thus the total
order received by the market maker is X = λ(2p − 1) + n. Similarly, the total order received
by the market maker is X = −λ(2p − 1) + n when V = −θ. Therefore, the total order X is
distributed on [−λ(2p− 1)−N,λ(2p− 1) +N ].
Receiving total orders X, the risk-neutral market maker updates his beliefs and sets the
price as the risky asset’s expected payoff: P = E(D|X). If −λ(2p− 1) +N < λ(2p− 1)−N ,
the total orders can fully reveal information regarding V and I have P = V , which leads to
zero trading profits for informed principals. This is impossible because the principals need to
27
pay costs for information. Thus I have the formal lemma regarding the population of informed
principals.
Lemma 1.3.1. The population of informed principals satisfies the following:
λ <
N
2p− 1 . (1.1)
This lemma is helpful for further analysis. Then, I have the following lemma regarding
price:
Lemma 1.3.2. Given λ and contract pi(s, P,D), the price follows the rule:
P (X) =

θ if N − λ(2p− 1) < X ≤ N + λ(2p− 1) ,
0 if −N + λ(2p− 1) ≤ X ≤ N − λ(2p− 1) ,
−θ if −N − λ(2p− 1) ≤ X < −N + λ(2p− 1) .
(1.2)
Lemma 1.3.2 shows that the price increases with the total orders X due to the correlation
between the total orders and the fundamental value V . However, with noisy traders, the total
orders do not fully reveal V . In particular, the probability that the price equals V is the
following:
prob(P = V |V ) = λ(2p− 1)
N
. (1.3)
This probability measures price informativeness. This probability increases with the population
of informed principals and the precision of signals, and decreases with the variance of noisy
traders’ demand.
Step 2. I solve the informed principals’ optimal contracts at t = 0. As Lemma 1.3.2 implies,
the asset price is informative regarding V . Thus principals will use the price to monitor agents.
The contracting problem is reduced to the optimization problem in Equation (1.6) subject to
constraints (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9). Due to risk-neutrality, the principals’ trading decisions and
contracting problems are independent. Then, the contracting problem can be transferred to
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the following:
max
pii(si,P,D)
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[−pii(si, P,D)]f I(P,D|si)dPdD, (1.4)
Equation 1.4 shows that principals minimize expected compensation subject to participant
constraint and incentive compatibility. However, if the residual uncertainty is sufficiently small,
the asset payoff D is perfectly informative about V and thus there is no role of asset price in
the contracting, which is not interesting. To avoid this case, I make the following assumption
regarding M :
Assumption 1.3.1. M satisfies: M ≥ θ.
From Dybvig et al. (2010), the joint conditional pdf or conditional probability of P and D
play important roles in optimal contracts. Thus I characterize the joint conditional pdf or the
conditional probability of P and D before I solve the optimal contracts. If agent i exerts effort,
signal si is informative about V and this indicates that prob
I(V = θ|si = h) = probI(V =
−θ|si = l) = p. Then, I have the following lemma:
Lemma 1.3.3. When si is informative about V , the conditional pdf is as follows:
(1) conditional on si = h,
f I(P = θ,D|si = h) =

p
2M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
0 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.5)
f I(P = 0, D|si = h) =

p
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
1
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
1−p
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.6)
f I(P = −θ,D|si = h) =

0 if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
(1−p)
2M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
(1.7)
(2) conditional on si = l,
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f I(P = θ,D|si = l) =

(1−p)
2M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
0 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.8)
f I(P = 0, D|si = l) =

1−p
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
1
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
p
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.9)
f I(P = −θ,D|si = l) =

0 if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
p
2M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
(1.10)
If agent i shirks, signal si is uninformative regarding V and this indicates that prob
U (V =
θ|si = h) = probU (V = −θ|si = l) = 12 . Then, I have the following lemma:
Lemma 1.3.4. When si is uninformative about V , the conditional pdf is as follows:
fU (P = θ,D) =

1
4M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
0 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.11)
fU (P = 0, D) =

1
4M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
1
2M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
1
4M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.12)
fU (P = −θ,D) =

0 if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
1
4M
λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
(1.13)
Lemma 1.3.3 shows that si is correlated with the asset price or the payoff when it is
informative. Lemma 1.3.4 shows that si is uncorrelated with the asset price or payoff when it
is pure noise. Thus agents’ efforts are tied to the accuracy of their forecasts for the asset price
and the payoff.
To simplify the optimization problems, in accordance with Grossman and Hart (1983) and
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Dybvig et al. (2010), I transfer the choice variables. I let:
v(si, P,D) = exp[−γapi(si, P,D]. (1.14)
I can rewrite the contracting problem in a similar form, in which choice variable becomes
v(si, P,D). Then principal i’s contracting problem becomes:
max
vi(si,P,D)
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
1
γa
log[vi(si, P,D)]f
I(P,D|si)dPdD, (1.15)
subject to constraints (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9). Then, I use the first-order approach to solve the
optimal contracts in both the first-best and the agency problem.
Proposition 1.3.1. (First-Best) The optimal contract in the first-best problem is: pii(si, P,D) =
Wa + C .
Proposition 1.3.1 shows that agents’ compensation is constant in the first-best problem.
This is slightly different from the previous literature, which assumes that investors are risk-
averse and finds that compensation is a proportional fee for risk-sharing purpose. However, I
assume that principals are risk-neutral. Therefore, principals do not care about risk and there
is no role for risk-sharing. In fact, the compensation is equal to agents’ reserve wealth and
information acquisition cost. This case is used later for comparative purposes with the agency
problem.
Assumption 1.3.2. C satisfies: C < − log 2+log(1−p)γa .
Assumption 1.3.2 is important because it guarantees that the optimal contract is imple-
mentable in the agency problem. I conduct the analysis with agency problems under Assump-
tion 1.3.2.
Proposition 1.3.2. (Agency Problem) Given λ, there exists one unique optimal contract in
the economy with agency problems. There are two cases regarding optimal contract as follows:
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(1) when p = 1, the first-best can be achieved. The optimal contract is the following:
pii(si, P,D) =

−∞ if si = h and P = −θ
−∞ if si = h and D < −M + θ
−∞ if si = l and P = θ
−∞ if si = l and D > M − θ
Wa + C otherwise
(1.16)
(2) when p < 1, the optimal contract is the following:
pii(si = h, P = θ,D) = pii(si = l, P = −θ,D) = log x
γa
(1.17)
pii(si = h, P = −θ,D) = pii(si = l, P = θ,D) = log y
γa
(1.18)
pii(si = h, P = 0, D) =

log x
γa
if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
log[px+(1−p)y]
γa
if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
log y
γa
if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.19)
pii(si = l, P = 0, D) =

log y
γa
if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
log[px+(1−p)y]
γa
if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
log x
γa
if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.20)
where x and y are defined in the Appendix. In particular, x > y.
Proposition 1.3.2 has several interesting features. First, when the signals acquired by agents
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are perfectly informative (p = 1), the first-best can be achieved through an infinite penalty for
incorrect forecasts. Given the finite support of the asset price or the asset payoff, if the asset
price or payoff deviates to a large extent from the forecasts, the principals know that the agents
are shirking. For example, when agent i acquires information and then reports si = h, it is
impossible that the price is −θ. This infinite penalty achieves the first best.10 Second, when
the signals acquired by agents are not perfectly informative (p < 1), the optimal compensation
depends on the agents’ forecasting accuracy for the asset price and the payoff. For example,
when agents report si = h, agents receive high compensation when the price or payoff is high
and low compensation when the price or payoff is low. Agents can forecast the asset price and
the payoff accurately if they acquire information. Thus, the forecasting accuracy is related
to agents’ efforts. This compensation will encourage agents to exert effort and tell the truth.
When p = 1, the first-best can be achieved, which is not analytically interesting. Thus I focus
on the case in which p < 1 in the following analysis. I formally state the assumption regarding
p as follows:
Assumption 1.3.3. p satisfies: p < 1.
1.3.3 Characteristics of Optimal Contract
I show the characteristics of the optimal contract in this section. I focus on how the price
informativeness or residual uncertainty affects the compensation.
The bonus, defined by the difference between agents’ compensations when they forecast
correctly and incorrectly, provides incentives for agents to exert effort. It is given as follows:
Definition 1.3.2. The bonus is defined as Sf : Sf =
log x−log y
γa
.
Because λ measures the price informativeness and M measures the residual uncertainty in
the asset’s payoff, I show their effects on bonuses as follows:
Proposition 1.3.3. Bonus Sf decreases with λ, but increases with M .
10In this basic model, I assume that agents have CARA utilities and do not have limited liability. Thus the
infinite penalty can be interpreted as infinite disutilities. For example, if agents have log utilities, pi = 0 provides
an infinite penalty for agents. I discuss more general utilities for agents in the following sections.
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Proposition 1.3.3 shows that Sf decreases with price informativeness and increases with
residual uncertainty. In fact, when the price becomes more informative, agents can forecast
the asset price more accurately with information. Agents are therefore more willing to exert
efforts. As a result, principals can provide less incentive, which is characterized as a decreased
bonus. Similarly, the bonus increases with residual uncertainty. In particular, because both
the asset price and the payoff are used in the incentive provision, their effects depend on each
other. I then have the following result:
Corollary 1.3.1. When θ = M , λ has no effect on Sf , that is
∂Sf
∂λ = 0 if θ = M .
When θ = M , the asset payoff is perfectly informative about the fundamental value. Thus,
principals solely use the asset payoff in the contracts.
1.4 Agency Problem and Information Acquisition Complemen-
tarity
In this section, I show how agency problems in delegated information acquisition affect the
financial market. I show that agency problems generate complementarities and multiple equi-
libria.
1.4.1 First-Best Case
Informed principal i’s final wealth W1,i has two components: the first is trading profit, which is
Xi(D−P ); the second is agents’ compensation pii. Informed principals’ expected trading profit
is denoted as Ep, where Ep = E[Xi(D − P )]. Thus the expected net benefit from information
is B = E[Xi(D − P )− pii]. Informed principals’ expected trading profit is shown as follows:
Lemma 1.4.1. Informed principals’ expected trading profit: Ep = θ(2p− 1)N−λ(2p−1)N .
Lemma 1.4.1 shows that informed principals’ trading profits decrease with the population
of informed principals because of competition in trading. This effect is called the strategic
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substitute effect. Because compensation is constant in the first-best problem, the net benefit
from information decreases with the population of informed principals. The result is shown as
follows:
Proposition 1.4.1. (First-Best) Information acquisition is a strategic substitute in the first-
best problem, that is ∂B∂λ < 0.
1.4.2 Agency Problem
With agency problems, the compensation depends on the accuracy of agents’ forecasts for the
asset price and payoff. In particular, the bonus decreases with the population of informed
principals, which leads to decreased compensation, and is the source of the strategic comple-
mentarity effect. When the residual uncertainty is large, there is a strategic complementarity
effect in the information acquisition delegation; otherwise, there is only a strategic substitute
effect. When the residual uncertainty is large, the principals rely largely on agents’ forecasts for
the asset price to incentive them. Thus, price informativeness has a larger impact on mitigat-
ing agency problems than lowering trading profit, which generates strategic complementarities.
When the residual uncertainty is small, only the substitute effect exists because price informa-
tiveness has little impact on mitigating agency problems. The result of information acquisition
delegation is shown as follows:
Proposition 1.4.2. (Agency Problem) In an economy with agency problems, I have the fol-
lowing:
(1) for a sufficiently small M , the information acquisition delegation is a strategic substitute.
That is, ∂B∂λ < 0.
(2) for a sufficiently high M , there exists λc satisfying the following: when λ < λc, the infor-
mation acquisition delegation is a strategic complement. That is ∂B∂λ > 0.
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1.4.3 Multiplicity of Equilibria
As shown in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), one unique equilibrium in in-
formation acquisition exists with a strategic substitute effect. However, the strategic comple-
mentarities may generate multiple equilibria (Dow, Goldstein and Guembel, 2011, Garcia and
Strobl, 2011, Goldstein, Li and Yang, 2013 and Veldkamp, 2006a). Proposition 1.4.2 shows
that agency problems produce strategic complementarities when the residual uncertainty is
large. Thus, multiple equilibria may emerge in this case. This result is important because it
may explain asset price jumps and excess volatilities in the financial market. The equilibrium
populations of informed principals in the first-best and agency problem are denoted by λfb and
λsb, respectively. Because there is a substitute effect in the first-best problem or in the agency
problem with low residual uncertainty, tone unique equilibrium exists in both cases, which is
shown as follows:
Lemma 1.4.2. There exists one unique equilibrium λfb regarding information acquisition del-
egation in the first-best problem.
Lemma 1.4.3. When M is sufficiently small, there exists one unique equilibrium λfb regarding
information acquisition delegation in the economy with agency problems.
Because the contract is very complex, I do not characterize all equilibria in the agency
problem with large residual uncertainty. However, my goal is to demonstrate the existence of
multiple equilibria. In particular, no information acquisition delegation may emerge as one of
the equilibria.
Proposition 1.4.3. (Agency Problem) When M is sufficiently large, there are three cases
regarding information acquisition delegation in the economy with agency problems,
(1) when θ(2p − 1) + log[exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)2p−1 ] > 0, all equilibria are with positive
population of informed principals, and at at least one equilibrium exists.
(2) when θ(2p− 1) + log[exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)2p−1 ] < 0 and maxλ<λfb Bap(λ) > 0, there
exists at least three equilibria, one of which is λsb = 0.
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(3) when maxλ<λfb Bap(λ) < 0, the unique equilibrium is no information acquisition delegation.
That is λsb = 0.
Proposition 1.4.3 shows that agency problems may generate multiple equilibria. When the
information acquisition cost is low (first case), agency problems are not severe and principals
have incentives to hire agents. In fact, when the information acquisition cost is high (third
case), agency problems are severe and thus no principals have incentives to hire agents. In the
second interesting case when information acquisition is neither too high nor too low, agency
problems produce multiple equilibria, and non-information is one of these equilibria. When
residual uncertainty is high, principals must rely heavily on the asset price in the incentive
provision. However, when no principals hire agents to acquire information, the price does not
incorporate any information, and the incentive provision from asset price fails. Consequently,
agency problems are severe, which deters principals from hiring agents. All results are shown
in Figure 4.1.11
This proposition has implications for asset price jumps or excess volatilities. With multiple
equilibria regarding information acquisition, the economy may switch between non-information
equilibrium and high-information equilibria without any relation to fundamentals, leading to
jumps in the asset price and informativeness. Because a jump is an extreme form of excess
volatilities, the same mechanism can also cause excess volatilities in asset price and informa-
tiveness. This result implies that the price informativenesses and institutional ownership are
more volatile for small/growth stocks or during recessions, which are usually associated with
large residual uncertainties. This result also implies that price jumps and excess volatilities
are more likely to occur for small/growth stocks or during recessions, which is consistent with
Bennet, Sias and Starks (2003), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), Xu and Malkiel
(2003), Ang, Hodrick and Zhang (2006, 2009) and Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2012).
I also examine how agency problems affect asset pricing behavior. I focus on the analysis of
price informativeness and return volatility. For price informativeness, because the equilibrium
11I set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, Wa = 0, C = 0.07. I also set M = 5, M = 20 and M = 200 for low residual
uncertainty, median residual uncertainty and high residual uncertainty cases, respectively.
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Figure 1.4.1: Information Acquisition Benefit
is not a linear function of fundamental value or noisy traders’ demand, the conditional variance
V ar(D|P ) in the conventional literature is not appropriate for my analysis because this measure
depends on the price P . In accordance with Malamud and Petrov (2014), I use the price’s
expected error as price informativeness. When the price is more informative, this expected
error is lower:
E(|V − P ||V ) = θ[N − λ(2p− 1)]
N
. (1.1)
For volatility, I calculate the asset return’s volatility V ar(V − P ) as follows:
V ar(V − P ) = M
2
3
+
θ2[N − λ(2p− 1)]
N
. (1.2)
When the population of informed principals increases, both the expected error of the price
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and the volatility decrease. Before proceeding, I know that agency problems negatively affect
the net benefit from information, which decreases the prices informativeness. Then, price
becomes more sensitive to noisy traders’ demand, leading to increased volatility. I denote Bap
as the net benefit of information in an economy with agency problems, and denote Bfb as the
net benefit in the first-best problem. I find the following result:
Lemma 1.4.4. Given λ, the net benefit in the agency problem is lower than the first-best
problem. That is Bap < Bfb.
I then have the formal result regarding price informativeness and volatility.
Proposition 1.4.4. Both price’s expected error and volatility are higher in an economy with
agency problems than the first-best problem.
I examine how different parameters affect the population of informed principals. I focus on
the case in which M is small because a unique equilibrium exists in this case. When the agents’
risk aversion increases, the agency problem becomes more severe and the principals need to
provide higher compensation to agents. Thus, I expect that the equilibrium population of
informed principals decreases with agents’ risk aversion. Furthermore, when M increases, it is
more difficult for principals to monitor agents and the agency problem is exacerbated. Thus, the
equilibrium population of informed principals decreases with residual uncertainty. These results
are shown in the following figures. I note that agents’ risk aversion or residual uncertainty does
not have any impact on the population of informed principals due to the assumption regarding
principals’ risk-neutrality. These two figures show that price informativeness is low during
recessions, which are associated with large uncertainty.12
1.5 Implications
In this section, I extend the basic model in three directions to study its asset pricing implication.
First, I show that the agency problems induce principals to herd in terms of acquiring similar
12I set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, Wa = 0, γa = 1, C = 0.05 and M = 20 for analysis of agents’ risk aversion. I
set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, Wa = 0, γa = 1, and C = 0.075 for analysis of residual uncertainty M .
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Figure 1.4.2: Population of Informed Principal and Agents’ Risk Aversion
Figure 1.4.3: Population of Informed Principals and Residual Uncertainty
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information. This may explain investors’ herding behavior in trading. Second, I show that the
agency problems encourage principals to acquire disproportionately more information on assets
about which they already have an information advantage. This may explain the home/industry
bias. Moreover, I shows that the agency problems provide a new and rational explanation for
the well-known idiosyncratic volatility comovment.
1.5.1 Herding
In this section, I show that the agency problems induce principals to herd in terms of acquiring
similar information. I assume that each principal can choose to hire his agent to acquire either
an exclusive signal, which is conditionally independent and can only be acquire by his agent, or
a common signal, which can be acquired by any agent. The exclusive signal is si ∈ {h, l}. The
common signal is sc ∈ {h, l}. I assume the probabilities with which these signals are correct
are the same (p > 12):
p = prob(si = h|V = θ) = prob(si = l|V = −θ)
= prob(sc = h|V = θ) = prob(sc = l|V = −θ) .
(1.1)
Then, I have the conditional probability of V as follows:
probI(V = θ|si = h) = probI(V = −θ|si = l) = p, (1.2)
probI(V = θ|sc = h) = probI(V = −θ|sc = l) = p, (1.3)
Following the basic model, I assume that if agent i does not exert costly effort, his signal
is a pure noise. I denote probU (V |si) as probability of V conditional on signal si if si is a pure
noise. Furthermore, the information acquisition costs are the same for all signals, which are
denoted by C.
I assume that the population of principals who hire agents to acquire sc is λ, and the
population of principals who hire agents to acquire si is µ. I follow Garcia and Strobl (2011)
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to define herding equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1.5.1. Herding Equilibrium: one equilibrium is herding equilibrium if µ = 0 and
λ > 0
This definition is following Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), who define herding as any behavior
similarity caused by individuals’ interaction. Herding equilibrium occurs only if all informed
principals hire agents to acquire the common signal. As argued by Garcia and Strobl (2011), the
common signal is less valuable for principals than the exclusive signal because of competition.
Thus, without agency problems, herding equilibrium never occur. However, I show that herding
equilibrium may emerge in an economy with agency problems through the following mechanism.
There are two groups of informed principals: the first group acquires sc; the second group
acquires si. Each principal in the first group is indexed by principal i, where i ∈ [0, λ]. And
each principal in the second group is indexed by principal j, where j ∈ [0, µ]. I denote Ecp
and EIp as expected trading profits for principals in the first and second group respectively. I
denote Bcfb and B
I
fb as net benefits of information for different groups in the economy without
agency problem. Moreover, I denote Bcap and B
I
ap as net benefit of information for different
groups respectively in the economy with agency problems.
For the first group, principal i submits Xi = 1 if sc = h, and submits Xi = −1 if sc = l.
For the second group, principal j submits Xj = 1 if sj = h, and submits Xj = −1 if sj = l.
To simplify the analysis, I only focus on the herding equilibrium. On the herding equilibrium,
µ = 0. In this case, if sc = h, the total orders is X = λ + n. If sc = l, the total orders is
X = −λ + n. Thus, the total orders X is distributed on [−λ −M,λ + M ]. Receiving total
orders, the market maker sets the price as follows:
Lemma 1.5.1. Given λ > 0 and µ = 0, the price follows the rule:
P (X) =

(2p− 1)θ if N − λ < X ≤ N + λ
0 if −N + λ ≤ X ≤ N − λ
−(2p− 1)θ if −N − λ ≤ X < −N + λ
(1.4)
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To show the existence of a herding equilibrium, I need to calculate expected trading profits
for these two groups. Although there is no second group in the herding equilibrium, I also can
calculate the expected trading profit for this group assuming one principal j is the marginal
principal acquiring an exclusive signal. Then I have the following results:
Lemma 1.5.2. The expected trading profit of principals with the common signal is given by:
Ecp = (2p− 1)θ
N − λ
N
. (1.5)
Lemma 1.5.3. The expected trading profit of principals with an exclusive signal is given by:
EIp = (2p− 1)θ
N − (2p− 1)2λ
N
. (1.6)
Lemma 1.5.2 and Lemma 1.5.3 shows that the expected trading profit of principals for the
second group is higher than the first group. There is a large price impact when principals
trade similarly because of having the same information, which makes the total orders more
informative about the common signal and decreases the first group’s information advantage.
Thus, principals have higher incentives to acquire the exclusive signal than the common signal
in the economy without agency problems. However, when the residual uncertainty is sufficiently
large, principals herd to the common signals in the economy with agency problems. Herding
makes the price sensitive to the common signal. Consequently, agents have strong incentives
to acquire the common signal as they can easily forecast the asset price with this signal,
which mitigates agency problems in acquiring it. Although the exclusive signals can generate
more trading profits, agents could not easily forecast asset price with these signals because of
their idiosyncratic noises, which worsens the agency problems in acquiring these signals. This
mechanism generates the herding equilibrium. I show the formal result as follows:
Proposition 1.5.1. Comparing the economy with and without agency problems, I have
(1) no herding equilibrium occurs in the first-best;
92) when M is small enough, no herding equilibrium occurs in the economy with agency prob-
lems; (2) when − log 4p(1−p)γa < C < (2p−1)θ−Wa and M is large enough, the herding equilibrium
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exists in the economy with agency problems.
Proposition 1.5.1 shows that the herding equilibrium occurs when the residual uncertainty
is large. This result implies that herding is stronger in small/growth stocks, which have consid-
erable uncertainty. It is consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Wermers
(1999), who find that institutional investors have stronger herding behavior in small/growth
stocks. Although my model is static, it implies that institutional investors tend to follow the
lead of others. When more fund managers trade in one specific stock, others observe this and
tend to follow their lead because these followers anticipate that the price will become more
informative and the agency problems will be mitigated.
1.5.2 Home/Industry Bias
In this section, I explore the model’s implication for the home/industry bias, which is a long-
standing puzzle. As documented by Fama and Poterba (1991), Coval and Moskowitz (1999),
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Huberman (2001) and Seasholes and Zhu (2010), both house-
holds and institutions prefer to trade the assets which are located around their hometowns or
home countries. Though it is possible that some behavior biases drive home bias in house-
holds, home bias among institutional investors is still puzzling because they are sophisticated
investors. Another plausible explanation is that investors have superior information on home
assets, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) argue that investors can easily acquire infor-
mation about other assets, which could eliminate home investors’ information advantage and
mitigate home bias. Even if investors can freely acquire information, I show that home bias
still exists with agency problems in information acquisition.
I extend the basic model to consider two groups of principals: the first group has some
opportunity to get free information; the second group has no information. The first group is
interpreted as home principals based on the conventional belief that investors have an infor-
mation advantage on home assets. The population of home principals is denoted by ω. Each
principal in this group is indexed by i, where i ∈ [0, ω]. The second group is called foreign
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principals. Each principal in this group is indexed by j. Any principals can hire agents to
acquire information. Furthermore, I assume that principal i in the first group is endowed by a
private signal sh,i, which takes the form:
sh,i = {V, ∅}. (1.7)
The feature of this signal is that sh,i is a pure noise when sh,i = ∅, and it is perfectly
informative if sh,i = V . The possibility that sh,i is perfectly informative is denoted by ph:
prob(sh,i = V ) = ph, (1.8)
where 0 < ph < p. There are two differences between home and foreign principals: the first
is that home principals can use their endowed signals in trading; the second difference is that
home principals can use their endowed signals in the contracting.13 Moreover, I assume that
the population of home principals hiring agents is λ, and the population of foreign principals
hiring agents is µ. Although home principals may know the fundamental value exactly, they
also have incentives to acquire information because they have chances to become uninformed.
If the endowed signals are informative, home principals only rely on their endowed signals
in trading. Otherwise, they have to rely on signals from agents. Thus, the total orders is
X = phω + (1 − ph)(2p − 1)λω + (2p − 1)µ + n if V = θ. And the total orders is X =
−phω − (1 − ph)(2p − 1)λω − (2p − 1)µ + n if V = −θ. To simplify the analysis, I let η =
phω + (1− ph)(2p− 1)λω + (2p− 1)µ. Before proceeding, I define two home bias equilibria as
follows:
Definition 1.5.2. Weak Home Bias Equilibrium: one equilibrium is weak home bias equilib-
rium if λ > 0 and µ > 0.
Definition 1.5.3. Strong Home Bias Equilibrium: one equilibrium is strong home bias equi-
13If these signals are not verifiable, there exist some mechanisms inducing principals to reveal their private
information, such as imposing an infinite penalty when asset payoff deviates considerably from principals’
reports. The infinite penalty can be interpreted as reputation concern. One interpretation of these contracts is
the subjective evaluation. Or this type of contract can be interpreted as an implicit contract.
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librium if λ > 0 and µ = 0.
Receiving total orders, the market maker sets the price as follows:
P (X) =

θ if N − η < X ≤ N + η
0 if −N + η ≤ X ≤ N − η
−θ if −N − η ≤ X < −N + η
(1.9)
I calculate the expected trading profits for different groups. I denote E1h,p, E
2
h,p and Ef,p
as expected trading profits for home principals who hire agents, home principals who do not
hire, and informed foreign principals respectively. They are shown as follows:
Ef,p = (2p− 1)θN − η
N
, (1.10)
E1h,p = [ph + (1− ph)(2p− 1)]θ
N − η
N
, (1.11)
E2h,p = phθ
N − η
N
. (1.12)
It is clear that the gain from information for home principals is (1−ph)(2p−1)θN−ηN , which
is lower than the trading profits of informed foreign principals. This is due to the decreasing
marginal benefits of information. Thus, without agency problems, home principals have lower
incentive than foreign principals to hire agents to acquire information. However, with agency
problems, this is not the case. Home principals can use their endowed information in incentive
provision, agency problems are not severe for home principals and home principals may have
higher incentive to acquire information than foreign principals. The formal results regarding
home bias are as follows:
Proposition 1.5.2. Comparing the economy with and without agency problems, I have
(1) neither weak home bias equilibrium nor strong home bias equilibrium occurs in the first-
best;
(2) when M is small enough, neither weak home bias equilibrium nor strong home bias equi-
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librium occurs in the economy with agency problem;
(3) when both M and N are large enough, a strong herding equilibrium exists in the economy
with agency problem when θ1 < θ < θ2.
where θ1 and θ2 are defined in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.5.2 shows that home bias occurs when the residual uncertainty is large. This
result implies that home bias is stronger when investors trade small/growth stocks. It is
consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999). For example, Coval
and Moskowitz (1999) find that U.S. fund managers have a stronger home bias when they
trade small stocks. It also implies that investors tend to learn more about the assets within
their expertise. This prediction is consistent with Massa and Simonov (2006), who find that
Swedish investors buy assets highly correlated with their non-financial income.
1.5.3 Idiosyncratic Volatility Comovement
In this section, I explore the model’s implication for idiosyncratic volatility comovement, which
is documented by recent studies (see Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, 2012, Kelly, Lustig and
Van Nieuwerburgh, 2013 and Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2013). More
importantly, because recent studies (Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich and Yaron, 2014, Campbell,
Giglio, Polk, Turley, 2014 and Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2013) find
that the common factor in idiosyncratic volatilities has significant effects on asset prices, it is
important to understand the driving force. In particular, the common factor in idiosyncratic
volatilities is not related to the conventional risk factors, and the driving force is still puzzling.
I extend the basic model to consider two risky assets. Each asset is indexed by k, where
k = 1, 2. Asset k’s payoff is denoted by Dk, which has a fundamental value Vk and a residual
uncertainty k. I assume k is uniformly distributed on [−Mk,Mk], where Mk > 0. Vk takes θk
and −θk with equal probability, where θk > 0. In particular, I assume that two assets’ residual
uncertainties are independent of each other, and also are independent of the two fundamentals.
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There is a correlation between the two fundamentals as shown:
prob(V2 = θ2|V1 = θ1) = prob(V2 = −θ2|V1 = −θ1) = q, (1.13)
prob(V1 = θ1|V2 = θ2) = prob(V1 = −θ1|V2 = −θ2) = q. (1.14)
The noisy traders’ demand in asset k is denoted by nk following a uniform distribution on
[−Nk, Nk], where Nk > 0. Noisy traders’ demands are independent of other random variables.
I assume that each market has one risk-neutral market maker, who sets the price independently
from each other. The price of asset k is denoted by Pk. Furthermore, there are two groups of
principals: group k can only trade the risky asset k, perhaps due to market segmentation or
trading constraints. The population of informed principals in asset k is λk. To simplify the
analysis, I assume that λ1 is exogenous, and λ2 is endogenous. This assumption is reasonable
in many circumstances. For example, there are some insiders or home investors, who are
endowed with information. The above assumptions are helpful to make the mechanism in my
model clear. If the principals can trade both assets, it is possible that there exist other possible
effects, which may mitigate or exacerbate my mechanism (see Vayanos and Woolley, 2013 and
Cespa and Foucault, 2014). Each informed principal’s signal is denoted by sk,i. Information
structures are the same as the basic model with one risky asset. Then, I have:
probI(Vk = θk|sk,i = h) = probI(Vk = −θk|sk,i = l) = p, (1.15)
To avoid the price of asset 1 being fully informative about the fundamental, I have λ1 <
N1
2p−1 . Although the principals in group 2 can not trade the risky asset 1, they still can write
contracts on the prices and payoffs of two assets. Specifically, informed principal i in group 2
design contract pi2,i(s
R(s2,i), P1, P2, D1, D2), where s2,i is his agent’s signal and s
R(s2,i) is the
report. The reason why principals in asset 2 write this type of contracts is that two assets’
fundamentals are correlated and agents’ forecasting accuracy for the price of asset 1 is also
related to their effort. I follow the procedure in the basic model to solve the equilibrium prices,
optimal contracts, and population of informed principals in group 2. I carry out the numerical
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Figure 1.5.1: Noisy Traders in Asset 1 and Population of Informed Principals in Asset 2
studies to show how the agency problems generate the idiosyncratic volatility comovement.
Figure 5.1 shows that the population of informed principals in asset 2 decreases with the noisy
trades’ demand in asset market 1 (N1) in the economy with agency problems. Because P1 is
also informative to V1, informed principals in group 2 use the price of asset 1 to monitor their
agents. When the noisy traders’ demand becomes more volatile in asset 1, P1 becomes noisier
and is more difficult for agents on asset 2 to predict. Consequently, the agents on the asset
2 are less willing to exert effort, which worsen the agency problems and decreases principals’
incentives to hire agents on asset 2. This induces the price of asset 2 to become less informative
and more sensitive to its noisy traders’ demand, leading to increased idiosyncratic volatility
(shown in Figure 5.2). Following the same mechanism, when the population of informed
principals in group 1 increases, asset 1’s price becomes more informative and the principals in
group 2 have higher incentives to hire agents (see Figure 5.3). This result is interesting and is
related to herding on the industry level(Choi and Sias, 2009).14
14In Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, I set θ1 = θ2 = 2, M1 = M2 = 5, N2 = 2, p = 0.6, q = 0.8, C = 0.75, Wa = 0,
λ1 = 2. In Figure 6.3, θ1 = θ2 = 2, M1 = M2 = 5, N1 = N2 = 2, p = 0.6, q = 0.8, C = 0.75, Wa = 0
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Figure 1.5.2: Idiosyncratic Volatility Comovement
Figure 1.5.3: Population of Informed Principals both Asset Markets
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1.6 Generalization
My model assumes: (1) agents have CARA utilities; (2) the fundamental value V takes binary
values; (3) principals do not learn information from the asset price. This section relaxes these
assumptions and shows that the strategic complementarities are robust.
1.6.1 General Utility Function of Agents
This section shows that my results are robust when agents have a general hyperbolic absolute
risk aversion (HARA) class of utility functions. The HARA utility function is shown as
follows:
U(W ) =
γ
1− γ [
AW
γ
+K]1−γ , K ≥ 0 (1.1)
where the utility function is only defined over AWγ +K > 0. I know the absolute risk aversion
coefficient is given by:
−U
′′
U ′
=
Aγ
AW +Kγ
(1.2)
When γ < 0, this HARA utility function has an increasing absolute risk aversion, which is
implausible. Thus, I only consider the case where γ > 0. Particularly, this general HARA
utility function has several examples which are largely used in finance or economy, such as
power utility, negative exponential utility or logarithmic utility.
Assumption 1.6.1. γ satisfies: γ > 0.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that agents need to incur a utility loss if they exert effort.
This utility lose is denoted by C. Thus, the participant constraint and incentive constraints
are shown as follows:
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
{U [pii(si, P,D)]− C}f I(P,D|si)dPdD = U [Wa], (1.3)
where LHS of Equation (1.3) is agent i’s expected utility when he exerts costly effort.
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Meanwhile, Wa is the reserve wealth of agents.
Ex Ante IC which is the incentive-compatibility of effort constraint
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫ {U [pii(si, P,D)]− C}f I(P,D|si)dPdD
≥ ∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[U [pii(s
R(si), P,D)]]f
U (P,D|si)dPdD
(1.4)
Ex Post IC which is incentive-compatibility of truth reporting(∀si and sR(si) : s→ s)
∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫ {U [pii(si, P,D)]}f I(P,D|si)dPdD
≥ ∑
si={h,l}
prob(si)
∫ ∫
[U [pii(s
R(si), P,D)]]f
I(P,D|si)dPdD
(1.5)
Assumption 1.6.2. I have different cases regarding the information acquisition cost
Case 1: If γ < 1, U(Wa)− C2p−1 > 0;
Case 2: If γ > 1, U(Wa) +
C
2p−1 < 0;
Case 3: if γ = 1 and K = 0.
This assumption could ensure that the optimal contracts can be implemented and there
is interior solution to the contracting for different γ. I show that strategic complementarity
effect is robust in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.6.1. Under Assumption 1.6.1 and Assumption 1.6.2, when the agents have
HARA utility in the economy with agency problems, I have the following results:
(1)for small enough M , information acquisition delegation is a strategic substitute. That is ,
∂B
∂λ < 0.
(2) for large enough M , there exists λgc satisfying: when λ < λgc, information acquisition
delegation is a strategic complement. That is ∂B∂λ > 0.
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1.6.2 More General Distribution of V
In this section, I assume that V takes three values in θ, 0 or −θ. In particular, the distribution
of V is symmetric. The probability that V = 0 is denoted as pm. The probability of V = θ or
V = −θ is given by:
prob(V = θ) = prob(V = −θ) = (1− pm)/2, (1.6)
After exerting effort, agent i generates a private signal si ∈ {h, 0, l} about the risky asset’s
fundamental value V . The probability with which a signal is correct by
prob(si = h|V = θ) = prob(si = 0|V = 0) = prob(si = l|V = −θ) = p, (1.7)
and
prob(si = 0|V = θ) = prob(si = 0|V = −θ) = (1− p)q, (1.8)
and
prob(si = l|V = θ) = prob(si = h|V = −θ) = (1− p)(1− q), (1.9)
and
prob(si = h|V = 0) = prob(si = l|V = −θ) = (1− p)/2, (1.10)
where si is independent across agents and p ≥ 13 , while q ≥ 12 . Principal i submits Xi = 1 when
he receives report si = h, does nothing when he receives report si = 0, and submits Xi = −1
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when he receives report si = l. Then the market maker sets the price as follows:
P (X) =

θ if N < X ≤ N + λ(p− (1− p)(1− q))
θ 1−pm1+pm if N − λ(p− (1− p)(1− q)) < X ≤ N
0 if −N + λ(p− (1− p)(1− q)) ≤ X
≤ N − λ(p− (1− p)(1− q))
−θ 1−pm1+pm if −N ≤ X < −N + λ(p− (1− p)(1− q))
−θ if −N − λ(p− (1− p)(1− q)) ≤ X < −N
(1.11)
It is clear that the price increases with the total orders X. It differs from the binary-state
case on the feature that the price takes five values. This difference also shows that the problem
will become extremely complicate when I consider more a general distribution of V . I carry
out the numerical studies to show that information acquisition complementarities is robust
in Figure 6.1, as is the relation between residual uncertainty/agents’ risk aversion and price
informativeness in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.15
1.6.3 Learning
This section shows that my results are robust when principals learn information from the asset
price. To obtain analytical solution in the non-linear REE, I modify the information structure
and the distribution of residual uncertainty. I assume that the residual uncertainty  follows
normal distribution N(0, σ2M ). The private signal acquired by agent i is denoted by si. Through
the costly effort ei ∈ {0, e}, the joint distributions of his signal si and the fundamental value
V is a mixture distribution as follows:
(b+ ei)f
I(si, V ) + (1− b− ei)fU (si, V ), (1.12)
15I set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, pm = 0.5, q = 0.6, Wa = 0, C = 0.07. I also set M = 5, M = 20 and M = 200
for low residual uncertainty, median residual uncertainty and high residual uncertainty cases respectively in
Figure 6.1. Then set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, pm = 0.5, q = 0.6, Wa = 0, gammaa = 1, C = 0.05 and M = 20
for analysis of agents’ risk aversion in Figure 6.2. I set θ = 2, N = 2, p = 0.6, pm = 0.5, q = 0.6, Wa = 0,
gammaa = 1, and C = 0.075 for analysis of residual uncertainty M in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 1.6.1: Information Acquisition Benefit: Triple-State Case
Figure 1.6.2: Population of Informed Principal and Agents’ Risk Aversion: Triple-State Case
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Figure 1.6.3: Population of Informed Principal and Residual Uncertainty: Triple-State Case
where e > 0 and b+ e < 1. Here, f I is an ”informed” distribution and fU in an ”uninformed”
distribution. I assume that si and V are independent in the uninformed distribution. Moreover,
I assume that the probability density of si is: f(si) =
1
2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(si−θ)2
2σ2 +12
1√
2piσ
exp−
(si+θ)
2
2σ2 .
Meanwhile, ”informed” joint distribution f I(si, V ) =
1
2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(si−V )2
2σ2 , while ”uninformed”
joint distribution fU (si, V ) =
1
2f(si).
One interpretation of the mixture model is that the signals observed by the agents may be
informative or not and the agents cannot tell which occurs. In particular, when agents exert
efforts, the probabilities that the signals are informative increase. Meanwhile, the mixture
model is a simple sufficient condition when I implement the first-order approach to solve the
optimal contracts in a general space. Without a loss of generality, I only consider moral hazard
problems in information acquisition. This implies that principals could observe the realized
signals acquired by agents, but they could not observe whether the agents exert efforts. Moral
hazard problems in information acquisitions can be interpreted in many realistic circumstances,
such as data collection. Thus, principal i’s objective function is as follows:
max
pii(si,P,D),Xi(si,pii,P )
∫
f(si)
∫ ∫
[W0 +Xi(D − P )− pii(si, P,D)]f I(P,D|si)dPdDdsi, (1.13)
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where Xi(si, pii, P ) is principal i’s demand function conditional on the price P and the signal
si reported by his agent. He maximizes his utility function subject to his agent’s participant
constraint and incentive compatibility as follows:
PC:
∫
f(si)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(si,P,D)+γaC ]f I(P,D|si)dPdDdsi = − exp(−γaWa), (1.14)
IC: ∫
f(si)
∫ ∫
[− exp−γapii(si,P,D)+γaC ]f I(P,D|si)dPdDdsi
≥ ∫ f(si) ∫ ∫ [− exp−γapii(si,P,D)+γaC ]fU (P,D|si)dPdDdsi, (1.15)
where f I(P,D|si) is the conditional probability density given that the agent i exerts effort,
and fU (P,D|si) is the conditional probability density given that the agent i shirks.
Now, I assume that there is one continuum of principals and the population of principals hir-
ing agents to acquire information is λ. For the informed principal i, the probability density of si
conditional on V = θ is denoted by ηI,i,h, where ηI,i,h =
1+b+e
2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s−θ)2
2σ2 +1−e−b2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s+θ)2
2σ2 ;
the probability density of si conditional on V = −θ is denoted by ηI,i,l, where ηI,i,l =
1+b+e
2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s+θ)2
2σ2 +1−e−b2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s−θ)2
2σ2 . For the uninformed principal i,the probability
density of si conditional on V = θ is denoted byηU,i,h, where ηU,i,h =
1+b
2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s−θ)2
2σ2 +1−b2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s+θ)2
2σ2 ;
the probability density of si conditional on V = −θ is denoted byηU,i,l, where ηU,i,l = 1+b2 1√2piσ exp
− (s+θ)2
2σ2 +1−b2
1√
2piσ
exp−
(s−θ)2
2σ2 .
Due to the assumption about risk-neutral principals, the optimal contracts and asset pricing
can be solved separately as our basic model. I solve the model following step-by-step: (1) in
the first step, I solve the asset pricing; (2) in the second step, I solve the optimal contract
given the population of informed principals; (3)in the third step, I calculate the net benefit of
information acquisition to show the strategic complementaries.
Asset Pricing In order to maximize the final wealth, it is necessary to compute the
conditional expectation of V for different groups. According to the Bayes’s rule, the posterior
probability pK(si, P ) of state h for principal i of type K after observing si and P is given by:
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pK(si, P ) =
fh(P )ηK,i,h
fh(P )ηK,i,h + fl(P )ηK,i,l
(1.16)
where fω(P ), ω = h, l is the probability density of the equilibrium price conditional on
the corresponding state of the world. Given the posterior probabilities, principals’ demand
schedules are shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.6.1. For any K = I, U , there exists a threshold XK(P ) such that the demand
schedule for principal i of type K is given by:
XK,i =

1 if si ≥ XK(P ) ,
−1 if si < XK(P ) ,
(1.17)
where the threshold XK(P ) is uniquely determined by the condition:
pK(XK(P ), P ) =
P + θ
2θ
. (1.18)
Having showing the demand schedules, the aggregate demand can be calculated as follows.
Conditional on V = θ, the aggregate demand is given by
D(P, θ) = λ[1− (1 + b+ e)Φ(XI(P )− θ)− (1− b− e)Φ(XI(P ) + θ)] (1.19)
+(1− λ)[1− (1 + b)Φ(XU (P )− θ)− (1− b)Φ(XU (P ) + θ)]; (1.20)
conditional on V = −θ, the aggregate demand is given by
D(P,−θ) = λ[1− (1 + b+ e)Φ(XI(P ) + θ)− (1− b− e)Φ(XI(P )− θ)] (1.21)
+(1− λ)[1− (1 + b)Φ(XU (P ) + θ)− (1− b)Φ(XU (P )− θ)], (1.22)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for normal distribution N(0, σ2). Consequently,
given realized demand from noisy traders, the market clearing condition takes the form as
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follows:
D(P, V ) = n (1.23)
Thus, the probability density of price P conditional on the value V is denoted as fi(P ). They
are calculated as follows:
fh(P ) =
λ
2N [(1 + b+ e)φ(XI(P )− θ) + (1− b− e)φ(XI(P ) + θ)]X
′
I(P )
+ (1−λ)2N [(1 + b)φ(XU (P )− θ) + (1− b)φ(XU (P ) + θ)]X
′
U (P )
(1.24)
fl(P ) =
λ
2N [(1 + b+ e)φ(XI(P ) + θ) + (1− b− e)φ(XI(P )− θ)]X
′
I(P )
+ (1−λ)2N [(1 + b)φ(XU (P ) + θ) + (1− b)φ(XU (P )− θ)]X
′
U (P )
(1.25)
where φ is the probability density function for the normal distribution N(0, σ2). The key to
solve the asset pricing is to solve the thresholds XI and XU . I follow Malamud and Petrov
(2014) to solve both. I denote the likelihood ratio by:
LK(X) = ηK,i,h/ηK,i,l. (1.26)
From the Lemma 1.6.1, I have the following condition:
LI(XI(P )) = LU (XU (P )). (1.27)
Thus, the relation between XU (P ) and XI(P ) is: XU (P ) = L
−1
U (LI(XI(P ))). It indicates that
the solution of XI can characterize the asset pricing. I have the following result regarding XI ,
XU and the probability density of price P :
Proposition 1.6.2. There exists a monotone increasing, absoluately continuous solution
XI(P ), P ∈ (−θ, θ) to
2 logLK(XI(P )) = log
P + θ
θ − P .
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Meanwhile, XI(P ), XU (P ) = L
−1
U (LK(XI(P ))) and
fh(P ) =
λ
2N [(1 + b+ e)φ(XI(P )− θ) + (1− b− e)φ(XI(P ) + θ)]X
′
I(P )
+ (1−λ)2N [(1 + b)φ(XU (P )− θ) + (1− b)φ(XU (P ) + θ)]X
′
U (P )
, (1.28)
and
fl(P ) =
λ
2N [(1 + b+ e)φ(XI(P ) + θ) + (1− b− e)φ(XI(P )− θ)]X
′
I(P )
+ (1−λ)2N [(1 + b)φ(XU (P ) + θ) + (1− b)φ(XU (P )− θ)]X
′
U (P )
(1.29)
form a rational expectations equilibrium.
Contracting I use the first-order approach to solve the optimal contracts. First, I let l1
and l2 be the Lagrange multipliers on the PC and IC. I can get the expression for optimal
compensation as follows:
pi(si, P,D) =
log(l1 + l2 − l2 exp
−γaC fU (P,D|si)
fI(P,D|si) ) + log(γa)
γa
(1.30)
Net Benefit of Information Now I calculate the net benefit of information. Conditional
on the fundamental value V and asset price P , the expected trading profit of principal i of
type K = I, U is calculated by:
EK,h,P = prob(si < XK(P )|V = θ, P )(P − θ) + prob(si ≥ XK(P )|V = θ, P )(θ − P )
= 1+b+e2 Φ(XK − θ)(P − θ) + 1−b−e2 Φ(XK + θ)(P − θ)
+1+b+e2 [1− Φ(XK − θ)](θ − P ) + 1−b−e2 [1− Φ(XK + θ)](θ − P ),
(1.31)
EK,l,P = prob(si < XK(P )|V = −θ, P )(P + θ) + prob(si ≥ XK(P )|V = −θ, P )(−θ − P )
= 1+b+e2 Φ(XK + θ)(P + θ) +
1−b−e
2 Φ(XK − θ)(P + θ)
+1+b+e2 [1− Φ(XK + θ)](−θ − P ) + 1−b−e2 [1− Φ(XK − θ)](−θ − P ).
(1.32)
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Figure 1.6.4: Information Acquisition Benefit: Learning Case
Then, the expected trading profit for different groups of principals is as follows:
EK =
1
2
∫
EK,h,P fh(P )dP +
1
2
∫
EK,l,P fl(P )dP. (1.33)
Consequently, the net benefit from information is: B = EI − EU − E(pi). Now, I numerically
show that the strategic complementarities are robust when the residual uncertainty has large
variance in the following figure.16
1.7 Conclusion
I show that optimal contracts depend on the accuracy of agents’ forecasts for the asset prices
and payoffs. Agents receive high compensation when they produce an accurate forecast. The
bonus, as a reward for an accurate forecast, decreases with price informativeness and increases
with residual uncertainty of the asset payoffs. When the price becomes more informative
or the residual uncertainty decreases, agents can forecast the asset prices or payoffs more
accurately with information. Consequently, agents are more willing to exert efforts in acquiring
16I set θ = 0.5, σ = 1, Wa = 0, C = 0.1, N = 10 σM = 50
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information. Thus, the principals can decrease the bonus. These results predict that the
bonus is larger for professionals, who trade or cover small/growth stocks with larger residual
uncertainty or assets with lower institutional ownership.
More importantly, I show that agency problems in delegated information acquisition play
important roles in shaping institutional investors’ behavior and asset pricing. The novelty
of my model is that agency problems generate a strategic complementarities in information
acquisition delegation. When more principals hire agents to acquire information, the price
becomes less noisy, which make it easier for agents to forecast. Therefore, agents are more
willing to exert effort, thereby mitigating agency problems. In turn, other principals are more
willing to hire agents. These strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria, which
have implications for jumps and excess volatilities in asset prices or price informativeness. In
particular, multiple equilibria occur when the asset payoff’s residual uncertainty is large. This
can provide a potential explanation for observed excess volatilities in small/growth stocks or
during recessions. My results also predict that price informativeness or institutional ownership
tend to have jumps for small/growth stocks. The extensions of this model demonstrate that
the agency problems could provide explanations for some phenomena, including idiosyncratic
volatility comovement, herding behavior and home/industry bias. Moreover, my model predicts
that the herding or home/industry bias is stronger for small/growth stocks.
The driving force for my results is as follows: the price becomes more informative when more
principals hire agents to acquire information, which mitigates agency problems. Thus, it is
clear that the assumptions about risk-averse principals will not overturn the main mechanisms.
However, relaxing these assumptions is interesting. If principals are risk-averse, I expect that
the optimal contract will consist of two components: the first is agents’ forecasting accuracy,
and the second is proportional fee attributable to risk sharing. I leave this extension for further
study.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proofs
This appendix provides all proofs omitted above.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1. If λ ≥ N2p−1 , market maker will know that V = θ if X > −N +
λ(2p− 1) and V = −θ if X < N − λ(2p− 1). Then market makers will always set P = V . If
this is the case, informed investors’ trading will always equals to zero because Xi(V −P ) = 0.
If the trading profit is zero, investors have no incentive to acquire information. Thus I can
conclude that the population of informed investors can not be larger than N2p−1 .
Proof of Lemma 1.3.2. On the support [−λ(2p−1)−N,λ(2p−1)+N ], the conditional pdf
of X follows
f(X|V = θ) =

1 if −N + λ(2p− 1) ≤ X ≤ N + λ(2p− 1)
0 if X < −N + λ(2p− 1)
(1.1)
f(X|V = −θ) =

0 if X > N − λ(2p− 1)
1 if −N − λ(2p− 1) ≤ X ≤ N − λ(2p− 1)
(1.2)
Using Bayesian updating, prob(V = θ|X) =
1
2
f(X|V=θ)
1
2
f(X|V=θ)+ 1
2
f(X|V=−θ) . Thus conditional on X,
market maker’s belief about probability of V = θ follows:
prob(V = θ|X) =

1 if N − λ(2p− 1) < X ≤ N + λ(2p− 1)
1
2 if −N + λ(2p− 1) ≤ X ≤ N − λ(2p− 1)
1 if −N − λ(2p− 1) ≤ X ≤ −N + λ(2p− 1)
(1.3)
Then because P = prob(V = θ|X)θ − [1− prob(V = θ|X)]θ, I can get the price function.
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Proof of Lemma 1.3.3 and Lemma 1.3.4. Step 1 f I(P = θ,D, si = h) = f
I(P = θ,D|si =
h)× prob(si = h).Then
f I(P = θ,D, si = h) = prob(P = θ, si = h)× f I(D|P = θ, si = h)
= prob(V = θ, si = h)× prob(N − λ(2p− 1) ≤ n ≤ N + λ(2p− 1))× f I(D|P = θ, si = h)
=

1
2M
p
2
λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
0 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.4)
Since prob(si = h) =
1
2 , I can get t f
I(P = θ,D|si = h) in the Lemma.
Step 2 f I(P = −θ,D, si = h) = f I(P = −θ,D|si = h)× prob(si = h). Then
f I(P = −θ,D, si = h) = prob(P = −θ, si = h)× f I(D|P = −θ, si = h)
= prob(V = −θ, si = h)× prob(N − λ(2p− 1) ≤ n ≤ −N + λ(2p− 1))× f I(D|P = −θ, si = h)
=

0 if M − θ < D ≤M + θ
1
2M
1−p
2
λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D ≤M − θ
(1.5)
Since prob(si = h) =
1
2 , I can get f
I(P = −θ,D|si = h) in the Lemma.
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Step 3 f I(P = 0, D, si = h) = f
I(P = 0, D|si = h)× prob(si = h). Then
f I(P = 0, D, si = h) = prob(P = 0, si = h)× f I(D|P = 0, si = h)
= prob(V = θ, si = h)× prob(−N + λ(2p− 1) ≤ n ≤ N − λ(2p− 1))× f I(D|P = θ, si = h)
+prob(V = −θ, si = h)× prob(−N + λ(2p− 1) ≤ n ≤ N − λ(2p− 1))× f I(D|P = −θ, si = h)
=

p
4M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
1
4M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
1−p
4M
N−λ(2p−1)
N if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.6)
Step 4: Then Lemma 1.3.3 and Lemma 1.3.4 can be derived following the same process
above.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. I prove this proposition in two steps.
Step 1 (proof of existence and uniquess)
max
vi(si,P,D)
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2
∫ ∫
1
γa
log[vi(si, P,D)]f
I(P,D|si)dD, (1.7)
subject to participation constraint:
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2
vi(si, P,D)f
I(P,D|si)dD = exp−γaWa−γaC (1.8)
Then I let f =
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2
∫ ∫
log[vi(si, P,D)]f
I(P,D|si)dD and then
D1= {−
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2
vi(si, P,D)f
I(P,D|si)dD ≥ − exp−γaWa−γaC} (1.9)
It is obvious that f is a strictly concave function and D1 is convex. Then I can conclude
that the local maximum of f over D1 is a global solution to this optimization. This implies
that the solution in the first-order approach is the global solution to this problem.
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Step 2: (Solution). I denote Lagrange multiplier of by λ1. Then I can get vi(si, P,D) =
1
γa
1
λ1
and 1γaλ1 = exp
−γaWa−γaC . Then I can conclude that pii(si, P,D) = Wa + C.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2. Step 1 (proof of existence and uniquess in the second-best)
The second-best case is proposed by Dybvig et al. (2010) where the principals are able to
observe agents’ signals, but are not able to observe agents’ hidden actions. Thus, there is not
misreporting problem. Then I will show that the agency problem in my study is equivalent to
this second-best case since the signals or fundamental value V take binary states. Particularly,
the IC in the second-best case is:
∑
si={h,l}
1
2
∫ ∫
vi(si, P,D)[f
I(P,D|si)− exp−γaC fU (P,D|si)]dPdD ≤ 0 (1.10)
Then I let f =
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2
∫ ∫
log[vi(si, P,D)]f
I(P,D|si)dD and then
D2= {−
∑
si={h,l}
∑
P={−θ,0,θ}
1
2vi(si, P,D)f
I(P,D|si)dD ≥ − exp−γaWa−γaC ;∑
si={h,l}
1
2
∫ ∫
vi(si, P,D)[f
I(P,D|si)− exp−γaC fU (P,D|si)]dPdD ≤ 0}
vi(si, P,D) ≥ 0
(1.11)
It is obvious that f is a strictly concave function over D2, while D2 is convex. Then I can
conclude that the local maximum of f over D2 is a global solution to this optimization. This
implies that the solution in the first-order approach is the global solution to this problem.
Step 2 (case when p = 1). The first order condition should be:
1 = [λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp
−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) ]γavi(si, P,D) (1.12)
When p = 1, if λ2 > 0 I have following cases:
when si = h and P = −θ: λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp
−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) = −∞ (1.13)
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when si = h , P = 0 and −M−θ ≤ D < −M+θ: λ1+λ2−λ2 exp
−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) = −∞ (1.14)
when si = l and P = θ: λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp
−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) = −∞ (1.15)
when si = l , P = 0 and M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ: λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp
−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) = −∞ (1.16)
First-order approach will fail here and this indicates that λ2 = 0. When λ2 = 0, I can
conclude that IC will not be binding. I substitute 1 = λ1γavi(si, P,D) into PC and get
1
λ1γa
= exp−γaWa−γaC . Then I can get result shown in the proposition.
Step 3: (case when p < 1). I denote Lagrange multiplier of PC by λ
′
1 and Lagrange
multiplier of IC by λ
′
2 . Then I can get
1 = [λ
′
1 + λ
′
2 − λ
′
2
exp−γaC f(P,D)
f I(P,D|si) ]γavi(si, P,D) (1.17)
Then I let: λ1 = λ
′
1γa, λ2 = λ
′
2γa and q = exp
−γaC (where q < 1)
From Lemma 1.3.3 and Lemma 1.3.4, I know that:
(1) When si = h,
1
vi(si = h, P = θ,D)
= λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q
2p
(1.18)
1
vi(si = h, P = −θ,D) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
q
2(1− p) (1.19)
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1vi(si = h, P = 0, D)
=

λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2p if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
λ1 + λ2 − λ2q if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2(1−p) if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.20)
(2) When si = l,
1
vi(si = l, P = θ,D)
= λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q
2(1− p) (1.21)
1
vi(si = l, P = −θ,D) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
q
2p
(1.22)
1
vi(si = l, P = 0, D)
=

λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2(1−p) if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
λ1 + λ2 − λ2q if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2p if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.23)
To simplify the analysis, I let x = λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2p and y = λ1 + λ2 − λ2 q2(1−p) . Then it is
clear that I have λ1 + λ2 − λ2q = px+ (1− p)y. I substitute vi(si = l, P = 0, D) into PC and
IC.
Step 4 (case when p < 1). After rearrangment, I have:
1
xp
λ(2p−1)
N +
1
x
pθ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N +
1
px+(1−p)y
M−θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N
+ 1y
(1−p)θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N +
1
y (1− p)λ(2p−1)N = exp−γaWa−γaC
(1.24)
1
y
=
1
x
+
exp−γaWa(1− exp−γaC)
(p− 12)(λ(2p−1)N + θM N−λ(2p−1)N )
(1.25)
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I let a1 =
λ(2p−1)
N +
θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N , a2 =
exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)
p−0.5 , then I have y =
a1x
a1+a2x
. From the
above two equations, I have:
a1
x
+
1− a1
px+ (1− p) a1xa1+a2x
= exp−γaWa −exp
−γaWa(1− exp−γaC)
2p− 1 (1.26)
I let g(x) = a1x +
1−a1
px+(1−p) a1x
a1+a2x
. It is obvious that g(x) is a decreasing function of x when
x > 0. This concludes that there exists unique solution. Let b = exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)2p−1 .
It is obvious that there is one unique positive solution when b > 0. I have:
x =
−[ba1+(1−p)a1a2−a2]+
√
[ba1+(1−p)a1a2−a2]2+4bpa2a1
2bpa2
and y = a1xa1+a2x
Step 5: Now I prove that this second-best is equivalent to the agency problem in my model.
I need to prove that agents’ utility in truth telling is higher than that when they misreport after
receiving informative signals, while agents’ utility in truth telling in information acquisition is
higher than that when they randomly reports without any information. This is to prove that :
1
xp
λ(2p−1)
N +
1
x
pθ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N +
1
px+(1−p)y
M−θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N
+ 1y
(1−p)θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N +
1
y (1− p)λ(2p−1)N
≤ 1ypλ(2p−1)N + 1y pθM N−λ(2p−1)N + 1px+(1−p)y M−θM N−λ(2p−1)N
+ 1x
(1−p)θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N +
1
x(1− p)λ(2p−1)N
(1.27)
Since 1y >
1
x and p >
1
2 , it is easy to show the above inequality always holds.
Proof of Corollary 1.3.1 and Proof of Proposition 1.3.3 . First, because y = a1xa1+a2x ,
it is obvious that Sf =
1
γa
log(1+ exp
−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)
p−0.5
x
λ(2p−1)
N
+ θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N
). I let z = xλ(2p−1)
N
+ θ
M
N−λ(2p−1)
N
.
For Sf , the signs of
∂Sf
∂λ and
∂Sf
∂M depend on
∂z
∂λ and
∂z
∂M respectively. For the equation
a1
x +
1−a1
px+(1−p) a1x
a1+a2x
= b, the LHS is decreasing with z and decrease with a1. Because RHS is
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constant with a1, then I know that
∂z
∂a1
< 0. Then I have
∂z
∂λ
=
∂z
∂a1
(1− θ
M
)
(2p− 1)
N
< 0 (1.28)
∂z
∂M
= − ∂z
∂a1
θ
M2
N − λ(2p− 1)
N
> 0 (1.29)
From equation, it is clear that when θ = M , I have ∂z∂λ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1 and Proposition 1.4.1. When si = h, I know that Xi = 1; When
si = l, Xi = −1. So I can calculate expected trading profit as follows:
Ep = prob(si = h)E(D − P |si = h) + prob(si = l)E(P − P |si = l) (1.30)
= θ(2p− 1)N − λ(2p− 1)
N
(1.31)
Then it is obvious that ∂B∂λ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.2. Let K = 12a1 log(x)+
1
2a1 log(y)+(1−a1) log[px+(1−p)y], I can
get B = θ(2p−1)N−λ(2p−1)N −K. Then∂B∂λ = − θ(2p−1)
2
N − ∂K∂a1 ∂a1∂λ = −
θ(2p−1)2
N − ∂K∂a1 (1− θM )
θ(2p−1)
N .
Step 1 (M is small enough) I know that for M > θ, limM→θ ∂B∂λ = − θ(2p−1)
2
N < 0. Because
∂B
∂λ is a continuous function, this implies that there exists a cutoff M
c satisfying M < M c,
∂B
∂λ < 0.
Step 2 (M is large enough) I know that forM = +∞, limλ→0 ∂B∂λ = − θ(2p−1)
2
N −lima1→0 ∂K∂a1
θ(2p−1)
N
lima1→0
∂K
∂a1
= lima1→0{12 log(x) + 12 log(y)− log[px+ (1− p)y]
+12a1
1
x
∂x
∂a1
+ 12a1
1
y
∂y
∂a1
+ (1− a1) 1px+(1−p)y [p ∂x∂a1 + (1− p)
∂y
∂a1
]}
(1.32)
Because y = a1xa1+a2x , I know that lima1→0 x =
1
bp , lima1→0 y = 0, lima1→0
∂x
∂a1
= finite
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lima1→0
∂y
∂a1
= lima1→0(
x
a1+a2x
− a1x
(a1+a2x)2
+ a1a1+a2x
∂x
∂a1
− a1x
(a1+a2x)2
∂x
∂a1
) = finite.
Thus I can obtain lima1→0
∂K
∂a1
= −∞. Then I can conclude that when M is large enough
and λ small enough, ∂B∂λ > 0. This concludes my proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.3. Step 1. When λ = 0, I know that Bap(0) = θ(2p− 1) + log b.
Step 2. If Bap(0) < 0 and maxλ<λfb B(λ) < 0, the unique equilibrium is no information
acquisition equilibrium.
Step 3. If Bap(0) < 0 and maxλ<λfb Bap(λ) > 0, I prove that there exist three equilibria.
The first one is non-information acquisition equilibrium becasue Bap(0) < 0 and
∂Bap(0)
∂λ > 0.
I let λ∗ be the solution to maxλ<λfb B(λ). Then there exists one solution in (0, λ
∗). Moreover,
because Bap < Bfb, I know that B(λfb) < 0, thus exists one solution in (λ
∗, λfb). Step 4. If
Bap(0) > 0, because Bap(λfb) < 0, then there exists at least one positive solution in (0, λfb)
Proof of Proposition 1.4.4. This result is direct because I know that Bap < Bfb.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.1. I know that E(V |X) = θp(V = θ|X) − θp(V = −θ|X). Then
because p(V = θ|X) = p(V=θ,X)P (X) ,then I have:
p(V = θ,X) =

p
2 if N − λ < X ≤ N + λ
1
2 if −N + λ ≤ X ≤ N − λ
1−p
2 if −N − λ ≤ X < −N + λ
(1.33)
p(V = −θ,X) =

1−p
2 if N − λ < X ≤ N + λ
1
2 if −N + λ ≤ X ≤ N − λ
p
2 if −N − λ ≤ X < −N + λ
(1.34)
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Then I have:
p(V = θ|X) =

p if N − λ < X ≤ N + λ
1
2 if −N + λ ≤ X ≤ N − λ
1− p if −N − λ ≤ X < −N + λ
(1.35)
Thus, I conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.2. The proof is shown as follows:
Ecp = p(sc = h)E(V − P |sc = h) + p(sc = l)E(P − V |sc = l)
= (2p− 1)θN−λN
(1.36)
Proof of Lemma 1.5.3. Because
E(P |sj = h) = (2p− 1)θ ∗ prob(sc = h|sj = h) λN
−(2p− 1)θ ∗ prob(sc = l|sj = h) λN
= θ λN (2p− 1)3
(1.37)
Following the same logic, I can get E(P |sj = l) = −θ λN (2p−1)3. Then I calculate expected
trading profit of investors who acquire private signal as:
EIp = (2p− 1)θN−(2p−1)
2λ
N
(1.38)
Proof of Proposition 1.5.1. Step 1. I prove that no herding equilibrium occurs in the econ-
omy without agency problem. Following the analaysis of optimal contract, I know that the
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payments pi = Wa + C. Then when λ > 0 and µ = 0 in the herding equilibriu, I will have
Ecp−Wa−C = 0 > EIp−Wa−C. Because this is impossible, I conclude that herding equilibrium
will not occur.
Step 2. I calculate the optimal payment scheme provided by principals who acquire sc in the
herding equilibrium. Because f I(P = −(2p−1)θ,D|sc = h) = f I(P = (2p−1)θ,D|sc = l) = 0,
the optimal scheme following the proof of Proposition 2.2, I know that
pi(P = −(2p− 1)θ, sc = h,D) = pi(P = (2p− 1)θ, sc = l,D) = −∞ (1.39)
Otherweise, pi = Wa + C.
Step 3. I calculate the optimal payment scheme provided by principals who acquire si in
the herding equilibrium in this step. Before calculation of optimal payment scheme, I calculate
pdf of P and D conditional on si. To simply the analysis, I only consider the case when M
goes to infinity. When M goes to infinity, I know that pdf of P and D conditional on si is
equivalent to pdf of P conditional on si. Then I have the following cases if agents acquire
information:
probI(P |si = h) =

λ[p2+(1−p)2]
N if P = (2p− 1)θ
N−λ
N if P = 0
2λp(1−p)
N if P = −(2p− 1)θ
(1.40)
probI(P |si = l) =

2λp(1−p)
N if P = (2p− 1)θ
N−λ
N if P = 0
λ[p2+(1−p)2]
N if P = −(2p− 1)θ
(1.41)
Then I have the following cases if agents do not acquire information:
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probU (P ) =

λ
2N if P = (2p− 1)θ
N−λ
N if P = 0
λ
2N if P = −(2p− 1)θ
(1.42)
Following the first-order approach in above proof, I know that
1
v(si = h, P = (2p− 1)θ) =
1
v(si = l, P = −(2p− 1)θ) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
exp(−γaC)
2[p2 + (1− p)2] (1.43)
1
v(si = h, P = −(2p− 1)θ) =
1
v(si = l, P = (2p− 1)θ) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
exp(−γaC)
4p(1− p) (1.44)
1
v(si = h, P = 0)
=
1
v(si = l, P = 0)
= λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp(−γaC) (1.45)
I let p1 = p
2 + (1− p)2, x1 = λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp(−γaC)2p1 , y1 = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
exp(−γaC)
2(1−p1) , a11 =
λ
N ,
a21 =
exp(−γaWa)(1−exp−γaC)
p1−0.5 and b1 = exp
−γaWa − exp(−γaWa)(1−exp−γaC)2p1−1 . When b1 < 0, the
solution to solve the optimal contract does not exists.
Step 4. If exp−γaWa − exp(−γaWa)(1−exp−γaC)2p1−1 < 0 and Ecp = (2p− 1)θN−λN −Wa − C > 0 for
some positive λ, I can get the results in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.2. Step 1. In the first-best case, it is clear that the optimal pay-
ment scheme is constant. That is pi = Wa+C. Because the net befit of information acquisition
for home investors is (1 − ph)(2p − 1)θN−ηN − Wa − C and the net benefit of information
acquisition for foreign investors is (2p− 1)θN−ηN −Wa − C. If λ > 0, this indicates that
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(1− ph)(2p− 1)θN − η
N
−Wa − C = 0 (1.46)
Moreover, this indicates that (2p−1)θN−ηN −Wa−C > 0. Thus, it implies that µ should be
infinity. This is impossible because price will be fully revealing when µ goes to infinity. Then
trading profit will become zero and this violate the assumption that (1 − ph)(2p − 1)θN−ηN −
Wa − C = 0. Therefore, I can conclude that λ = 0. This implies that neither weak herding
equilibrium not strong herding equilibrium occur in the first-best case.
Step 2. I only prove that strong herding equilibrium occurs under some condition in the
economy with agency problem. Particularly, I try to find the condition under which λ = 1
and µ = 0. For the foreign investors, the approach to solve the optimal contract is simila to
the proof of Proposition 3.2. I only replace λ(2p − 1) with η in the proof. When both of M
and N go to infinity, I know that net benefit of information acquisition for foreign investors is
Bf,ap(0) = (2p− 1)θ + log[exp−γaWa − exp
−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)
2p−1 ].
Step 3. I take the following steps to solve the optimal contract for the home investors. The
conditional pdf of sh,i when si is informative is shown as follows:
probI(sh,i|si = h) =

php if sh,i = θ
1− ph if sh,i = ∅
ph(1− p) if sh,i = −θ
(1.47)
probI(sh,i|si = l) =

ph(1− p) if sh,i = θ
1− ph if sh,i = ∅
php if sh,i = −θ
(1.48)
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The conditional pdf of sh,i when si is uninformative is shown as follows:
probU (sh,i) =

ph
2 if sh,i = θ
1
2 if sh,i = ∅
ph
2 if sh,i = −θ
(1.49)
Following the first-order approach in proof of Proposition, I know that
1
v(si = h, sh,i = θ)
=
1
v(si = l, sh,i = −θ) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2
exp(−γaC)
2p
(1.50)
1
v(si = h, sh,i = −θ) =
1
v(si = l, sh,i = θ)
= λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp(−γaC)
2(1− p) (1.51)
1
v(si = h, sh,i = ∅) =
1
v(si = l, sh,i = ∅) = λ1 + λ2 − λ2 exp(−γaC) (1.52)
This is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2, I let x = λ1+λ2−λ2 exp(−γaC)2p , y = λ1+λ2−
λ2
exp(−γaC)
2(1−p) , a12 = ph, a22 =
exp(−γaWa)(1−exp−γaC)
p−0.5 and b2 = exp
−γaWa − exp(−γaWa)(1−exp−γaC)2p−1 .
Following proof of Proposition 4.2, I know that the net benefit of informaiton acquisition
for home investors is Bh,ap(ph) = (1− ph)(2p− 1)θ−K (where K = 12ph log(x) + 12ph log(y) +
(1− ph) log[px+ (1− p)y] ).
When ph = 0, I know that Bh,ap(0) = (2p − 1)θ + log[exp−γaWa − exp
−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)
2p−1 ].
Then I denote the derivative of Bh,ap(ph) with ph by
∂Bh,ap
∂ph
. Then I know that for very
small positive , I know that Bh,ap() = (2p − 1)θ + log[exp−γaWa − exp
−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)
2p−1 ] +
 ∗ ∂Bh,ap∂ph . Because
∂Bh,ap(0)
∂ph
is infinity and θ is not in the function Bh,ap, there exists small
enough θ satisfying (2p − 1)θ + log[exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC)2p−1 ] = −. In this case, I
know that Bh,ap() > 0 and Bh,ap(0) < 0. I let θ1 =
− log[exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC )
2p−1 ]−
2p−1 and
θ2 =
− log[exp−γaWa − exp−γaWa (1−exp−γaC )
2p−1 ]
2p−1 . This implies foreign investors never have incentive
to acquire information, but home investors have incentive to acquire informtion under the
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condition:θ1 < θ < θ2.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.1. Following the similar process in the proof of Proposition 1.3.2
and Proposition 1.4.2, I know that
pii(si = h, P = θ,D) = pii(si = l, P = −θ,D) = pi1 (1.53)
pii(si = h, P = −θ,D) = pii(si = l, P = θ,D) = pi3 (1.54)
pii(si = h, P = 0, D) =

pi1 if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
pi2 if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
pi3 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.55)
pii(si = l, P = 0, D) =

pi3 if M − θ ≤ D ≤M + θ
pi2 if −M + θ ≤ D < M − θ
pi1 if −M − θ ≤ D < −M + θ
(1.56)
As I know thatpi1 > pi2 > pi3 if all PC and IC in the second-best are binding as shown
below. Then it is similar as proof of Proposition 1.3.2, I know that this contract can satisfies
ex ante IC and ex post IC. Then I let U1 = U(pi1),U2 = U(pi2) and U3 = U(pi3). Particularly,
the PC and IC follows:
a1pU1 + (1− a1)U2 + a1(1− p)U3 = U(Wa) + C (1.57)
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U1 = U3 +
C
a1(p− 0.5) (1.58)
It is clear that U2 = U(Wa)− C2p−1 − a11−a1U3.
Now I prove information acquisition complementarity is robust when M is infinite and λ
is small enough for different γ as follows.
Now the principals’ optimization problem becomes to minimize
min
pi1,pi2,pi3
a1ppi1 + (1− a1)pi2 + a1(1− p)pi3 (1.59)
This problem can be transferred to:
min
U3
G(U3) (1.60)
where G(U3) = a1pU
−1(U3 + Ca1(p−0.5)) + (1 − a1)U−1(U(Wa) − C2p−1 −
a1
1−a1U3) + a1(1 −
p)U−1(U3).
Since a1 is a linear function of λ. The first-order condition with λ is equivalent to the
first-order condition with a1, I have
∂G(U3)
∂U3
= 0. It is easy to check that Assumption ass:crra
can ensure there exists interior solution to the contracting problem. Particularly, I have the
following three cases:
Case 1: If 0 < γ < 1, I know that I U3 should satisfy: U3 > 0 and U(Wa)− C2p−1− a11−a1U3 >
0.
Case 2: If γ > 1, I know that U3 should satisfy: U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) < 0,U3 < 0 and
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3 < 0.
Case 3: If γ = 1 and K = 0, then I know that U(W ) u ln(W ) (where u represents liner
transformation).
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It is obvious that U−(x) = [(1−γγ x)
1
1−γ −K] γA . I let the solution to this problem to be U∗3 .
Then the minimum value of G(U3) is G(a1, U
∗
3 ). Now I have effect of a1 on G(a1, U
∗
3 ) is:
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂a1
= pU−1(U3 + Ca1(p−0.5))− U−1(U(Wa)− C2p−1 −
a1
1−a1U3) + (1− p)U−1(U3)
+
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂U∗3
∂G(U∗3 )
∂a1
− a1p
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
C
a21(p−0.5)
+(1− a1)
∂[U−1(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)]
∂(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)
(− 1
(1−a1)2U3)
(1.61)
For any cases, I know that
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂U∗3
∂G(U∗3 )
∂a1
= 0. I show information acquisition is complemen-
tary case by case.
Case 1( γ < 1): I know that: (1 − a1)
∂[U−1(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)]
∂(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)
(− 1
(1−a1)2U3) < 0 because
U3 < 0
and −U−1(U(Wa)− C2p−1 − a11−a1U3) + (1− p)U−1(U3) < 0
and then pU−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5))−p
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
C
a1(p−0.5) = p
γ
A(
1−γ
γ )
1
1−γ (U3+
C
a1(p−0.5))
1
1−γ−1[U3−
γ
1−γ
C
a1(p−0.5) ]− p
γ
AK < p
γ
A(
1−γ
γ )
1
1−γ ( Ca1(p−0.5))
1
1−γ−1[U3 − γ1−γ Ca1(p−0.5) ]− p
γ
AK
Because U3 > 0 and U3 < U(Wa) + C, I know that lima1→0
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂a1
= −∞. For the net
benefit of information acquisition B, I have lima1→0
∂B
∂a1
= ∞ for large enough M and small
enough λ.
Case 2 ( γ > 1) From the proof of , I know that p(Api1γ + K)
γ+ (1 − p)(Api3γ + K)γ =
(Api2γ +K)
γ .
Let pi
′
i = (
Api1
γ + K)
γ , I know that pii = [(pi
′
i)
1
γ −K] γA , which is a concave function of pi
′
i.
Then I can have
pU−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5))−U−1(U(Wa)− C2p−1−
a1
1−a1U3)+(1−p)U−1(U3) = p pi1+(1−p)pi3−pi2 <
0
Becasue U−(x) = [(1−γγ x)
1
1−γ−K] γA , I know that ∂[U
−1(x)]
∂x =
1
A(
1−γ
γ x)
1
1−γ−1 and ∂
2[U−1(x)]
∂x2
>
0
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Then from FOC ∂G(U3)∂a1 = 0, I know that
a1p
∂[U−1(U3 + Ca1(p−0.5))]
∂(U3 +
C
a1(p−0.5))
+(1−a1)
∂[U−1(U(Wa)− C2p−1 − a11−a1U3)]
∂(U(Wa)− C2p−1 − a11−a1U3)
+a1(1−p)∂[U
−1(U3)]
∂(U3)
= 0
(1.62)
Thus, I have
p
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
C
a1(p−0.5)+
∂[U−1(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)]
∂(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)
1
1−a1U3 = p
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
[ Ca1(p−0.5)−
a1U3
(1−a1)2 ]−
a1U3
(1−a1)2 (1− p)
∂[U−1(U3)]
∂(U3)
Because [U(Wa)− C2p−1 ]1−a1a1 < U3 < − Ca1(p−0.5) , I know that lima1→0 Ca1(p−0.5) −
a1U3
(1−a1)2 =
∞.
For ∂[U
−1(x)]
∂x =
1
A(
1−γ
γ x)
1
1−γ−1, I know that lima1→0
∂[U−1(U3)]
∂(U3)
= 0 because U3 → −∞.
Because U3 +
C
a1(p−0.5) > U(Wa) + C, I have
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
> ∂[U
−1(x)]
∂x |x=U(Wa)+C
Thus, I can conclude that
lima1→0 p
∂[U−1(U3+ Ca1(p−0.5) )]
∂(U3+
C
a1(p−0.5) )
C
a1(p−0.5) +
∂[U−1(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)]
∂(
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 −
a1
1−a1U3)
1
1−a1U3 =∞
Therefore, it is easy to show that lima1→0
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂a1
= −∞ and I conclude that lima1→0 ∂B∂a1 =
∞ for large enough M and small enough λ.
Case 3 forU(W ) = ln(W ), I directly calculate
∂G(U3)
∂a1
= a1p exp(U3 +
C
a1(p−0.5)) + a1(1− p) exp(U3)− a1 exp[
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 − a11−a1U3] = 0
Thus exp( 11−a1U3)[p exp(
C
a1(p−0.5)) + (1− p)] = exp[
U(Wa)− C2p−1
1−a1 ]
I have U3 = U(Wa)− C2p−1 − (1− a1) log[p exp( Ca1(p−0.5)) + (1− p)]
Then
G(a1,U∗3 )
∂a1
= exp{U(Wa)− C2p−1 + a1 log[p exp( Ca1(p−0.5)) + (1− p)]}
Then I let g(a1) = a1 log[p exp(
C
a1(p−0.5)) + (1− p)]
I know that lima1→0 g(a1) =
a21
1
p exp( C
a1(p−0.5) )
p exp( C
a1(p−0.5) )+(1−p)
C
a21(p−0.5)
= C(p−0.5)
Then I know that ∂g∂a1 =
1
a1
[a1 log[p exp(
C
a1(p−0.5)) + (1− p)]− C(p−0.5) ]
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Thus I have lima1→0
∂g
∂a1
= −∞
Then I can conclude that lima1→0
∂G(a1,U∗3 )
∂a1
= −∞. For the net benefit of information
acquisition B, I have lima1→0
∂B
∂a1
=∞ for large enough M and small enough λ.
Proof of Lemma 1.6.1. For principal i, his expected trading profit when he submits 1 is
(2pK(si, P )−1)θ−P , while his expected trading profit when he submits -1 is P −(2pK(si, P )−
1)θ. Because pK(si, P ) is increasing with si, principal i is indifferent between submitting 1
and -1 when (2pK(si, P )− 1)θ − P = 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.2. First, we have the condition as follows:
pI(XI , P ) = pU (XU , P ) =
P + θ
2θ
=
1
1 + flfh
1
LI
. (1.63)
Then we have log(P+θθ−P ) = log(
fh
fl
) + log(LI). Denote B(P ) =
∂L−1U (LI(XI))
∂P . From the expres-
sions of fh and fl, we have
log(fhfl ) = log(
λ(1+b+e)φ(XI−θ)X′I+λ(1−b−e)φ(XI+θ)X
′
I+(1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU−θ)BX
′
I+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU+θ)BX
′
I
λ(1+b+e)φ(XI+θ)X
′
I+λ(1−b−e)φ(XI−θ)X
′
I+(1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU+θ)BX
′
I+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU−θ)BX
′
I
)
= log(
[(1+b+e)φ(XI−θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI+θ)][λX′I+
(1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU−θ)B+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU+θ)
(1+b+e)φ(XI−θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI+θ) BX
′
I ]
[(1+b+e)φ(XI+θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI−θ)[λX′I+
(1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU+θ)B+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU−θ)
(1+b+e)φ(XI+θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI−θ) BX
′
I
)
(1.64)
Because LI(XI) = LU (XU ), we have
(1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU−θ)B+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU+θ)
(1+b+e)φ(XI−θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI+θ)
= (1−λ)(1+b)φ(XU+θ)B+(1−λ)(1−b)φ(XU−θ)(1+b+e)φ(XI+θ)+(1−b−e)φ(XI−θ)
(1.65)
Thus, log(fhfl ) = log(LI)
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Chapter 2
Investment Waves under Cross
Learning
Shiyang Huang and Yao Zeng (Harvard University)
Abstract: We investigate how firms’ cross learning amplifies industry-wide investment
waves. Firms’ investment opportunities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks as well as a common
shock, and firms’ asset prices aggregate speculators’ private information about the two types of
shocks. In investing, each firm learns from other firms’ prices (in addition to its own) to make
better inference about the common shock. Thus, a spiral between firms’ higher investment
sensitivity to the common shock and speculators’ higher weighting on the common shock
emerges. This leads to systematic risks in investment waves: higher investment and price
comovements as well as their higher comovements with the common shock. Moreover, each
firm’s cross learning creates a new pecuniary externality on other firms, because it makes other
firms’ prices less informative on their idiosyncratic shocks through speculators’ endogenous
over-weighting on the common shock. This externalities increases in the number of firms,
suggesting that more competitive industries may exhibit more inefficient investment waves.
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2.1 Introduction
Industry-wide investment waves are frequently observed in history, especially after the arrival
of major technology or financial innovations involving high uncertainty.1 However, existing
theories are often silent on one of their defining features: high systematic risks associated
with many firms.2 Specifically, in investment waves, a firm’s real investment and asset price
co-move greatly with other firms’ investments and prices (see Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and
Viswanathan, 2005, Pastor and Veronesi, 2009, Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, Bhattacharyya and
Purnanandam, 2011, Patton and Verardo, 2012, Greenwood and Hanson, 2013, for recent em-
pirical documents). Also, both primary and secondary financial market participants overweight
some industry-wide common news while underweight their corresponding idiosyncratic news in
making investment decisions (see Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev, 2007 and more broadly Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005, Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, and Bhattacharyya and
Purnanandam, 2011). An even more surprising fact recently documented is that more compet-
itive industries exhibit more inefficient investment waves with higher systematic risks (Hoberg
and Phillips, 2010, Greenwood and Hanson, 2013). Our paper provides a new rational the-
ory that helps unify these facts of industry-wide investment waves that seem jointly puzzling
otherwise.
Our mechanism to generate industry-wide investment waves highlights firms’ cross learn-
ing, which means that firms learn from other firms’ asset prices (in addition to their own
asset prices) in making investment decisions, a natural fact well documented empirically but
1The most typical examples include the “railway mania” of the UK in the 1840s, the rapid development
of automobiles and radio in the 1920s, and most recently the surge of the Internet in the 1990s, among many
others. In addition to technological progress, other notable examples include major financial innovations like
asset-backed securities (ABS) and credit default swaps (CDS), as well as the Mississippi Scheme and the South
Sea Bubble, in which market structures experienced dramatic changes.
2The most popular explanation of investment waves comes from the literature of bubbles (see Brunnermeier
and Oehmke, 2013, Xiong, 2013, for surveys of various models and evidence). These theories have focused on
the over-investment or over-valuation of one single firm, and have often referred to behavioral aspects. The
modern literature of macro-finance (see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov, 2013, for an extensive survey)
also generates various forms of over-investment, over-borrowing, and over-lending, by highlighting agency or
financial frictions. Also see He and Kondor (2013) for a most recent treatment of two-sided pecuniary externality
in generating inefficient investment cycles. This literature focuses more on the macroeconomic implications of
over-investment, such as fire sales and financial crises, rather than on the microeconomic anatomy of multi-firm
investment waves as we tend to emphasize.
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overlooked in the theoretical literature.3 It has been also explicitly identified by recent em-
pirical work (Foucault and Fresard, 2014, Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013). Our model builds on
the burgeoning literature that highlights the feedback from secondary market asset prices to
primary market investment decisions (see Bond, Edmans and Goldstein, 2012, for an extensive
survey on the theoretical literature). Specifically, since secondary market participants may
have incremental information that is unavailable to firms and primary market participants,
firms or their capital providers may learn from the asset prices in the secondary markets for
making investment decisions, and this in turn affects the asset prices in the secondary mar-
kets (see Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012, for empirical
evidence). The feedback literature, however, has not explored the multi-firm context and the
cross-learning mechanism we emphasize which generate industry-wide investment waves.
Towards our goal, we extend the classical feedback framework to admit multiple firms with
two fundamentally different types of shocks and cross learning. We highlight that investment
opportunities in an industry or an economy are generally correlated, so that firms have the
incentives to learn from each other’s asset prices. To fix idea, Figure 1 depicts the typical
landscape of a classical feedback story without this consideration, even if it can literally ac-
commodate many firms. Although these firms can take advantage of their respective feedback
channel for making better investment decisions, they are essentially separated in segmented
economies and others’ asset prices are irrelevant. Thus, they can be modeled by a represen-
tative firm. This is also the reason that why the existing feedback models usually feature one
single firm or one single asset.4
3In the seminal field survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), CFOs of firms report that they tend to rely on
other firms’ prices in making capital budgeting decisions, and this in turn affects CEOs’ investment decisions.
As far as we know, this point has not been formally taken into account in existing corporate finance models.
4One exception is Subrahmanyam and Titman (2013), in which a private firm learns from the stock price
of another public firm to make investment decision. The private firm’s investment affects the profitability of
the public firm through competition, which further generates interesting macroeconomic implications. But the
public firm does not invest by itself and the private firm also does not have its own asset price. Hence, their
model still features the standard feedback channel as shown in Figure 1. Their formal model also admits two
private firms, which introduces an additional externality in terms of investment complementarity that amplifies
their feedback effect. But as the authors have claimed, the introduction of two private firms is inessential for
most of their results.
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Figure 2.1.1: Self-Feedback Benchmark
Instead, the novelty of our work is to develop a tractable model, admitting two-way cross
learning of firms from other firms’ asset prices (in addition to their own), and to identify a new
pecuniary externality involved. We explicitly model correlated investment opportunities by
incorporating two fundamentally different shocks that necessitate firms’ cross learning. When
the fundamental of each firm’s asset is subject to both a common productivity shock (industry
shock)5 and an idiosyncratic shock (firm-specific shock), other firms’ asset prices are informa-
tive about the common shock for the firm in question. Thus, the firm in question uses other
firms’ asset prices (and its own) to know more about the common shock for making better
investment decisions; similarly to other firms. Such cross learning makes firms’ investments
more sensitive to the common shock, encouraging secondary market speculators to weight in-
formation about the common shock more in trading. This in turn makes firms’ asset prices
more informative about the common shock, further encouraging firms to cross learn and thus
resulting in an even higher investment sensitivity to the common shock. As a consequence,
even a tiny common shock can be amplified significantly. This mechanism is reminiscent of the
classic signal extraction problem and the resulting rational herding highlighted by Scharfstein
and Stein (1990), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and many others, while we explicitly
5In a broader sense, our common shock can also be interpreted as a shock to the entire economy. Hence,
our model speaks to not only industry-wide investment waves but also more broadly economy-wide investment
waves.
94
Asset Price 1
Cross Learning
Investment 1
Asset Price 2
Speculators
Investment 2
Firms / Capital Providers
Common Shock
Figure 2.1.2: Firm / Capital Provider Cross Learning
consider the feedback from financial markets to the real economy and do not rely on any forms
of short-termism. Moreover, in our framework, when one firm makes use of other firms’ asset
prices, it does not internalize a negative pecuniary externality that those prices become less
informative about other firms’ idiosyncratic shocks, because of the secondary market spec-
ulators’ endogenous over-weighting on the common shock. This externality leads to higher
investment inefficiency. Interestingly, the new pecuniary externality takes effect through the
informativeness rather than the level of prices. Figure 2 illustrates the idea of cross learning
and contrasts it to the standard feedback framework. Empirically, firms’ cross learning has
been documented by recent studies like Foucault and Fresard (2014)6 and Ozoguz and Rebello
(2013) and the magnitude is shown to be considerable, serving as a foundation for our theory.
The predictions of our model are consistent with many empirical regularities on invest-
ment waves. Compared to a benchmark in which firms are unable to learn from others’ asset
prices, cross learning generates a higher weight of the speculators on the information of the
common shock in trading (as documented by Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev, 2007 and more
6For the purpose of developing empirical hypotheses, Foucault and Fresard (2014) build a suggestive model,
featuring one-way learning: one focal firm may learn from its peer firm’s price while not the other way around,
and the peer firm does not invest. That model lays out a nice foundation for their empirical analysis. However,
it generates neither inefficient multi-firm investment waves nor comovements with the common productivity
shock as emphasized in our paper. The setup and mechanisms of their model are also completely different from
ours.
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broadly by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005, Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, and
Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam, 2011) and the firms’ higher investment sensitivity to the
common shock.7 We further show that under cross learning, a firm’s investment and price
co-move more greatly with 1) other firms’ investments and prices, and with 2) the common
productivity shock as well, fitting in line with the evidence in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and
Viswanathan (2005), Pastor and Veronesi (2009), Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Bhattacharyya
and Purnanandam (2011) and Patton and Verardo (2012). We interpret these patterns as
higher systematic risks in industry-wide investment waves. Compared to alternative theories,
cross learning is further consistent with Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang (2013)’s message that
investment waves are more significant among public firms than among private firms, by high-
lighting the indispensable role of explicit prices in public financial markets. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first to establish the existence and significance of firms’ two-way
cross-learning effect on both investments, prices, and systematic risks.
Along this line, we investigate many circumstances in which the changes of economic con-
ditions generate higher systematic risks in investment waves via the cross-learning mechanism,
which are otherwise puzzling. First, an increasing uncertainty on the common productivity
shock, most typically induced by the introduction of major technological innovations, leads
to stronger weighting on the information of the common shock and higher systematic risks.
This is consistent with the empirical facts in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Pastor and
Veronesi (2006, 2009) and the more broadly documented evidence in the bubble literature
(Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013, Xiong, 2013). Our new mechanism contributes to the exist-
ing rational learning mechanisms (Pastor and Veronesi, 2009, Johnson, 2007), by featuring both
multi-firm investment waves and inefficiency. Second, an improvement of the firms’ knowledge
on the common productivity shock leads to higher systematic risks, consistent with the facts
in Greenwood and Nagel (2009). Last, lower market liquidity or higher variance of idiosyn-
cratic noisy supply also leads to higher systematic risks. These empirical regularities have
7Complementary to the theoretical literature that highlights investors’ attention allocation to the common
shock (see Peng and Xiong, 2006, Veldkamp, 2006, Veldkamp and Wolfers, 2007), our work speaks to its en-
dogenous origin from firms’ cross learning as well as its feedback into firms’ investment decisions.
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been frequently ascribed to separate behavioral accounts in the past literature, while our work
provides a consistent rational explanation.
Our framework allows for a clear welfare analysis, offering a new perspective to look at
the relationship between inefficient investment waves and industrial competition. Due to the
unaligned interests of firms and speculators in feedback and the new pecuniary externality
associated with cross learning, the investment waves are inefficient. In particular, we show that
as the number of firms in an industry increases, cross learning becomes stronger, leading to a
more severe pecuniary externality. This suggests a rationale for the puzzling facts identified
in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Greenwood and Hanson (2013) that more competitive
industries exhibit more predictable financial and real boom-bust cycles as well as greater market
and real inefficiencies. According to Hoberg and Phillips (2010), no single existing theory can
accommodate their findings. Our cross-learning mechanism with the new pecuniary externality
implies that more competitive industries may exhibit more over-weighting on the common
shock, more under-weighting on the idiosyncratic shocks, and more inefficient investment waves
with higher systematic risks, consistent with Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Greenwood and
Hanson (2013)’s messages. Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) have also explicitly identified that
firms in more competitive industries have a higher investment sensitivity to stock prices of
their peers, which supports our predictions.
Fundamentally, the amplification effect of cross learning stems from a series of endogenous
strategic complementarities and a spiral that are absent in existing literature. At the begin-
ning, the dependence of investment on asset price results in an endogenous complementarity
between each firm’s investment sensitivity on the common shock and speculators’ weighting
on information about the common shock. When multiple firms’ cross learning is introduced,
a new spiral comes out. Cross learning first makes different firms’ investments more corre-
lated with the common shock as well as with each other. As a result, speculators find it
more profitable to put a higher weight on information about the common shock. Since asset
prices thus become relatively more informative about the common shock, firms’ investment
sensitivities on the common shock increase even more. This spiral further generates two new
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complementarities in our multi-firm setting. The first is among speculators’ weights on the
information about the common shock in each asset market, and the second is among different
firms’ relative investment sensitivities to the common shock. The interaction of the spiral
and these endogenous complementarities is again seen in Figure 2, which constructs a strong
amplification effect from a fundamental shock to systematic risks. In contrast to the existing
literature involving complementarities in financial markets (see Veldkamp, 2011, for an exten-
sive review), our mechanism does not rely on any exogenous complementarities (for example,
higher-order beliefs or coordination in actions) but a well documented fact that firms learn
from own and other firms’ asset prices. Given that trading in financial markets usually exhibit
natural strategic substitutability, our endogenous complementarities and spiral are of more
significance.
Related Literature. Our work contributes to the literature of rational models on invest-
ment booms and busts.8 Early literature has focused on the role of industrial organizations (for
example, Reinganum, 1989, Jovanovic and McDonald, 1994) or self-fulfilling expectations (for
example, Shleifer, 1986) in generating investment waves, but financial markets are generally
absent in these classic papers. The modern literature has been paying increasing attention
to the role of learning in financial markets.9 In the rational learning model of Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004), which shares a similar signal extraction problem with ours, man-
agers cannot distinguish between common misvaluation and possible idiosyncratic synergies,
leading to merger and acquisition waves. Pastor and Veronesi (2009) propose a more explicit
learning model, in which the uncertain productivity of a new technology is subject to learn-
ing. Learning and the ensuing technology adoption makes the uncertainty from idiosyncratic
to systematic, generating investment waves. In this spirit, Johnson (2007) argues that firms
8This literature is more broadly related to the bubble and modern macro-finance literatures mainly based on
behavioral or belief aspects and agency or financial frictions, as discussed above. The focuses of those literatures
are however different from ours. Our model is not intended as a general dynamic theory of booms and busts
either.
9Other notable rational models on investment waves include DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007, 2008),
featuring endogenous relative wealth concerns from the non-tradability of future endowments, Carlson, Fisher
and Giammarino (2004) and Aguerrevere (2009), featuring investments as real options, and Ozdenoren and
Yuan (2013), featuring contractual externalities given the average performance contractable and the resulting
excessive risk-taking.
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may learn about uncertain investment opportunities in the form of experimenting, which also
generates investment waves. Our contribution to this literature is three-fold. First, our model
features multiple firms and their cross learning explicitly, which allows us to study industry-
wide investment waves directly rather than to look at them from the perspective of single-firm
investment cycles. Second, we cast the microstructure of public asset markets explicitly by
an adapted Kyle (1985) model, ensuring us to reflect the indispensable role of public financial
markets as suggested by Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang (2013). Lastly, our model identifies
a new externality regarding the use of information about common shocks and idiosyncratic
shocks in making inefficient investment decisions.
Our framework also contributes to the burgeoning feedback literature as surveyed by Bond,
Edmans and Goldstein (2012). Among existing models, closely related are Goldstein, Ozde-
noren and Yuan (2013), Goldstein and Yang (2014a,b), and Sockin and Xiong (2014a,b), all of
which highlight the feedback from (secondary market) speculators’ information aggregation to
(primary market) capital providers’ scale-varying real investment decisions. Technically, these
papers have also employed a log-normal framework. Our contribution is to investigate multi-
firm feedback by introducing a tractable two-way cross-learning framework with two types of
shocks, which generates the new pecuniary externality and various implications that are absent
in existing models.
Identifying the externality associated with cross learning contributes to the large pecuniary
externality literature.10 The classical pecuniary externality takes effect through the level of
prices: agents do not internalize the impacts of their actions on equilibrium price levels, leading
to a welfare loss under various frictions. In our framework, instead, firms that make real
investment decisions do not fully internalize the impacts of cross learning on equilibrium price
informativeness. This leads to a “tragedy of the commons” regarding the use of the price
system as an information source under multi-firm cross learning. In this sense, our pecuniary
externality is reminiscent of the learning externality in the early dynamic learning and herding
literature (for example, Vives, 1997) that an agent, when responding to his private information,
10See Stiglitz (1982), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985), and Farhi and
Werning (2013), He and Kondor (2013), Davila (2014) for recent theoretical developments.
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does not take into account the benefit of increased informativeness of public information in the
future.11
Our work is also related to the literature on the interaction across asset markets or fun-
damentals, in particular the models that highlight learning. This literature has focused on
speculators’ learning rather than firms’ cross learning as we model. Cespa and Foucault (2014)
consider the contagion of illiquidity across segmented markets by introducing a concept of
cross-asset learning. By cross-asset learning, speculators trading in one market can potentially
learn from the asset price in another market, which generates propagation. Goldstein and
Yang (2014c) model an environment in which different speculators are informed of different
fundamentals affecting one single asset. Trading on information about the two fundamentals
exhibits complementarity, suggesting that greater diversity of information improves price in-
formativeness. Our model complements to those papers by focusing on the implications of firm
cross learning on both real investments and asset prices, in contrast to their exchange economy
setting that focuses on trading.
Finally, our framework is broadly related to a large macroeconomic literature focusing on
dispersed information, in particular on the different roles of private and public information.
Closely related are Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2012) on the role of beauty contest in
generating investment exuberance and Amador and Weill (2010) on the crowding-out effect
of exogenous public information provision to the use of private information.12 Compared to
Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2012) highlighting information spillover from real activities to
financial markets, our cross-learning framework with more detailed financial market structures
arguments it with the opposite learning channel explicitly. Importantly, by modeling cross
learning with two types of shocks, we are able to generate new strategic complementarities and
the new spiral towards the common shock, which are consistent with empirical evidence. Our
11The recent study of Vives (2014) further combines the classical pecuniary externality (through the level of
prices) and the learning externality associated with exogenous public information in an industrial competition
context. This is different from our new pecuniary externality through endogenous price informativeness on the
two shocks. Its focus is also on the strategic interaction in product markets instead of our endogenous cross
learning in financial markets.
12Amador and Weill (2010) also relies on the earlier idea in Vives (1993) that the more informative prices
are, the less agents rely on private information, with the consequence that less information will be incorporated
into prices.
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externality is also different from theirs that features beauty contest in signaling and higher-
order uncertainties. Complementary to Amador and Weill (2010), the externality in our model
stems from a different mechanism and suggests a new crowding-out effect: endogenous over-
weighting of the common shock crowds out the use of information about the idiosyncratic
shocks. Neither of these two papers has distinguished between common productivity shock
and idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the model, featuring
correlated investment opportunities and cross learning. Section 2.3 characterizes the cross-
learning equilibrium and benchmarks it to the self-feedback case. Section 2.4 investigates
important implications of cross learning with a focus on systematic risks in investment waves.
Section 2.5 explores the externality and the relationship between investment inefficiency and
competition. Section 2.6 discusses some extensions of the model. All proofs are delegated to
Appendix unless otherwise noted.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Economy
The model extends the feedback framework of Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2013) for a
different focus on capital provider cross learning.13 We consider a continuum of 1 of firms,
i ∈ [0, 1), each having an asset traded in a secondary market. Each firm i’s corresponding asset
market is occupied by a mass 1 of informed risk-neutral speculators, respectively. We index
speculators for firm i by a couple (i, j), with j ∈ [0, 1).14 Each firm i’s corresponding secondary
market is occupied by noise traders. Each firm also has an exclusive capital provider i in a
primary market who decides how much capital to provide to the firm for investment purpose.
13For related papers building on this framework or sharing a similar mathematical foundation in modeling,
see Sockin and Xiong (2014a,b) and Goldstein and Yang (2014a,b). These papers do not consider fundamentally
different productivity shocks or multiple firms’ cross learning as we do.
14Since the speculators do not have a diversification motive, our results are unaffected if we assume that they
can trade all assets. In other words, market segmentation in terms of trading plays no roles in our model.
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There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At date 0, the speculators trade in their corresponding
asset market with their private information, and the asset price aggregates their information.
At date 1, the capital providers observe the asset prices of both their own firm and all the
other firms. Having observed all the prices and received their private information, the capital
providers decide the amount of capital to provide for their corresponding firms and the firms
undertake investment accordingly. All the cash flows are realized at date 2.
2.2.2 Capital Providers and Investment
All the firms in the economy have an identical linear production technology: Q(Ii) = AFiIi ,
where Ii is the amount of capital provided by capital provider i to firm i, and A and Fi are
two stochastic productivity shocks. Specifically, shock A captures an industry-wide common
productivity shock, and shock Fi captures the idiosyncratic productivity shock for firm i only.
15
Denote by a and fi the natural logs of these shocks, and assume that they are normal and
mutually independent:
a ∼ N(0, 1/τa) , and fi ∼ N(0, 1/τf ) ,
where τa and τf are positive and i ∈ [0, 1).
The introduction of multiple firms and the two fundamentally different productivity shocks
plays an important role in necessitating firms’ cross learning. Specifically, if the investment
opportunities are uncorrelated, cross learning makes no sense. On the other hand, however,
if the investment opportunities are perfectly correlated, all asset prices become identical and
thus there is no need to learn from other’s prices as well. To flesh our cross-learning mechanism
out, we abstract away from possible industrial organization of the firms’ product market.
At date 1, all the capital providers choose the amount of capital Ii simultaneously in their
respective primary markets. Capital provider i captures a proportion κ ∈ (0, 1) of the output
Q(Ii) by providing Ii, which incurs a private quadratic adjustment cost, C(Ii) =
1
2cI
2
i . Thus,
15In what follows, we omit the term productivity for brevity at times when there is no confusion.
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capital provider i’s problem at t = 1 is
max
Ii
E
[
κAFiIi − 1
2
cI2i |Γi
]
, (2.1)
where Γi is the information set of capital provider i at t = 1. It consists of the price of firm i’s
own asset, Pi, and those of all the other firms’ assets, denoted by the set {P−i} for brevity,16
formed at date 0 as endogenous public signals, as well as their private signals about the (log)
productivity shocks a and fi. Specifically, we assume that each capital provider i gets a private
noisy and independent signal sa,i about the (log) common productivity shock a with precision
τs, and another private noisy and independent signal sf,i about its own (log) idiosyncratic
productivity shock fi with precision τf :
sa,i = a+ εa,i , where εa,i ∼ N(0, 1/τsa) , and
sf,i = fi + εf,i , where εf,i ∼ N(0, 1/τsf ) .
That is, for capital provider i, the information set is Γi = {Pi, {P−i}, sa,i, sf,i}.
Different from existing literature, one major novelty of our setup is to allow capital providers
to learn from other firms’ asset prices as well as own firms’ prices, which we formally call cross
learning. As will be highlighted later, although the capital providers only care about their own
firms, they use the prices of other firms’ assets for making better investment decisions.
2.2.3 Speculators and Secondary Market Trading
At date 0, the remaining cash flow (1−κ)Q(Ii), as an asset, is traded in a separate competitive
secondary market for each firm i. For firm i, denote the price of this asset by Pi. To focus on
capital providers’ cross learning, we do not consider any possible monetary transfers from the
secondary market to the firm, but highlight the information revealed in the secondary market
16As will be elaborated later, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which the firm in question i always puts the
same weight on each of other firms’ asset prices in cross learning. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to distinguish
between those asset prices in analyzing cross learning.
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trading.17 In the asset market of firm i, each speculator (i, j) has two private and independent
signals about the common shock and the respective idiosyncratic shock. Specifically, the first
signal is about the common shock:
xij = a+ εx,ij , where εx,ij ∼ N(0, 1/τx) ,
and the second signal is about the firm-specific idiosyncratic shock:
yij = fi + εy,ij ,where εy,ij ∼ N(0, 1/τy) .
Thus, the information set of speculator (i, j) is Γij = {xij , yij}.18
Based on their private information, the speculators submit limited orders in a similar
manner of Kyle (1985), with an additional constraint that each speculator can buy or sell up
to a unit of the asset.19 Formally, the speculators maximize their expected trading profit,
taking the asset price as given.20 Their problems at t = 0 are
max
dij∈[−1,1]
dijE [(1− κ)AFiIi − Pi|Γij ] , (2.2)
where dij is speculator (i, j)’s demand. The aggregate demand from the speculators in market
i is given by Di =
∫ 1
0 dijdj.
We assume that the noisy supply in asset market i takes the following form:
∆(ζ, ξi, Pi) = 1− 2Φ(ζ + ξi − λ logPi) ,
17Hence, this asset can be interpreted as either equity of the firm or a derivative on the return from the firm’s
investment. See a more detailed justification of this point in Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2013).
18The fact that the speculators’ information set does not consist of the asset prices is not essential. For any
firm i, even if its speculators can learn from its asset price Pi, as long as they do not cross learn from other
firms’ asset prices {P−i}, all of our results are unaffected.
19As discussed in Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2013), the specific size of this position limit is inessential
for the results, as long as speculators cannot take unlimited positions, otherwise the prices will be fully revealing.
This constraint can be easily justified by their capital or borrowing constraints.
20The asset price can be viewed as set by a unmodeled market maker, as that in Kyle (1985).
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where
ζ ∼ N(0, τ−1ζ ) , and ξi ∼ N(0, τ−1ξ ) .
We elaborate the noisy supply. Φ(·) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution
function. The first shock ζ captures a common noisy supply shock that can be viewed as
industry-wide sentiment or industry-wide fund flow. The second shock ξi captures the id-
iosyncratic noisy supply shock in market i that can be viewed as styled trading or uninformed
investors’ unobserved preferences. The presence of a common noisy supply not only makes our
framework more general, but more importantly prevents the aggregate price from fully reveal-
ing the common productivity shock. Both noisy supply shocks ζ and ξi are independent and
also independent of other shocks in the economy. Meanwhile, λ in the noisy supply function
captures price elasticity and can be viewed as market liquidity. When λ is high, the demand
from speculators can be easily absorbed and thus their aggregate demand has little impact on
the asset prices.
Finally, in equilibrium, the prices will clear each asset market by equalizing the aggregate
speculator demand to the noisy supply in each asset market i:
Di = ∆(ζ, ξi, Pi) . (2.3)
2.2.4 Discussion
Before proceeding, we discuss some important differences of our settings from the past literature
in the feedback literature, in particular, Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2013), Foucault and
Fresard (2014), and the contemporaneous study by Goldstein and Yang (2014a,b). There are,
of course, more differences between our work and the existing feedback literature than what
we discuss below, but the following ones are crucial for our mechanism and thus help stand
out our contribution.
First, to lay out a foundation for characterizing cross learning, our model features a con-
tinuum of many firms. To accommodate multiple firms and two-way cross learning imposes
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new technical challenges in the sense of finding closed form solutions. To this end, our model
provides a tractable approach not only suited for our purpose but potentially useful for future
work in other directions.
Second, built upon the multiple-firm setup, our economy features two fundamentally dif-
ferent productivity shocks: one is common to all firms while the other is firm-specific. In most
previous literature, there is only one productivity shock. One exception is Goldstein and Yang
(2014a,b) who consider two shocks on the cash flow. However, their two shocks are fundamen-
tally symmetric. Specifically, their two shocks differ in an exogenous informational sense that
the capital providers perfectly observe one but not the other. Instead, our model allows us to
explicitly recover how cross learning affects the endogenous sensitivities of firms’ investment
on the specific common shock and the idiosyncratic shocks. The contrast between the two
fundamentally different shocks plays an important role in generating investment waves as well
as delivering welfare implications on inefficient investment waves and competition.
Third, to highlight the interaction of the two fundamentally different shocks under cross
learning, our model does not feature any public information of the speculators as often seen in
the literature. Our efficiency implications come endogenously from a new pecuniary externality
absent in previous literature that focuses on coordination failure or higher-order beliefs.
Finally, in contrast to the hypotheses development in Foucault and Fresard (2014), our
framework features fully two-way cross learning instead of one-way learning by a focal firm
from its peer firm. The one-way learning channel in Foucault and Fresard (2014) gives clear
predictions on how the peer firm’s stock price may affect the focal firm’s investment, but the
peer firm itself does not invest or learn. Our framework with two-way cross learning as well as
more detailed real and financial market structures captures the new strategic complementarities
and spiral toward the common productivity shock. The fundamental difference between the
common shock and the idiosyncratic shocks matters only when the fully two-way cross learning
is introduced. This eventually generates industry-wide inefficient investment waves consistent
with empirical regularities.
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2.3 Cross-Learning Equilibrium
2.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
We formally introduce the equilibrium concept. We focus on symmetric linear equilibria that
are standard in the literature. Specifically, the speculators in market i long one share of the
corresponding asset when φixij + yij > µi, and short one share otherwise, where φi and µi are
two constants that will be determined in equilibrium. Since agents are risk neutral and firms
are symmetric in our framework, symmetry further implies that φi = φ and µi = µ, which
mean that all the speculators use symmetric trading strategies in all asset markets, and the
information contents of all asset prices are also symmetric.
Definition 2.3.1. A (symmetric) cross-learning equilibrium is defined as a collection of a
price function for each firm i, Pi(a, fi, ζ, ξi): R4 → R, an investment policy for each capital
provider i, Ii(sa,i, sf,i, Pi, {P−i}): R2 × R∞ → R, and a linear monotone trading strategy for
each speculator (i, j), dij(xij , yij) = 1(φixij + yij > µi)− 1(φixij + yij 6 µi), such that
i) each capital provider i’s investment policy Ii(sa,i, sf,i, Pi, {P−i}) solves problem (2.1),
ii) each speculator (i, j)’s trading strategy dij(xij , yij) is identical and solves problem (2.2),
and
iii) market clearing condition (2.3) is satisfied for each market i.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We characterize the equilibrium, featuring the capital providers’ cross learning. The equi-
librium is hard to solve and involves many fixed-point problems, so we follow a step-by-step
approach.
Step 1. We first solve for the price functions, which helps characterize the information
contents of prices from the capital providers’ perspective. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3.1. The speculators’ trading leads to the following equilibrium price of each asset
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i:
Pi = exp
 φi
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
a+
1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
fi +
ζ + ξi
λ
− µi
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
 . (2.1)
Hence, from any capital provider i’s perspective, the price for its own firm i’s asset is
equivalent to the following signal in predicting the common shock a:
za(Pi) =
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y logPi + µi
φi
= a+
1
φi
fi +
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
φi
(ζ + ξi) , (2.2)
and is equivalent to the following signal in predicting the corresponding idiosyncratic shock fi:
zf (Pi) = λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y logPi + µi = fi + φia+
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y (ζ + ξi) . (2.3)
Lemma 2.3.1 not only helps specify the information contents of a firm’s asset price to its
own capital provider, but also hints those to other firms’ capital providers. Thus, it suggests
the presence of capital providers’ cross learning when feasible. The next step formulates the
idea.
Step 2. We then characterize the informational consequences of cross learning. Specifically,
we show that, when cross learning is feasible, that is, capital provider i’s information set
includes both Pi and {P−i}, the capital provider relies on the aggregate price as well as the
own asset price (in addition to their own private signals) in inferring the two productivity
shocks. We impose the symmetry conditions φi = φ and µi = µ to conditions (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.3) now as we focus on symmetric equilibria, and we also define the aggregate price as
P =
∫ 1
0
Pidi .
21
Lemma 2.3.2. For capital provider i, when her information set includes both Pi and {P−i},
21The fact that the asset prices are equally weighted in calculating the aggregate price is inessential to their
information contents. Our results carry through even if we choose arbitrarily positive weights.
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these asset prices are informationally equivalent to the following two signals:
i) a signal based on the aggregate price P :
za(P ) = a+
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
φ
ζ (2.4)
for predicting the common shock a, with the precision
τpa =
τxτyτζφ
2
τx + τyφ2
, (2.5)
which is increasing in φ, and
ii) a signal based on the own asset price Pi as well as the aggregate price P :
zf,i(P ) = zf (Pi)− φza(P ) = fi +
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y ξi (2.6)
for predicting the corresponding idiosyncratic shock fi, with the precision
τpf =
τxτyτξ
τx + τyφ2
, (2.7)
which is decreasing in φ.
Along with Lemma 2.3.1, Lemma 2.3.2 implies that cross learning changes the feedback
channel in which a capital provider uses asset prices to infer the two productivity shocks: she
now uses the aggregate price P to infer the common shock a and still uses the own price Pi
to infer the idiosyncratic shock fi. Intuitively, for capital provider i, other firms’ asset prices
{P−i} are uninformative on the idiosyncratic shock fi but informative on the common shock
a. Hence, when other firms’ asset prices are observable, which is natural in reality, the capital
provider of the firm in question uses them to make better inference about the common shock.
In particular, in a symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate price is sufficient for this purpose, as all
asset prices are symmetric. By the law of large numbers, P only aggregates information about
the common shock a: the information about idiosyncratic shocks and about the idiosyncratic
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noisy supply shocks all gets wiped out, while the presence of the common noisy supply shock
still prevents the aggregate price from fully revealing. This makes za(P ), as characterized
in (2.4), the most informative signal about the common shock a the capital provider can
get. Moreover, knowing za(P ), the capital provider also eliminates the information about the
common shock and about the common noisy supply shock when she uses her own price Pi to
infer the idiosyncratic shock fi, as characterized in (2.6).
Step 3. We then solve for the capital providers’ optimal investment policy under cross
learning. This indicates the real consequences of cross learning. Lemma 2.3.2 implies that,
under cross learning, capital provider i uses the new signal za(P ) and her private signal sa,i to
infer the common shock a, and the new signal zf,i(P ) and the private signal sf,i to infer the
idiosyncratic shock fi. Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.3. Observing sa,i, sf,i, Pi and {P−i}, capital provider i’s optimal investment policy
is
Ii =
κ
c
exp
[
τsasa,i + τpaza(P )
τa + τsa + τpa
+
1
2(τa + τsa + τpa)
+
τfsf,i + τpfzf,i(P )
τf + τsf + τpf
+
1
2(τf + τsf + τpf )
]
.
(2.8)
The investment policy is intuitive. On the one hand, the optimal amount of investment is
higher when the share κ of capital provider is higher while lower when the investment cost c
is higher. On the other hand, the capital providers infer the two productivity shocks a and
fi independently but simultaneously in making investment decisions, reflected in the first and
third terms in the parenthesis. In particular, the capital providers find it optimal to learn
from both the own asset prices as well as other firms’ prices, which are summarized in the two
new signals za(P ) and zf,i(P ). This fits quite in line with the recent empirical facts about
firms’ and capital providers’ cross learning behavior (Foucault and Fresard, 2014, Ozoguz and
Rebello, 2013).
According to Lemma 2.3.3, we propose the following intuitive concept of investment sensi-
tivity to capture how the capital providers’ investment decision responds to the two produc-
tivity shocks under cross learning.
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Definition 2.3.2. For capital providers, the investment sensitivity to the common productivity
shock and that to the idiosyncratic productivity shock are defined as:
Sa(τpa) =
τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
, and Sf (τpf ) =
τsf + τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
,
respectively. We call Sa the common investment sensitivity and Sf the idiosyncratic investment
sensitivity henceforth.
We highlight that, the investment sensitivity depends on not only the capital providers’
private signals about the corresponding shock, but also the new endogenous price signals com-
ing from cross learning as characterized in Lemma 2.3.2. In particular, these two notions of
investment sensitivity are increasing functions of τpa and τpf , respectively, which are in turn
affected by the speculators’ trading strategy. Hence, by Lemma 2.3.2, we have the follow-
ing straightforward lemma that bridges the capital providers’ investment sensitivity and the
speculators’ weight φ on the signal of the common productivity shock.
Lemma 2.3.4. The common investment sensitivity Sa(τpa) is increasing in φ while the idiosyn-
cratic investment sensitivity Sf (τpf ) is decreasing in φ.
Lemma 2.3.4 is helpful because it offers an intuitive look at the real consequences of learning
from asset prices in the economy with two fundamentally different shocks. When speculators’
weight φ is higher, they put more weight on the information about the common shock, and
thus asset prices become more informative about the common shock while less informative
about the idiosyncratic shocks. This in turn leads to a more sensitive investment policy in
response to the common shock while a less sensitive one in response to the idiosyncratic shock.
Step 4. We finally close the model by solving for the speculators’ equilibrium trading strat-
egy, characterized by the weight φ and the constant µ. This also pins down other equilibrium
outcomes since they are all functions of φ.
For speculator (i, j), her expected profit of trading given her available information is
E [(1− κ)AFiIi − Pi|xij , yij ] , (2.9)
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in which Ii and Pi have been characterized by conditions (2.8) and (2.1) respectively.
It is easy to show that, speculators’ expected profit (2.9) of trading asset i can be expressed
as
E [(1− κ)AFiIi − Pi|xij , yij ] = κ(1− κ)
c
exp (α0 + α1xij + α2yij)− exp (γ0 + γ1xij + γ2yij) ,
where α0, α1, α2, γ0, γ1, and γ2 are all functions of φ:
α1 = (Sa + 1)
τx
τa + τx
,
α2 = (Sf + 1)
τy
τf + τy
,
γ1 =
φ
λ
√
τx + τyφ2
τx
τa + τx
,
γ2 =
1
λ
√
τx + τyφ2
τy
τf + τy
.
By definition, in a symmetric cross-learning equilibrium with cross learning, we have
φ =
α1 − γ1
α2 − γ2 .
Plugging in α1, α2, γ1 and γ2 yields
φ =
(
Sa + 1− φ
λ
√
τx+τyφ2
)
τx
τa+τx(
Sf + 1− 1
λ
√
τx+τyφ2
)
τy
τf+τy
. (2.10)
Analyzing this equation by further plugging in Sa and Sf , which are both functions of φ, we
reach a unique cross-learning equilibrium, formally characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.1. For a high enough noisy supply elasticity λ, there exists a cross-learning
equilibrium in which the speculators put a positive weight φ > 0 on the signal of the common
productivity shock. For a high enough information precision τy (of the speculators’ signal on
the idiosyncratic shock), the equilibrium is unique.
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To establish the existence of a unique equilibrium is essential for our further analysis regard-
ing investment waves, as it allows us to investigate that how changes in economic environment
affect investments and prices through the cross-learning mechanism. When φ is higher, the
speculators put more weight on the information about the common shock in trading, encour-
aging all the capital providers to respond to the common shock more sensitively through cross
learning, which in turn leads to an even higher φ. This new spiral gives rise to many impli-
cations in line with the empirical phenomena regarding industry-wide investment waves as we
explore later.
The conditions to guarantee a unique cross-learning equilibrium are not only standard in
the feedback literature (see Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan, 2013, among many others) but
empirically plausible. A relatively high noisy supply elasticity λ implies that markets are liquid
enough. A relatively high information precision τy of the speculators’ signal on the idiosyncratic
shock suggests that asset market participants understand their target firms better than the
whole industry. These two conditions are in particular appropriate when we focus on the
contexts leading to investment waves: relatively liquid markets and relatively more uncertain
macroeconomic news.22,23
2.3.3 Self-Feedback Benchmark
Having established the existence and uniqueness of a cross-learning equilibrium, we benchmark
the cross-learning equilibrium to the corresponding self-feedback equilibrium in a comparable
economy. This self-feedback benchmark helps understand how the presence of cross learning
affects the capital providers’ investment policy and the speculators’ trading strategy, in contrast
to the counterfactual where cross learning is absent. In demonstrating these effects, we again
focus on the difference of the speculators’ weight φ on the signal of the common productivity
shock in the two respective equilibria, as all equilibrium outcomes are functions of this weight.
22In the appendix, we explore other sufficient conditions that guarantee a unique cross-learning equilibrium.
Our results regarding investment waves and investment inefficiency survive under other sets of sufficient condi-
tions.
23We have numerically shown that these conditions are not restrictive. Even for reasonably small λ and τy,
our model still features a unique cross-learning equilibrium. These numerical results are reported in Section 2.5.
113
We still consider unique symmetric equilibria and denote by φ′ the speculators’ weight on the
signal of the common productivity shock in the self-feedback benchmark.
Formally, the only difference of the benchmark economy is that, each capital provider
i observes its own asset price Pi but not other firms’ asset prices {P−i}. That is, capital
provider i’s information set is Γi = {Pi, sa,i, sf,i}. We have
Pi = exp
 φ′
λ
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y
a+
1
λ
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y
fi +
ζ + ξi
λ
− µi
λ
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y
 ,
which is equivalent to the following two signals
za(Pi) =
λ
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y logPi + µi
φ′
= a+
1
φ′
fi +
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y
φ′
(ζ + ξi)
in predicting the common shock a and
zf (Pi) = λ
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y logPi + µi = fi + φ′a+
√
τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y (ζ + ξi)
in predicting the corresponding idiosyncratic shock fi. The precisions of za(Pi) and zf (Pi) are
denoted as τpa and τpf where
τpa =
1
1
(φ′)2 τ
−1
f +
τ−1x (φ′)2+τ−1y
(φ′)2 (τ
−1
ζ + τ
−1
ξ )
,
and
τpf =
1
(φ′)2τ−1a + (τ−1x (φ′)2 + τ−1y )(τ−1ζ + τ
−1
ξ )
.
Following the same definition of investment sensitivity and the same analysis for the capital
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providers’ investment policy and the speculators’ trading strategy, we have
S′a =
τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
+
τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
φ′ ,
S′f =
τsf + τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
+
τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
1
φ′
,
α′1 =
(
S′a + 1
) τx
τa + τx
,
α′2 =
(
S′f + 1
) τy
τf + τy
,
γ′1 =
φ′
λ
√
τx + τy(φ′)2
τx
τa + τx
,
γ′2 =
1
λ
√
τx + τy(φ′)2
τy
τf + τy
.
In the self-feedback equilibrium, we also have
φ′ =
α′1 − γ′1
α′2 − γ′2
to pin down the speculators’ weight on the information of the common shock. Plugging in
α′1, α′2, γ′1 and γ′2 yields
φ′ =
(
S′a + 1− φ
′
λ
√
τx+τy(φ′)2
)
τx
τa+τx(
S′f + 1− 1λ√τx+τy(φ′)2
)
τy
τf+τy
. (2.11)
Therefore, we have the following proposition regarding the comparison between the cross-
learning equilibrium and the corresponding self-feedback benchmark. We focus on comparable
cases in which a self-feedback equilibrium and its corresponding cross-learning equilibrium are
both unique.
Proposition 2.3.2. For a high enough noisy supply elasticity λ, a low enough idiosyncratic
noisy supply shock precision τξ, and a high enough information precision τy (of the specula-
tors’ signal on the idiosyncratic shock), there exists a unique self-feedback equilibrium in which
speculators put a positive weight φ′ > 0 on the signal of the common productivity shock. In
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particular, φ′ < φ, where φ is the speculators’ weight on the signal of the common productivity
shock in the corresponding cross-learning equilibrium.
The comparison between a cross-learning equilibrium and its corresponding self-feedback
equilibrium implies that, the presence of cross-learning may encourage the speculators to put
a higher weight φ on the information about the common productivity shock. We also have
the following straightforward corollary regarding the information precisions of the endogenous
price signals and the capital providers’ investment sensitivities, all of which are functions of φ.
Corollary 2.3.1. Compared to its corresponding self-feedback equilibrium, a cross-learning
equilibrium features a higher ratio of the asset price information precision in predicting the
common shock to that in prediction the idiosyncratic shock, i.e., τpa/τpf > τpa/τpf , and a
higher ratio of the investment sensitivity to the common shock to that to the idiosyncratic
shock, i.e., Sa/Sf > S
′
a/S
′
f .
The results in Proposition 2.3.2 and Corollary 2.3.1 uncover the informational and real
consequences of cross learning in equilibrium. Intuitively, when the capital providers are able
to cross learn from each other’s asset prices (in addition to their own firms’ prices), they
indeed do so in equilibrium as other firms’ asset prices help them better infer the common
shock. This makes firms’ investments relatively more correlated with the common shock as
well as with each other. Thus, the speculators find it more profitable to put more weight on
the information about the common shock. This further makes asset prices becoming relatively
more informative about the common shock in guiding investment decisions, and thus the capital
providers respond to the common shock even more sensitively in investing. This spiral is absent
in existing feedback models, and it indeeds plays an important role in amplifying industry-wide
investment waves as we fully explore in the next section.
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2.4 Systematic Risks in Investment Waves
The most important implications of cross learning are on the systematic risks in industry-
wide investment waves. This comes from the endogenous spiral between the capital providers’
investment sensitivity to the common shock and the speculators’ weighting on the information
about the common shock, as shown in Section 2.3. In our multi-firm setting, this spiral
further leads to two new endogenous strategic complementarities. The new spiral and strategic
complementarities help generate empirical implications of systematic risks in many relevant
economic environments that seem jointly puzzling otherwise.
2.4.1 Impacts of Speculators’ Weight on Systematic Risks
It is instructive to first investigate the impacts of the speculators’ weight φ (on the information
of the common shock) on systematic risks, taking the weight as given. Along the way, we also
introduce our measures of systematic risks in investment waves.
Definition 2.4.1. The correlation coefficients between the investments of two firms and be-
tween the asset prices of two firms are defined as:
βI =
Cov(log Ii, log Ij)√
Var(log Ii)
√
Var(log Ij)
, and βP =
Cov(logPi, logPj)√
Var(logPi)
√
Var(logPj)
,
respectively. We call βI the investment beta and βP the price beta henceforth.
We take the investment beta βI and the price beta βP as two major measures of systematic
risks in investment waves, on both the real and financial aspects, respectively. Typically,
stronger investment waves are associated with a higher βI and a higher βP . However, as the
recent study by Hong and Sraer (2013) argues, some investment waves only exhibit a higher
investment beta βI but not a higher price beta βP . Hence, it is helpful to us to distinguish
between these two betas in characterizing different types of investment waves.
We have the following intuitive result on the impacts of the speculators’ weight φ on the two
betas. When the speculators put a higher weight on the information of the common shock, the
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capital providers’ investment sensitivities to the common shock increases, which makes their
investments more correlated. Moreover, this in turn encourages the speculators to put a higher
weight on the common productivity shock, which results in a higher correlation between asset
prices. With the comparison between a cross-learning equilibrium and its corresponding self-
feedback equilibrium in Section 2.3, these predictions shed lights on the empirical regularities in
papers such as Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005), Pastor and Veronesi (2006,
2009), Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam (2011) and Patton and
Verardo (2012).
Lemma 2.4.1. Both the investment beta βI and the price beta βP are increasing in φ when
φ > 0.
Similarly, we also look at the correlations between investment and the two productivity
shocks, respectively. As a complement to Definition 2.3.2 of investment sensitivity and the
associated Lemma 2.3.4, the following definition shoots a closer look at the equilibrium invest-
ments’ correlation with the two shocks.
Definition 2.4.2. The correlation coefficient between investment and the common productivity
shock and that between investment and the idiosyncratic productivity shock are defined as:
βA =
Cov(log Ii, logA)√
Var(log Ii)
√
Var(logA)
, and βF =
Cov(log Ii, logFi)√
Var(log Ii)
√
Var(logFi)
,
respectively. We call βA the common investment correlation and βF the idiosyncratic invest-
ment correlation henceforth.
Intuitively, when the speculators put a higher weight on the information of the common
shock, both investments and prices become more correlated with the common productivity
shock instead of the idiosyncratic shocks. This is because the asset prices become more in-
formative in predicting the common shock but less informative in predicting the idiosyncratic
shock.
Lemma 2.4.2. The common investment correlation βA is increasing in φ while the idiosyncratic
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investment correlation βF is decreasing in φ when φ > 0.
In what follows, we focus on the investment beta βI and the price beta βP in exploring
the full equilibrium dynamics, highlighting the speculators’ endogenous weight and equilibrium
systematic risks under cross learning. The investigation on the common investment correlation
βA and the idiosyncratic investment correlation βF yields the same insights.
2.4.2 Endogenous Cross Learning and Systematic Risks
Having established the impacts of the speculators’ weight φ (on the information about the
common shock) on systematic risks, we turn to one of the most interesting parts of the paper,
which investigates how the changes of economic environments affect equilibrium systematic
risks through the cross-learning mechanism. This unifies several empirical regularities that are
otherwise hard to reconcile without taking the capital providers’ cross learning into account.
Mathematically, we perform formal comparative statics of the equilibrium betas with respect to
exogenous parameters. We elaborate the first comparative statics (with respect to the common
uncertainty) in more detail to explore the underlying mechanism, and the other comparative
statics will follow the same intuition.
Common Uncertainty
We first focus on the effects of common uncertainty, which is captured by the prior precision τa
of the common productivity shock. We view the change of common uncertainty as an important
case, because a majority of industry-wide and economy-wide investment waves is associated
with an increasing common uncertainty at the first place. The most typical driver for an
increasing common uncertainty is the arrival of all-purpose technology or financial innovations,
as documented in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), Pastor and Veronesi (2006, 2009), and more
broadly the literature of bubbles. Our predictions help deliver a new perspective to look at the
impacts of innovations and the accompanying increasing common uncertainty on the systematic
risks in investment waves, highlighting the cross-learning mechanism.
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We use the following assumption (only valid in this subsection on common uncertainly) to
flesh out the cross-learning mechanism.
Assumption 2.4.1. The ratios τsa/τa (of the capital providers’ signal precision on the common
shock and the prior precision on the common shock) and τx/τa (of the speculators’ signal
precision on the common shock and the prior precision on the common shock) are kept as
constants when τa changes.
Assumption 2.4.1 not only helps shut down a direct information channel that confounds the
cross-learning mechanism (only in this case about common uncertainty) but also captures the
reality better. By keeping the two ratios constant, both the capital providers and the specula-
tors do not find their private information more valuable in predicting the common productivity
shock. This is actually closer to the reality that, when the common uncertainty increases, no
market participant naturally has an advantage in resolving the common uncertainty. In this
case, our cross-learning mechanism plays an important amplification role that is impossible
otherwise. Assumption 2.4.1 is also completely benign; our results are only stronger without
it.
Lemma 2.4.3. Increasing the common uncertainty leads to a higher weight of the speculators
on the information about the common shock. Specifically, the speculators’ weight φ is decreasing
in τa.
From Lemma 2.4.3, we understand that an increasing in the common uncertainty leads
to a stronger cross-learning spiral towards the common shock, despite that both the capital
providers and speculators experience equally increasing uncertainty in their private informa-
tion on the common shock. The following proposition further establishes the impacts on the
equilibrium systematic risks.
Proposition 2.4.1. Increasing the common uncertainty leads to both a higher investment beta
and a higher price beta in equilibrium. Specifically, βI and βP are both decreasing in τa. We
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further decompose the effects into two negative components (the same for βI and βP ):
dβ(τa, φ)
dτa
=
∂β(τa, φ)
∂τa︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mechanical Effect <0
+
∂β(τa, φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τa︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cross-Learning Effect <0
< 0 .
Proposition 2.4.1 indicates two effects contributing to the higher systematic risks associ-
ated with an increasing common uncertainty. The first is a mechanical effect that does not
depend on the endogenous interaction between the capital providers and the speculators under
cross learning. Intuitively, when the common uncertainty increases, speculators’ investment
sensitivity to the common shock increases as well. This immediately results in a higher corre-
lation among firms’ investments and prices. Figure 2.4.1 illustrates this mechanical effect in a
two-firm example.
Figure 2.4.1: Mechanical Effect on Systematic Risks
The second effect, the cross-learning effect, is more interesting and only at play in our multi-
firm cross-learning framework with two types of shocks. It reflects the new spiral between the
capital providers’ investment sensitivity to the common shock and the speculators’ weight on
the signal of the common shock. Interestingly, it takes place even when only some (not all)
firms in the economy perceive the increasing common uncertainty.24 Figure 2.4.2 illustrates
this cross-learning effect in a two-firm example. Suppose, without loss of generality, firm 1’s
24Technically, this requires some non-meaure-zero firms to perceive the increasing common shock.
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capital provider perceives the increasing common uncertainty. As in the upper-left panel, firm
1’s investment sensitivity to the common shock Sa1 first increases (along with a decreasing
investment sensitivity to its idiosyncratic shock), leading to a higher weight φ1 on the infor-
mation of the common shock by its speculators. Then, as in the upper-right panel, a higher φ1
results in an even higher Sa1 since firm 1 learns from its own price. More importantly, because
of cross learning, firm 2’s investment sensitivity to the common shock Sa2 also increases, since
firm 2 finds firm 1’s price more informative about the common shock and thus understands
the common shock better. It then naturally leads to a higher weight φ2 on the information
of the common shock by firm 2’s speculators, as in the lower-left panel. Finally, the increase
of φ2 results in even higher Sa1 and Sa2 by cross learning, as in the lower-right panel. The
entire process suggests two new strategic complementarities only under cross learning: the first
is among speculators’ weights on the information about the common shock in each market,
and the second is among different firms’ relative investment sensitivities to the common shock.
With the two strategic complementarities, the spiral goes on and on and eventually pushes the
economy to a new equilibrium with much higher systematic risks.
Our predictions on systematic risks after an increasing common uncertainty are consis-
tent with the literature (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004, Pastor and Veronesi, 2006, 2009)
that documents the increasing systematic risks after major technological innovations, as these
innovations often come with industry-wide uncertain market prospects. In particular, the
cross-learning effect sheds lights on the huge magnitude of systematic risks in these investment
waves that are often ascribed to behavioral biases (see Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013, Xiong,
2013, for surveys).
Capital Providers’ Access to Information
We then turn to the capital providers’ access to private information, captured by the two
precisions τsa and τsf regarding the two productivity shocks, respectively. Again, we have the
following lemma pertaining to the speculators’ endogenous weight.
Lemma 2.4.4. Increasing the capital providers’ information precision on the common shock
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leads to a higher weight of the speculators on the information about the common shock, while
increasing the capital providers’ information precision on the idiosyncratic shock leads to a
lower weight. Specifically, the speculators’ weight φ is increasing in τsa while decreasing in τsf .
Lemma 2.4.4 prescribes that, when the capital providers have better information on the
common shock, the equilibrium cross-learning spiral towards the common shock is also stronger;
while better information on the idiosyncratic shock pushes the cross-learning spiral towards the
idiosyncratic shocks. This further leads to the following proposition. Similar to Proposition
2.4.1, we have the mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect, both in the same direction.
Proposition 2.4.2. For the capital providers’ access to private information, we have the
following results.
i) Increasing the precision on the common shock leads to a higher investment beta when the
precision is not large, and always a higher price beta; specifically, βI is increasing in τsa when
τsa > τa + τxτζ and βP is always increasing in τsa.
ii) Increasing the precision on the idiosyncratic shock leads to both a lower investment beta
and a lower price beta; specifically, βI and βP are always decreasing in τsf .
The predictions here are broadly supported by the empirical evidence in Greenwood and
Nagel (2009). It suggests that younger and more confident capital providers, who tend to
have better knowledge about the industry-wide common shock compared to that on their
idiosyncratic shocks, tilt their investments more towards the common shock, leading to higher
investment and price correlations. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) admit that the magnitude of
systematic risks they have observed is obviously larger than any existing rational models can
accommodate and thus refer to behavioral explanations. In this sense, our predictions provide
a new angle to investigate such effects from a rational perspective, highlighting the potential
of strong cross learning.
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Liquidity Trading
We also investigate the effects of liquidity trading, captured by the market liquidity λ and the
two precisions of noisy supplies τζ and τξ. Similarly, we have the following intuitive lemma on
the speculators’ endogenous weight.
Lemma 2.4.5. For liquidity trading, a higher weight of the speculators on the information
about the common shock results from a lower market liquidity, a lower variance of common
noisy supply, or a higher variance of idiosyncratic noisy supply. Specifically, the speculators’
weight φ is decreasing in λ, increasing in τζ , and decreasing in τξ.
The predictions along the three dimensions are all intuitive. When the market liquidity
is higher, it is easier for the noisy traders to absorb speculators’ demand, so that the cross-
learning spiral towards the common shock is weaker. When the variance of the common noisy
supply is lower, speculators are more likely to trade upon the common productivity shock.
In contrast, when the variance of the idiosyncratic noisy supply is lower, speculators are less
likely to trade upon the common shock, which results in a weaker spiral towards the common
shock,
These predictions are further reflected in the following proposition, speaking to the overall
effects of liquidity trading on investment waves. Again, similar to Proposition 2.4.1, we have
the mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect in the same direction.
Proposition 2.4.3. For liquidity trading, we have the following results.
i) A higher investment beta βI results from a lower market liquidity, a lower variance of
common noisy supply, or a higher variance of idiosyncratic noisy supply. Specifically, βI is
decreasing in λ, increasing in τζ , and decreasing in τξ.
ii) A higher price beta βP results from a lower market liquidity, or a higher variance of
idiosyncratic noisy supply. Specifically, βP is decreasing in λ and decreasing in τξ.
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2.5 Investment Inefficiency and Competition
An important question is that how firms’ cross learning affects real investment efficiency. On
the positive side, cross learning allows capital providers to take advantage of more information
that would not be available if they were not able to observe their own and other firms’ asset
prices. However, the interests between capital providers and speculators in learning the two
types of shocks are not perfectly aligned. More importantly, each firm’s cross learning further
creates a new pecuniary externality on other firms. These frictions result in investment in-
efficiency. In particular, the pecuniary externality associated with cross learning increases in
the number of firms, suggesting that more competitive industries may exhibit more inefficient
investment waves.
In evaluating that how these frictions affect investment efficiency, we proceed by two steps.
First, we evaluate the overall investment efficiency and show that any cross-learning equilibrium
always features investment inefficiency. Then we characterize the new pecuniary externality
induced by cross learning to better understand the origin of such inefficiency. By doing this, we
particularly underscore the implications of competition on inefficient investment waves through
the new pecuniary externality.
2.5.1 Overall Investment Efficiency
Formally, we define investment efficiency by the ex-ante expected net benefit of the total
investments by all the firms, given that capital providers may learn from all publicly available
asset prices:
Definition 2.5.1. The investment efficiency of the economy is defined as
R =
∫ 1
0
Ridi ,
where
Ri = E
[
E
[
AFiIi − c
2
I2i |Γi
]]
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denotes each firm i’s ex-ante expected net benefit of investment, given its capital provider’s
information set under cross learning: Γi = {Pi, {P−i}, sa,i, sf,i}.
We have the following proposition indicating the universal presence of investment ineffi-
ciency in a cross-learning equilibrium. We focus on the cases in which a unique cross-learning
equilibrium is guaranteed.
Proposition 2.5.1. There always exists a unique optimal weight φ∗ > 0 of the speculators
on the signal of the common shock that maximizes investment efficiency. In particular, for
a high enough noisy supply elasticity λ and a high enough information precision τy (of the
speculators’ signal on the idiosyncratic shock), the optimal weight is always smaller than that
in the corresponding cross-learning equilibrium, i.e., φ∗ < φ.
Proposition 2.5.1 indicates that when the speculators’ signal on the idiosyncratic shock is
relatively more precise, they tend to put an inefficiently high weight on the other signal about
the common shock. This makes capital providers to respond to the common shock inefficiently
too sensitively, leading to inefficient investment waves. This particular inefficiency fits quite
in line with what we have observed in typical investment waves (for example, Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005, Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev, 2007, Hoberg and Phillips,
2010, Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam, 2011) that both primary and secondary market in-
vestors pay inefficiently too much attention to common shocks or noisy macroeconomics news
while ignore informative idiosyncratic news.25
To better understand the impacts of cross learning on investment efficiency and potentially
shed lights on corrective policies, we perform comparative statistics of investment efficiency
with respect to several economic parameters. Again, we focus on unique cross-learning equi-
libria by assuming that the noisy supply elasticity λ and the information precision τy (of
speculators’ signal on the idiosyncratic shock) are high enough.
25Our framework is in fact general enough to admit the opposite case: when the speculators’ signal on the
common shock is relatively more precise, they tend to put an inefficiently too high weight on the signal about
the idiosyncratic shocks, also leading to generic investment inefficiency. This case is empirically less plausible,
but we still explore the theoretical possibilities in the appendix.
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Proposition 2.5.2. In a cross-learning equilibrium, investment efficiency is higher when the
market liquidity is higher, or the precision of idiosyncratic noisy supply is higher, or the capital
providers’ information precision on the idiosyncratic productivity shock is higher. Specifically,
R is increasing in λ, τξ, and τsf .
The comparative statics regarding the investment efficiency are intuitive. First, a higher
market liquidity has a corrective effect on the investment efficiency. That is, in a deeper asset
market, the speculators’ trading positions can be more easily absorbed. Specifically, when an
asset market is more liquid or deeper, it becomes harder for the same amount of informed
trading to impact the asset price. This is in particular beneficial when cross learning is strong
after the arrival of major innovations or other common news involving high uncertainty, because
the inefficient impact from speculators’ overuse of information about the common shock can
be better absorbed.
Importantly, this corrective effect on real investment efficiency helps justify recent regula-
tory concerns and practices by the SEC in limiting informed speculators’ trading positions but
at the same time lifting the participation barrier to less informed market makers and retail
investors. These two are hard to be reconciled as approaches to correct investors’ irrationality
or to sidestep limits to arbitrage. In this sense, our cross-learning mechanism does a better
job in delivering policy implications than typical models featuring bubbles.
Second, increasing investment efficiency in an economy with cross learning calls for a better
use of information about the idiosyncratic shocks in the economy. Any policies on financial
disclosure or government communication failing to keep this point in mind may end up crowding
out the idiosyncratic news and resulting in investment inefficiency. This policy implication fits
broadly in line with the recent studies that speak to the dark side of financial disclosures or
central bank communications (Di Maggio and Pagano, 2013, Kurlat and Veldkamp, 2013).
Theoretically, the endogenous overuse of information on the common shock due to multi-firm
cross learning results in an inefficient crowding-out effect on the use of information on the
idiosyncratic shock. Thus, it also complements the idea on the crowding-out effect of public
information provision on the use of private information (see Amador and Weill, 2010).
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2.5.2 Competition and Cross Learning
To help better understand the origin of investment inefficiency, we perform a theoretical exercise
to further identify a new pecuniary externality induced by cross learning. In particular, in
doing so, we extend our baseline model to admit finite number of firms. This allows us not
only to underscore the efficiency change associated with different extent of cross learning but
to investigate the relationship between competition and inefficient investment waves, which has
been a well documented puzzle in recent empirical literature (see Hoberg and Phillips, 2010,
Greenwood and Hanson, 2013, among others).
We first outline the extended cross-learning framework. A major challenge in identifying
the externality associated with cross learning is to deal with the information endowment effect.
Specifically, when the actual number of firms increase, the total amount of information in the
economy also increases, leading to an efficiency gain to each firm. This information endowment
effect confounds the identification of externalities and thus needs to be controlled properly. To
achieve this goal, our extended cross-learning framework still features a continuum of 1 of
firms being able to learn from all asset prices. However, we assume that the speculators do not
fully internalize capital providers’ cross learning. Concretely, they believe that each firm only
observes and learns from as many as n > 1 asset prices, including its own price. This setting
delivers an equilibrium weight (of the speculators on the information about the common shock)
identical to that in a corresponding economy with n finite firms operating and the speculators
fully internalizing their cross learning, while keeps the total amount of information endowment
invariant with n. Hence, we are able to stand out the externality associated with cross learning
as the number of firms increases.
We rigorously formulate the idea above as follows. We divide all the firms into n > 1
groups, a continuum of 1/n of firms in each group. The firms still observe and learn from all
the asset prices as in the baseline model, regardless of the grouping. However, the speculators
do not fully internalize firms’ cross learning as before. Specifically, let i ∈ [0, 1/n) denote
one firm in the first group. The speculators believe that for any i, the n firms in the set
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{i + k/n|0 6 k 6 n − 1, k ∈ Z} learn only from the asset prices of each other but not from
the asset prices of other firms outside the set. Figure 5 offers an illustration of the case when
n = 3, in which the speculators believe that the three red firms (i, i+ 1/3, and i+ 2/3) cross
learn only from each other and the three blue firms (i′, i′ + 1/3, and i′ + 2/3) cross learn only
from each other, similar for other firm triples.
This setting has several advantages, both economically and technically. First, it casts in-
dustry competition in a straightforward way. Since the speculators are risk neutral, it looks to
them as if there are exactly n firms operating in the economy. Thus, the speculators’ weight in
equilibrium is identical to that in a corresponding economy with exactly n firms and the specu-
lators fully internalizing their cross learning. Second, it helps identify the pecuniary externality
induced by cross learning while keeps the total information endowment fixed. Especially, the
efficiency change associated with cross learning takes place only through the speculators’ en-
dogenous weighting over the two types of shocks, making it possible to distinguish that from
firms’ actual information endowment. Last, this setting offers a smooth transition between the
baseline model with full cross learning (as n goes to infinity) and the self-feedback benchmark
(as n equals to 1). This not only makes our analysis analytically tractable but helps unify all
the results and intuitions.
We acknowledge again that we are abstracting away from any possible industrial organiza-
tion of the firms’ product markets. Rather, we make use of the number of firms as a proxy for
competition, which we believe is the most relevant measure.26 This allows us to underscore
the cross-learning mechanism by highlighting it as the only interaction among firms. In this
sense, our model serves as a benchmark for further research that may take more aspects of
industrial competition along with firms’ cross learning into account.27
We proceed to characterize the equilibrium in the extended framework and the corre-
26To use the number of firms to proxy competition is common in the literature, especially when information
is a focus (see Vives, 2010, for a survey).
27For example, Peress (2010) offers an interesting analysis on the impacts of monopolistic competition in
product markets on stock market efficiency, but does not consider feedback to real investments or cross learning
as we do. He does not consider the implications on investment waves as well.
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sponding investment efficiency. We still consider symmetric equilibria, and denote by φn the
speculators’ weight on the signal of the common shock, when the speculators believe that each
firm only learns from as many as n asset prices, including its own. For convenience, we call
the associated equilibrium an n-learning equilibrium.
Formally, each capital provider i still observes its own asset price Pi and all other firms’
asset prices {P−i}. Same as before, the information content of any asset price is characterized
by
Pi = exp
 φn
λ
√
τ−1x φ2n + τ
−1
y
a+
1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2n + τ
−1
y
fi +
ζ + ξi
λ
− µi
λ
√
τ−1x φ2n + τ
−1
y
 ,
equivalent to a signal
zn (Pi) = φna+ fi +
√
τ−1x φ2n + τ
−1
y (ζ + ξi) .
However, in an n-learning equilibrium, the speculators believe that each capital provider
only learns from its own price as well as the other n− 1 firms’ asset prices. Specifically, from
the speculators’ perspective, due to symmetry, each capital provider i has four signals: the
own private signals sa,i and sf,i, the signal zn(Pi) from its own asset price, and another signal
zn(P−i) coming from the other n− 1 asset prices:28
zn (P−i) = φna+
∑
l 6=i fl
n− 1 +
√
τ−1x φ2n + τ
−1
y
(
ζ +
∑
l 6=i ξl
n− 1
)
.
From the speculators’ perspective, capital provider i uses these four signals to infer the
sum of the two (log) productivity shocks, a+ fi, in making investment decisions. Concretely,
the speculators believe that capital provider i updates beliefs as
E[a+ fi|Γi] = z′Var(z)−1Cov(a+ fi, z) , (2.12)
28When n = 1, only the first three signals are relevant and the n-learning equilibrium degenerates to a
self-feedback equilibrium.
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where z = [sa,i, sf,i, zn(Pi), zn(P−i)]′. As a consequence, the speculators’ perceived investment
sensitivities San to the common shock and Sfn to the idiosyncratic shocks are read off from
the conditional expectation (2.12). Following the same approach as before in solving for the
speculators’ optimal weight in trading, we finally get
φn =
(
San + 1− φn
λ
√
τx+τyφ2n
)
τx
τa+τx(
Sfn + 1− 1
λ
√
τx+τyφ2n
)
τy
τf+τy
. (2.13)
Clearly, the equilibrium condition (2.13), with the investment sensitivities prescribed by
condition (2.12), is equivalent to that in a corresponding economy with n firms operating
and speculators fully internalizing their cross learning, so is the equilibrium weight φn, while
the expression of investment efficiency can be shown to be the same as that in Definition
2.5.1. Therefore, we have the following proposition regarding the equilibrium weight φn and
investment efficiency Rn in an n-learning equilibrium. We still focus on comparable cases in
which all n-learning equilibria are unique.
Proposition 2.5.3. For a high enough noisy supply elasticity λ, a low enough idiosyncratic
noisy supply shock precision τξ, and a high enough information precision τy (of the speculators’
signal on the idiosyncratic shock),
i) for all n > 1, there exists a unique n-learning equilibrium in which the speculators put a
positive weight φn > 0 on the signal of the common productivity shock,
ii) for all n > 1, φ∗ < φ′(= φ1) < φn < φ, in particular, φn is increasing in n, where φ, φ′
are the equilibrium weights in the baseline cross-learning equilibrium and in the self-feedback
equilibrium, respectively, and φ∗ is the optimal weight that maximizes investment efficiency,
and
iii) for all n > 1, R < Rn < R∗, in particular, Rn is decreasing in n, where R is the in-
vestment efficiency in the baseline cross-learning equilibrium and R∗ is the optimal investment
efficiency.
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Proposition 2.5.3 offers a clear identification of the externality and efficiency loss associ-
ated with cross learning. Under the parameters we are interested, when the number of firms
increases, cross learning makes the speculators to put an increasing weight φn on the signal of
the common shock. Along with the established results in Section 2.4, this suggests stronger
investment waves with higher systematic risks. Moreover, since the information endowment is
controlled, this leads to a decreasing investment efficiency, associated with an increasing extent
of cross learning. The key to understand this is a new externality through the speculators’
weighting over the two types of shocks in response to the capital providers’ cross learning.
When each capital provider learns from other firms’ asset prices, she only cares about her own
investment decision and wants to use other firms’ asset prices for better inferring the common
shock. This makes her investment more sensitive to the common shock, which in turn en-
courages the speculators to put a higher weight on the signal of the common shock. However,
she does not internalize the endogenous cost on other firms’ investment decisions, because her
cross learning makes asset prices endogenously less informative on other firms’ idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, through the speculators’ endogenous response in terms of weighting the
two shocks. When there are more firms in the economy, the speculators respond more heavily
to the capital providers’ cross learning and each asset price is also used by more firms, which
implies a stronger externality not being internalized by each capital provider in cross learning.
We highlight the externality we have identified as a new pecuniary externality, taking
effect through the informativeness of prices instead of price levels. In the classical pecuniary
externality literature (see Stiglitz, 1982, Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986, and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis, 1985, and for recent theoretical developments see Farhi and Werning, 2013, He
and Kondor, 2013, and Davila, 2014 for a comprehensive treatment), agents do not internalize
the impacts of their actions on equilibrium price levels, leading to a welfare loss under various
frictions. In particular, the classical pecuniary externality generates welfare transfers across
agents through the levels of prices. In our framework, instead, the capital providers do not
fully internalize the impacts of cross learning on equilibrium price informativeness. This leads
to a typical “tragedy of the commons” regarding the use of the price system as an information
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source under multi-firm cross learning. This tragedy-of-the-commons observation is absent in
classical single-firm feedback models. In this sense, our pecuniary externality is also reminiscent
of the notion of learning externality in the earlier dynamic learning and herding literature (for
example, Vives, 1997) that an agent, when responding to private information, does not take
into account the benefit of increased informativeness of public information in the future. This
literature, however, does not explicitly consider the roles of financial markets and in particular
the feedback from market prices to investments as we do.
Along with the results in Section 2.4, the new pecuniary externality associated with cross
learning offers a new perspective to investigate the puzzling fact that more competitive in-
dustries exhibit more inefficient investment waves with higher systematic risks. This fact has
been recently documented in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and shown to be robust after many
relevant controls. As they suggest, however, no single theory in the literature can accommo-
date their findings. More recently, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) find a similar pattern in the
cargo ship industry that also applies to other industries. They estimate a behavioral theory in
which firms over-extrapolate exogenous demand shocks and partially neglect the endogenous
investment responses of their competitors. Our fully rational cross-learning framework helps
reconcile these facts by explicitly identifying the pecuniary externality associated with com-
petition and its impacts on real investment efficiency. Relatedly, Ozoguz and Rebello (2013)
have empirically identified that firms in more competitive industries adapt investments more
sensitively to stock prices of their peers, which supports our theory.
It is worth noting that, when n = 1, that is, the speculators believe that there is only
one firm operating, the economy still features investment inefficiency. Under the parameters
we are interested, this benchmark investment inefficiency comes from the fact that the capital
providers find the information about their idiosyncratic shocks more valuable whereas the
speculators still find it profitable to put a considerable weight on the signal of the common
shock in trading. This conflict of interests between capital providers (or firms) and speculators
is generally present in the feedback literature in different forms (see the survey by Bond,
Edmans and Goldstein, 2012), and Goldstein and Yang (2014a) formally identify it as the
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mismatch channel of feedback. Thus, the contribution of our work is first to extend the
mismatch channel to a multi-firm feedback framework with two fundamentally different types
of shocks, and then more importantly, to identify the new pecuniary externality associated
with cross learning that is absent in classical feedback models.
Although our framework allows for an analytical characterization, we also offer numerical
examples to help illustrate the pecuniary externality and efficiency loss associated with different
extent of cross learning. We set τa = τf = τsa = τsf = τx = τζ = 1, τy = 10, τξ = 0.1, λ = 2,
κ = 1, and c = 0.5. The left panel of Figure 2.5.2 depicts the equilibrium weight φn as n
increases as the blue solid line. When n becomes larger, the weight gradually approaches that
in the baseline cross-learning equilibrium, as depicted by the red dashed line. The right panel of
Figure 2.5.2 depicts the log of the efficiency loss due to cross learning, measured by log(R∗/Rn).
As shown in the blue solid line, the efficiency loss associated with cross learning increases in
n, suggesting a more severe pecuniary externality as competition becomes stronger. In the
baseline cross-learning equilibrium, the pecuniary externality is the strongest, as depicted by
the red dashed line. These results are robust to a very wide range of parameters once λ and τy
are relatively large while τξ is relatively small, which are empirically relevant as we discussed
above.
Admittedly, our identification of the pecuniary externality associated with cross learning
does not attempt to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the merits of competition. Relatedly,
the investment efficiency Rn in an n-learning equilibrium cannot be interpreted as a direct
measure of the investment efficiency in an actual competitive industry with n firms. Our point
is focused, however, to suggest a new perspective to look at the relationship between inefficient
investment waves and competition, a puzzling fact well documented recently and hard to be
reconciled with existing theories. We admit that, despite the fact that competition increases
the extent of cross learning, with new adverse implications for investment efficiency, it may
well remain desirable when all other social benefits and costs of competition are taken into
account.
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2.6 Discussion
Our cross learning framework focuses on the systematic risks and investment inefficiency in
investment waves, which we believe are less understood in the literature. It is also natural to
rely on our framework to shed lights on some other commonly observed phenomena and to
add new insights. This section discusses two directions.
2.6.1 Over-investment under Cross Learning
Investment waves usually exhibit both high systematic risks (second moment) and over-investment
(first moment). Although the latter has been well addressed in the literature, our framework
is easily adaptable to generate so. Especially, our cross learning framework offers a new per-
spective to explain why over-investment happens more often in technologies or industries that
are more sensitive to common shocks.
We keep all the settings in our baseline model except for introducing two different invest-
ment technologies. Specifically, each firm i now has two mutually exclusive projects, one only
subject to the common shock A while the other only subject to the idiosyncratic shock Fi.
We call the former common project and the latter idiosyncratic project. Introducing the two
types of projects is a parsimonious way to model the cross-section of different technologies or
industries according to their different sensitivity to the common shock. For simplicity, here we
only allow each firm to allocate a fixed amount of money between the two projects. Hence,
each capital provider’s problem is:
max
Ii∈[0,1]
[AIi + Fi(1− Ii)|Γi] .
We again highlight cross learning: Γi = {Pi, {P−i}, sa,i, sf,i} . This adapted setting is in the
similar spirit of Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2011) but enriches it with both cross learning
and the firm’s debate between the common project and the idiosyncratic project.
Following the same equilibrium concept as our baseline model, one can show that a cross-
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learning equilibrium features over-investment in the common project while under-investment
in the idiosyncratic project, compared to the first best. The intuition is the same as before.
When the capital providers are able to cross learn, the speculators again find it more profitable
to put a higher weight on the information about the common shock. This makes the prices
more informative about the common shock and thus encourages the capital providers to invest
more on the common project while less on their idiosyncratic projects.
Complementary to the existing literature about over-investment, our cross-learning mecha-
nism has two new implications. First, over-investment is more likely to happen in technologies
or industries that are more sensitive to common shocks, which is reflected by the common
project in our stylized model. This fits quite in line with the recent episodes of over-investment
in the IT industry and in housing markets. Second, which is perhaps more subtle and inter-
esting, over-investment in the common project is always accompanied by under-investment
in the idiosyncratic projects at the same time. This suggests that over-investment does not
necessarily imply an inefficiently large economy scale but rather an inefficient composition of
various economic activities.
The comparative statics of the adapted model also offer predictions consistent with the
reality. For example, when the common project has a higher ex-ante expected productivity,
cross learning is stronger and thus the equilibrium features a higher level of over-investment
in the common shock. Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2011) and more recently Fajgelbaum,
Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014) provide full-fledged models to demonstrate such a
relationship between investment and information provision. They have similar predictions on
how beliefs of productivity affect investment decisions. These papers, though featuring self-
feedback and speaking to the level of investment directly, do not consider cross learning and
the two types of shocks as we do.
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2.6.2 Industry Momentum under Cross Learning
The contemporaneous study by Sockin and Xiong (2014b) uses a feedback model to generate
return momentum in a housing cycle context. Although our model does not aim to provide a
general dynamic account for investment waves, the introduction of multiple firms and the two
types of shocks also help shed lights on the understanding of momentum by further establishing
a channel between cross learning and industry momentum.
Industry momentum, first identified by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), suggests that
industry portfolios also exhibit considerable momentum, and it even accounts for much of
the individual stock momentum. As discussed by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), individual
stock momentum may be explained by a number of behavioral theories focusing on investors’
information barrier or risk appetite. But there have been no formal theories that directly speak
to the existence and the magnitude of industry momentum. Our framework can potentially
offer a consistent rational theory for both individual stock momentum and industry momentum,
highlighting firms’ investment activities and their cross learning instead.
In our benchmark three-period model, the standard definition of overall individual momen-
tum is
Mi = Cov (log(AFiIi)− logPi, logPi) ,
and industry momentum can be defined as
M = Cov
(
log
∫ 1
0
AFiIidi− logP , logP
)
.
It is straightforward to show that both individual stock momentum and industry momen-
tum exist in equilibrium, and their magnitudes increase in the speculators’ weight φ on the
information about the common shock. Specifically, Mi and M are always positive when the
noisy supply elasticity λ and the information precision τy (of speculators’ signal on the id-
iosyncratic shock) are large enough, and they increase in φ. Intuitively, when the speculators
put a higher weight on the common shock, the asset prices become more informative about
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the common shock and thus firms’ investment also becomes more sensitive to the common
shock. Therefore, the common shock plays a more important role in determining both the
asset prices and the eventual cash flows of the firms, implying both a stronger individual stock
momentum and a stronger industry momentum. Moreover, according to the results regarding
the relationship between cross learning and competition in Section 2.5, both individual stock
momentum and industry momentum may be stronger in more competitive industries, also due
to a stronger cross learning effect.
It is worth highlighting that our mechanism to generate individual momentum and in-
dustry momentum is fundamentally different from the prevailing explanations that highlight
overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998), sentiment (Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1998), or slow information diffusion (Hong and Stein, 1999). In those models,
investors generally ignore some information content revealed by asset prices. In contrast, in
our model, the capital providers’ rational cross learning from all available asset prices plays a
central role.
2.7 Conclusion
Firms and capital providers’ cross learning behavior is not only empirically important but also
theoretically relevant for commonly observed investment waves. We have developed a tractable
model to admit cross learning and delivered a series of predictions regarding investment waves.
We have illustrated that investment waves comes from new strategic complementarities and
a spiral that coordinate capital providers’ investment sensitivity and speculators’ weight in
trading towards the common productivity shock. However, cross learning may lead to higher
investment inefficiency, because capital providers do not internalize the new externality that
other firms’ asset prices become less informative on their idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
In more competitive industries, cross learning tends to be stronger, potentially leading to
more inefficient investment waves with higher systematic risks. Hence, appropriate policy
interventions are called for to correct the inefficiency in industry-investment waves.
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Figure 2.4.2: Learning Effect on Systematic Risks
Order: Upper-Left, Upper-Right, Lower-Left, Lower-Right
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Figure 2.5.1: Extended Cross-Learning Framework
Figure 2.5.2: Competition on Cross Learning and Efficiency Loss
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proofs
This appendix provides all proofs omitted above with auxiliary results.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. According to the equilibrium definition, any speculator (i, j) longs
one share of asset i when φixij + yij > µi and shorts one share otherwise. Equivalently,
speculator (i, j) longs one share of asset i when
φixij + yij√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
>
µi − (φia+ fi)√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
,
and shorts one share otherwise. Thus, in asset market i, all speculators’ aggregate demand is
Di = 1− 2Φ
µi − (φia+ fi)√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
 .
Hence, in equilibrium, market clearing implies
1− 2Φ
µi − (φia+ fi)√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
 = 1− 2Φ(ζ + ξi − λ logPi) ,
which further implies that the equilibrium price in asset market i is
Pi = exp
 φi
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
a+
1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
fi +
ζ + ξi
λ
− µi
λ
√
τ−1x φ2i + τ
−1
y
 .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2. In a symmetric equilibrium, the capital providers put a same weight
φ on the information of the common shock in any asset market i. Thus, by Lemma 2.3.1, for
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asset price Pi, its equivalent signal in predicting the common shock a becomes
za(Pi) = a+
1
φ
fi +
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
φ
(ζ + ξi) .
Since fi and ξi are both i.i.d. and have zero means, the aggregate price P is equivalent to
the following signal
za(P ) =
∫ 1
0
a+ 1
φ
fi +
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
φ
(ζ + ξi)
 di = a+
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
φ
ζ
in predicting the common shock a. It immediately follows the construction of the other signal
zf,i(P ) in predicting the idiosyncratic shock.
Finally, it is easy to verify that any combination of the asset prices {Pi, i ∈ [0, 1]} cannot
be more informative in predicting the two productivity shocks. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3. From the capital providers’ problem (2.1), the first order condition
is
Ii =
κ
c
E[exp(a+ fi)|Γi]
=
κ
c
exp
(
E[a+ fi|Γi] + 1
2
Var[a+ fi|Γi]
)
.
By Lemma 2.3.2, we know that sa,i and za(P ) are only informative about the common
shock a and sf,i and zf,i(P ) are only informative about the idiosyncratic shock fi. Applying
Bayesian updating immediately leads to the following optimal investment policy
Ii =
κ
c
exp
[
τsasa,i + τpaza(P )
τa + τsa + τpa
+
1
2(τa + τsa + τpa)
+
τfsf,i + τpfzf,i(P )
τf + τsf + τpf
+
1
2(τf + τsf + τpf )
]
.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4. This is a direct application of Lemma 2.3.2 to Definition 2.3.2.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. We proceed step by step.
Step 1: Proof of the existence of the solution.
Following the equilibrium condition (2.10) for the cross-learning case, let
g(φ) = φ− α1 − γ1
α2 − γ2 = φ−
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
+ 1− φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τsf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
,
where τpa is given by (2.5) and τpf is given by (2.7), both being function of φ. It is easy to
check that limφ→−∞ g(φ) < 0 and limφ→+∞ g(φ) > 0 by the following two equations:
lim
φ→−∞
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
+ 1− φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τsf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
=
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
τsa+τζτx
τa+τsa+τζτx
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
τsf
τf+τsf
+ 1
,
and
lim
φ→+∞
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
+ 1− φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τsf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
=
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
τsa+τζτx
τa+τsa+τζτx
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
τsf
τf+τsf
+ 1
.
The analysis above indicates that there always exists a solution of φ to the equilibrium
condition (2.10), i.e., g(φ) = 0, by the intermediate value theorem. Especially, when λ >
1/
√
τ−1x , we know that
f(0) = −
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
+ 1
τsf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x
τx
τa+τx
τy
τf+τy
< 0 .
We conclude that there always exists a positive solution φ > 0 as long as λ is large enough.
Step 2: Proof of the uniqueness of the solution when τf is large enough.
By simple algebra, the equilibrium condition (2.10) is re-expressed as
 τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
+ 1− φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
 τx
τa + τx
= φ
 τsf + τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
 τy
τf + τy
.
(2.1)
149
Applying Taylor expansion to the terms in equation (2.1) with respect to τ−1y yields:
τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
= − τa
τa + τsa + τpa
− τa
(τa + τsa + τpa)2
τζ
τ−2x φ2
τ−1y + o(τ
−1
y ) ,
τsf + τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
= 1− τf
τf + τsf + τpf
− τf
(τf + τsf + τpf )
2
τξ
τ−2x φ4
τ−1y + o(τ
−1
y ) ,
φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
=
1
λ
√
τ−1x
− 1
2λτ
− 32
x φ2
τ−1y + o(τ
−1
y ) ,
and
1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
=
1
λφ
√
τ−1x
− 1
2λτ
− 32
x φ3
τ−1y + o(τ
−1
y ) .
Plugging them back into equation (2.1), we have:
τx
τa+τx
τf+τy
τy
[
2− τaτa+τsa+τpa − τa(τa+τsa+τpa)2
τζ
τ−2x φ2
τ−1y − 1
λ
√
τ−1x
+ 1
2λτ
− 32
x φ2
τ−1y + o(τ−1y )
]
= φ
[
2− τfτf+τsf+τpf −
τf
(τf+τsf+τpf )
2
τξ
τ−2x φ4
τ−1y − 1
λφ
√
τ−1x
+ 1
2λτ
− 32
x φ3
τ−1y + o(τ−1y )
]
,
which becomes a cubic equation of φ when τy goes to infinity:
(
τsa + τxτζ
τa + τsa + τxτζ
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
)
τx
τa + τx
=
τsfφ
3 + τxτξφ
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 + τxτξ
+ φ−
√
τx
λ
. (2.2)
Note that, the left hand side of equation (2.2) does not depends on φ. Denote by h(φ) the
right hand side of (2.2), and its first order derivative with respect to φ is given by
∂h(φ)
∂φ
= 1− τfφ
2
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 + τxτξ
+ 1− 2τfτxτξφ
2
(τfφ2 + τsfφ2 + τxτξ)2
> 0 ,
which indicates that the right hand side of equation (2.2) is increasing in φ and thus we have
a unique solution to equation (2.2). Therefore, since g(φ) is a continuous function of τy, there
always exists one unique solution to g(φ) = 0, i.e., equation (2.1), when τy is large enough.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3.1. In the
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benchmark case without cross learning, the equilibrium condition (2.11) is re-expressed as
 τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
+
τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
φ′ + 1− φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
 τx
τa + τx
= φ
 τsf + τpf
τf + τsf + τpf
+
τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
1
φ′
+ 1− 1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
 τy
τf + τy
,
which further reduces to
(
τsa
τa + τsa
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
)
τx
τa + τx
= φ
(
τsf
τf + τsf
+ 1−
√
τx
λφ
)
, (2.3)
when τy goes to infinity, τξ goes to zero and λ >
√
τx. Since the right hand side of equation
(2.3) is increasing inf φ, we know that there must exist one unique solution to equation (2.3).
On the other hand, when τξ goes to zero (and when τy goes to infinity and λ >
√
τx),
equation (2.2) in the case with cross learning becomes
(
τsa + τpa
τa + τsa + τpa
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
)
τx
τa + τx
= φ
(
τsf
τf + τsf
+ 1−
√
τx
λφ
)
. (2.4)
We compare between the two equations (2.3) and (2.4). It is clear that their right hand
sides are the same, while the left hand side of (2.3) (for the benchmark case without cross
learning) is smaller than the left hand side of (2.4) (for the case with cross learning). Thanks
to the continuity with respect to τy and τξ of the two equilibrium conditions (2.11) and (2.10)
in the two cases, we conclude that the equilibrium φ′ in the benchmark case without cross
learning is always lower than the equilibrium φ is the problem with cross learning, as long as
λ >
√
τx, τy is large enough, and τξ is small enough.
In the following proofs, we will frequently refer to the two notions of investment sensitivity
defined in Definition 2.3.2, i.e., common investment sensitivity Sa and idiosyncratic investment
sensitivity Sf . They are both functions of φ in equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. We first consider the investment beta βI . Recall the investment
policy (2.8), we have
log Ii =
τsasa,i + τpaza(P )
τa + τsa + τpa
+
1
2(τa + τsa + τpa)
+
τfsf,i + τpfzf,i(P )
τf + τsf + τpf
+
1
2(τf + τsf + τpf )
.
Following the definition of βI and after some algebra, we reach
βI =
Sa/τa − τsa(τa+τsa+τpa)2
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
.
To simplify the analysis, let g1 = Sa/τa , g2 = τsa/ (τa + τsa + τpa)
2 , and g3 = Sf/τf . By
Lemma 2.3.4, it is straightforward that g1 is increasing in φ and both g2 and g3 are decreasing
in φ. Thus, as φ > 0, we also have that g1 is increasing in φ
2 and both g2 and g3 are decreasing
in φ2. Furthermore, we have
∂βI
∂φ2
=
g′1 − g′2
g1 + g3
− (g1 − g2)(g
′
1 + g
′
3)
(g1 + g3)2
=
[(g′1 − g′2)g1 − (g1 − g2)g′1] + (g′1 − g′2)g3 − (g1 − g2)g′3
(g1 + g3)2
,
where g′1, g′2 and g′3 stands for the first order derivative with respect to φ2.
Since we know that g′1−g′2 > g′1 (due to the fact that g2 is decreasing in φ2) and g1 > g1−g2,
we have (g′1 − g′2)g1 − (g1 − g2)g′1 > 0. Meanwhile, we have g′1 > 0, g′2 < 0, and g3 > 0, so that
(g′1−g′2)g3 > 0. Lastly, since g1 > g2 and g′3 < 0, we also know that (g1−g2)g′3 < 0. Therefore,
we conclude that ∂βI/∂φ
2 > 0, i.e., βI is an increasing function of φ when φ > 0.
We then consider the price beta βP . Recall the pricing function (2.1), we have
logPi =
φ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
a+
1
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
fi +
ζ + ξi
λ
− µ
λ
√
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
.
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Following the definition of βP and after some algebra, we reach that
βP =
φ2
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τa
+ 1τζ
φ2
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τa
+ 1τζ +
1
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τf
+ 1τξ
.
To simplify, let
h1 =
φ2
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
1
τa
+
1
τζ
(2.5)
and
h2 =
1
τ−1x φ2 + τ−1y
1
τf
+
1
τξ
. (2.6)
It is straightforward that h1 is increasing in φ and h2 is decreasing in φ. Hence, we have
∂βP
∂φ2
=
−g1 ∂g2∂φ2
(g1 + g2)2
> 0 ,
which indicates that βP is an increasing function of φ when φ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. We first consider common investment correlation βA. Recall the
investment policy (2.8) and the definition of βA, we have
βA =
Cov(log Ii, logA)√
Var(log Ii)
√
Var(logA)
=
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
√
τa
√
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
1
τa
+
τf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
1
τf
=
Sa√
τa
√
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
.
It is convenient for us to consider instead
1
τaβ2A
=
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
S2a
=
1
τaSa
+
Sf
τfS2a
.
By Lemma 2.3.4, since Sa is increasing in φ
2 and Sf is decreasing in φ
2 when φ > 0, it
is straightforward that 1/τaβ
2
A is decreasing in φ
2. This indicates that βA is an increasing
function of φ when φ > 0.
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We then consider the idiosyncratic investment correlation βF . Again, recall the investment
policy (2.8) and the definition of βF , we have
βF =
Cov(log Ii, logFi)√
Var(log Ii)
√
Var(logFi)
=
τf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
√
τf
√
τsa+τpa
τa+τsa+τpa
1
τa
+
τf+τpf
τf+τsf+τpf
1
τf
=
Sf√
τf
√
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
.
Similarly, it is convenient for us to consider instead
1
τfβ
2
F
=
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
S2f
=
Sa
τaS2f
+
1
τfSf
,
which is decreasing in φ2, again by Lemma 2.3.4. Hence, we conclude that βF is an increasing
function of φ as well, when φ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3. Following Assumption 2.4.1, we keep the ratios τsa/τa and τx/τa
constant when consider the changes of τa. We also focus on the case when τy and λ are large
enough so that a unique solution of φ is guaranteed. Specifically, the reduced equilibrium
condition (2.2) (in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1) is re-expressed as
τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa
τa(1 + τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa)
τx/τa
1 + τx/τa
+
τx/τa
1 + τx/τa
+
√
τx
τa
τa
λ
1
1 + τx/τa
=
τsfφ
3 + τxτa τξφτa
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 +
τx
τa
τξτa
+φ .
(2.7)
When λ is high enough, the first order derivative of the left hand side of equation (2.7)
with respect to τa is
− τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa
τ2a (1 + τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa)
τx/τa
1 + τx/τa
+
√
τx/τa
λ
1
1 + τx/τa
1
2
√
τa
< 0 .
And it is straightforward that the right hand side of (2.7) is an increasing function of τa. Thus,
when τa increases, the left hand side of (2.7) decreases, which further calls for a decreasing φ
to make the right hand side of (2.7) to decrease as well. This concludes the proof.
154
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. Again, following Assumption 2.4.1, we keep the ratios τsa/τa
and τx/τa constant when consider the changes of τa. We still focus on the case when τy and λ
are large enough so that a unique solution of φ is guaranteed.
We first consider the investment beta
βI =
Sa − g
Sa + τaSf/τf
,
where
g =
(
τsa
τa + τsa + τpa
)2 τa
τsa
. (2.8)
It is instructive for us to decompose the total effects of the changing of τa on βI into two
parts: the mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect:
dβI(τa, φ)
dτa
=
∂βI(τa, φ)
∂τa
+
∂βI(τa, φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τa
.
The sign of the second term, the cross-learning effect, is straightforward by Lemma 2.4.1
and Lemma 2.4.3. Specifically, Lemma 2.4.1 indicates that ∂βI(τa, φ)/∂φ > 0 and Lemma
2.4.3 indicates that ∂φ/∂τa < 0, so that the cross-learning effect is negative in this case.
For the first term, the mechanical effect, since we keep τsa/τa and τx/τa constant and
τpa = τxτς when τy goes to infinity, we know that Sa and g are constant in this case. On the
other hand, Sf is increasing in τx given τpf = τxτξ/φ
2 and thus is also increasing in τa given
that τx/τa is constant. This indicates that τaSf/τf is increasing in τa. Hence, we know that
∂βI(τa, φ)/∂τa < 0, i.e., the mechanical effect is negative as well.
Taking the two effects together, we know that the total effect is also negative, i.e., dβI(τa, φ)/dτa <
0.
We then consider the price beta
βP =
φ2
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τa
+ 1τζ
φ2
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τa
+ 1τζ +
1
τ−1x φ2+τ−1y
1
τf
+ 1τξ
=
h1
h1 + h2
,
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where h1 and h2 are already defined in (2.5) and (2.6) (in the proof of Lemma 2.4.1).
Again, we decompose the total effects of the changing of τa on βP into two parts: the
mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect:
dβP (τa, φ)
dτa
=
∂βP (τa, φ)
∂τa
+
∂βP (τa, φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τa
.
Keep in mind that we keep τsa/τa and τx/τa constant in this case. First, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the mechanical effect ∂βP (τa, φ)/∂τa is negative, because βP is an increasing
function of h1 that is in turn decreasing in τa at the same time. Furthermore, Lemma 2.4.1
indicates that ∂βP (τa, φ)/∂φ > 0 and Lemma 2.4.3 indicates that ∂φ/∂τa < 0, which together
imply that the cross-learning effect is negative as well. Therefore, we conclude that the total
effect is also negative, i.e., dβP (τa, φ)/dτa < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.4.3. We again focus
on the case when τy and λ are large enough so that a unique solution of φ is guaranteed. In
this case, we recall the reduced equilibrium condition (2.2) (in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1):
(
τsa + τxτζ
τa + τsa + τxτζ
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
)
τx
τa + τx
=
τsfφ
3 + τxτξφ
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 + τxτξ
+ φ−
√
τx
λ
.
It is clear that the left hand side of (2.2) is increasing in τsa. Hence, when τsa increase, the
right hand side of (2.2) increases as well. On the other hand, we have already known that the
right hand side of (2.2) is increasing in φ. Hence, in equilibrium, φ increases. This indicates
that φ is an increasing function of τsa.
The analysis is similar for τsf . The right hand side of (2.2) is increasing in τsf , while the
left hand side is independent of τsf . Thus, when τsf increase, φ decreases to ensure a constant
right hand side of (2.2). This indicates that φ is a decreasing function of τsf .
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. We first consider the comparative statics with respect to τsa.
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For the investment beta βI , we have
βI = 1− Sf/τf + g/τa
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
,
where g is already defined in (2.8) (in the proof of Proposition 2.4.1).
We also decompose the total effects of the changing of τsa on βI into two parts: the
mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect:
dβI(τsa, φ)
dτsa
=
∂βI(τsa, φ)
∂τsa
+
∂βI(τsa, φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τsa
.
Clearly, Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.4 indicate that the second term, the cross-learning
effect, is positive. For the first term, the mechanical effect, we first know that Sa is increasing
in τsa, given φ fixed. Also, it is easy to show that g/τa is increasing in τsa (given φ fixed)
when τsa < τa + τxτζ , and decreasing in τsa (also given φ fixed) when τsa > τa + τxτζ . Hence,
we conclude that when τsa > τa + τxτζ , the mechanical effect is positive, and thus total effect
dβI(τsa, φ)/dτsa is positive as well. When τsa < τa + τxτζ , the mechanical effect is negative
and thus the total effect is ambiguous.
For the price beta βP , there is only cross-learning effect but no mechanical effect. Hence,
by Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.4 we have that
dβP (τsa, φ)
dτsa
=
∂βP (τsa, φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τsa
> 0 .
We then consider the comparative statics with respect to τsf in a similar manner. For the
investment beta βI , we have
βI =
Sa/τa − g/τa
Sa/τa + Sf/τf
.
By the similar decomposition and again by Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.4, we know that
both the mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect in this case are negative. So that the
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total effect is also negative:
dβI(τsf , φ)
dτsf
=
∂βI(τsf , φ)
∂τsf
+
∂βI(τsf , φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τsf
< 0 .
For the price βP , again, there is only cross-learning effect but no mechanical effect. Hence,
by Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.4 we have that
dβP (τsf , φ)
dτsf
=
∂βP (τsf , φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τsf
< 0 .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.5. We focus on the case when τy and λ are large enough so that a
unique solution of φ is guaranteed. We first consider the effect of λ. Recall the re-expressed
reduced equilibrium condition (2.7) (in the proof of Lemma 2.4.3):
τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa
τa(1 + τsa/τa + τxτζ/τa)
τx/τa
1 + τx/τa
+
τx/τa
1 + τx/τa
+
√
τx
τa
τa
λ
1
1 + τx/τa
=
τsfφ
3 + τxτa τξφτa
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 +
τx
τa
τξτa
+φ .
It is clear that the left hand side of (2.7) is decreasing in λ while the right hand side is
independent of λ. Hence, when λ increases, φ decreases in equilibrium.
We then consider the effects of τζ and τξ. Recall the reduced equilibrium condition (2.2)
(in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1):
(
τsa + τxτζ
τa + τsa + τxτζ
+ 1−
√
τx
λ
)
τx
τa + τx
=
τsfφ
3 + τxτξφ
τfφ2 + τsfφ2 + τxτξ
+ φ−
√
τx
λ
.
On the one hand, the left hand side of (2.2) is increasing in τζ , while the right hand side
is independent of τζ , so that φ is increasing in τζ in equilibrium. On the other hand, the right
hand side of (2.2) is increasing in τξ while the left hand side is independent of τξ, so that φ is
decreasing in τξ in equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.3. We first consider the comparative statics with respect to λ.
Since λ has no mechanical effect on ether βI or βP , we focus on the cross-learning effect along.
By Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.5, we know that both βP and βI are decreasing in λ.
We then consider the comparative statics with respect to τζ . For the investment beta βI ,
we have
βI =
Sa − g
Sa + τaSf/τf
,
where g is defined in (2.8) (in the proof of Proposition 2.4.1).
Again, we decompose the total effects of the changing of τζ on βI into two parts: the
mechanical effect and the cross-learning effect:
dβI(τζ , φ)
dτζ
=
∂βI(τζ , φ)
∂τζ
+
∂βI(τζ , φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τζ
.
By Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.5, we know that the cross-learning effect is positive. For
the mechanical effect, when φ is fixed, it is easy to show that ∂βI(τζ , φ)/∂τpa > 0. Since we
know that ∂τpa/∂τζ > 0, we get that the mechanical effect is also positive. Hence, the total
effect dβI(τζ , φ)/dτζ is positive.
However, the total effect on the price beta βP is ambiguous in this case. We have
βP =
h1
h1 + h2
,
where h1 and h2 are already defined in (2.5) and (2.6) (in the proof of Lemma 2.4.1). Decom-
position gives
dβP (τζ , φ)
dτζ
=
∂βP (τζ , φ)
∂τζ
+
∂βP (τζ , φ)
∂φ
∂φ
∂τζ
.
Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.5 give a positive cross-learning effect, i.e., the second term.
However, it is easy to show that the first term, the mechanical effect, is negative. Hence, the
total effect is ambiguous and will be determined by other model parameters.
We finally consider the comparative statics with respect to τξ. Similarly, we follow the
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decomposition above. For the investment beta βI , by Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.5, we know
that the cross-learning effect is negative. For the mechanical effect, when φ is fixed, it is easy to
show that ∂βI(τξ, φ)/∂τpf > 0. Since we know that ∂τpf/∂τξ > 0, we get that the mechanical
effect is also negative. Hence, the total effect dβI(τξ, φ)/dτξ is negative. Following similar
arguments and again by Lemma 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.5, we know that both the mechanical
effect and the cross-learning effect on the price beta βP are also negative, so that the total
effect on βP is negative as well.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1. Following the definition of real investment efficiency, we know
that
R =
∫ 1
0
Ridi ,
where
Ri = E
[
AFiIi − c
2
I2i
]
=
κ(2− κ)
2c
E [AFiE [AFi|Γi]] ,
and
E[AFi|Γi] = exp
[
τsasa,i + τpaza(P )
τa + τsa + τpa
+
1
2(τa + τsa + τpa)
+
τfsf,i + τpfzf,i(P )
τf + τsf + τpf
+
1
2(τf + τsf + τpf )
]
.
Since κ and c are constant, without loss of generality, we set κ = 1 and c = 0.5 to ease the
exposition. After some tedious algebra, the investment efficiency R is re-expressed in a much
simpler and more intuitive form:
R = exp
(
1 + Sa
τa
+
1 + Sf
τf
)
. (2.9)
We solve for the socially optimal φ∗ that maximizes R. Taking the first order condition
gives
∂ logR
∂(φ2)
=
τ2xτζτy
(τa + τsa + τpa)2
1
(τx + τyφ2)2
− τxτ
2
y τξ
(τf + τsf + τpf )
2
1
(τx + τyφ2)2
= 0 , (2.10)
160
which reduces to
(τa + τsa + τpa)
2
(τf + τsf + τpf )
2
=
τxτζ
τyτξ
. (2.11)
Since τpa is increasing in φ
2 while τpf is decreasing in φ
2, we know that the left hand side
of (2.11) is increasing in φ2. Therefore, there is a unique non-negative solution of φ∗.
We further compare between the socially optimal weight φ∗ and the weight φ in the cross-
learning equilibrium, focusing on the case in which τy and λ are large enough so that there is
always a unique positive solution of φ. We re-express the first order condition (2.10) as
∂ logR
∂(φ2)
=
τxτ
2
y
(τa + τsa + τpa)2
[
τxτζ
τy
− (τa + τsa + τpa)
2τξ
(τf + τsf + τpf )
2
]
= 0 . (2.12)
When τy goes to infinity, we know that τxτζ/τy goes to 0, and we also have
(
τa + τsa + τpa
τf + τsf + τpf
)2
=
(
τa + τsa + τxτζ
τf + τsf + τxτζ/φ2
)2
> 0 .
Hence, when τy and λ are large enough, the left hand side of (2.12) is always negative. There-
fore, we conclude that the cross-learning equilibrium φ is always larger than the socially optimal
φ∗ when τy and λ are large enough.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.2. Recall the expression of investment efficiency (2.9):
R = exp
(
1 + Sa
τa
+
1 + Sf
τf
)
.
We again focus on the case when τy and λ are large enough so that a unique solution of φ is
guaranteed. We first consider the comparative statics with respect to λ. Lemma 2.3.4 implies
that ∂Sf/∂φ < 0 and Lemma 2.4.5 implies that ∂φ/∂λ < 0. Since there is no direct effect of λ
on Sf , we know that Sf is increasing in λ in equilibrium. Moreover, because the effect of φ on
Sa is negligible when τy is sufficiently large, we eventually know that that R is an increasing
function of λ.
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We then consider τξ. Similarly, Lemma 2.3.4 implies that ∂Sf/∂φ < 0 and Lemma 2.4.5
implies that ∂φ/∂τξ < 0, so that Sf , and thus R is increasing in τξ in equilibrium.
We finally consider τsf . It is clear that ∂Sf/∂τsf > 0, i.e., the mechanical effect is positive.
For the cross-learning effect, Lemma 2.3.4 implies that ∂Sf/∂φ < 0 and Lemma 2.4.4 implies
that ∂φ/∂τξ < 0. Hence, the total effect is positive as well, i.e., Sf is increasing in τsf in
equilibrium. Since the effect of φ on Sa is negligible when τy is sufficiently large, we eventually
know that that R is an increasing function of τsf .
Proof of Proposition 2.5.3. Part i) is straightforward following the proofs of Proposition
2.3.1 and Proposition 2.3.2. For part ii), we make use of the conditional expectation (2.12).
Specifically, we have
Var(z) =

σ11 σ12 σ13 σ14
σ21 σ22 σ23 σ24
σ31 σ32 σ33 σ34
σ41 σ42 σ43 σ44

,
where
σ11 = τ
−1
a + τ
−1
sa ,
σ12 = 0 ,
σ13 = φnτ
−1
a ,
σ14 = φnτ
−1
a ,
σ22 = τ
−1
f + τ
−1
sf ,
σ23 = τ
−1
f ,
σ24 = 0 ,
σ33 = τ
−1
f + φ
2
nτ
−1
a + (τ
−1
x φ
2
n + τ
−1
y )(τ
−1
ζ + τ
−1
ξ ) ,
σ34 = φ
2
nτ
−1
a + (τ
−1
x φ
2
n + τ
−1
y )τ
−1
ζ ,
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σ44 =
τ−1f
n− 1 + φ
2
nτ
−1
a + (τ
−1
x φ
2
n + τ
−1
y )
(
τ−1ζ +
τ−1ξ
n− 1
)
,
and
Cov(z, a+ fi) = [τ
−1
a , τ
−1
f , φnτ
−1
a + τ
−1
f , φnτ
−1
a ] .
By condition (2.12), we get the expressions of San and Sfn after some tedious algebra
and plug them into the equilibrium condition. Denote by RHS the right hand side of the
equilibrium condition (2.13) and we get
∂ limτy→∞RHS(φn, n)
∂n
= C1C2C3C4C5(C6 + C7 + C8)
2 , (2.13)
where
C1 = φ
2
n(τf + τsf )τζ + τxτζτξ − φn(τa + τsa + τxτζ)τξ ,
C2 = φ
2
nτa(τf + 2τsf )τζ + 2τaτxτζτξ + φnτf (τa + 2(τsa + τxτζ))τξ ,
C3 = φ
2
nτf + τxτξ ,
C4 = φ
2
nτfτ
2
xτξ ,
C5 = τa + τx ,
C6 = φ
3
nτ
2
f τxτζτξ + φnτfτ
2
xτζτ
2
ξ + 2(τa + τsa)τ
2
xτζτ
2
ξ ,
C7 = φ
4
nτf (τf + 2τsf )((τa + τsa)τζ + n(τa + τsa + τxτζ)τξ) ,
C8 = φ
2
nτxτξ((τa + τsa)(3τf + 2τsf )τζ + ((2n− 1)τf + 2τsf )(τa + τsa + τxτζ)τξ) .
Note that, only the first term C1 has a negative component. However, when τξ is small
enough, C1 is always strictly positive, so is the entire derivative (2.13). It implies that when τy
is large enough and τξ is small enough, the equilibrium φn is increasing in n. Also, the proof
of Proposition 2.5.1 directly implies that φ′(= φ1) > φ∗, so that φn > φ∗ for all n > 1.
Finally, for part iii), by the proof of Proposition 2.5.1, in particular condition (2.9), we
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know that
Rn = exp
(
1 + Sa(φn)
τa
+
1 + Sf (φn)
τf
)
,
where Sa and Sf are the capital providers’ investment sensitivities in the baseline cross-learning
case pinned down by however the equilibrium weight in the corresponding n-learning equilib-
rium. By Lemma 2.3.4, it follows that R < Rn < R
∗ for all n > 1. This concludes the
proof.
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Chapter 3
How Options Affect Information
Acquisition and Asset Pricing
Shiyang Huang
Abstract: We study the effect of introducing an options market on investors’ incentive
to collect private information in a rational expectation equilibrium model. We show that an
options market has two effects on information acquisition: a negative effect, as options act
as substitutes for information, and a positive effect, as informed investors have less need for
options and can earn profits from selling them. When the population of informed investors
is high because of the low information acquisition cost, the supply for options is larger than
the demand, leading to low option prices. Low option prices in turn induce investors to use
options instead of information to reduce risk, while informed investors have little opportunity
to earn profits from selling options to cover their information acquisition cost. Introducing
an options market thus decreases investors’ incentive to acquire information, and the prices of
the underlying assets become less informative, leading to lower prices and higher volatilities.
A dynamic extension of this analysis shows that introducing an options market increases the
price reactions to earnings announcements. However, when the information acquisition cost
is high, the opposite effects arise. Further analysis shows that our results are robust for
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more general derivatives. These results provide a potentially unified theory to reconcile the
conflicting empirical findings on the options listing of individual stocks in both the U.S. market
and international markets.
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3.1 Introduction
As one of the largest derivative markets, the options market has experienced tremendous
growth (see Figure 3.1).1 Further, the effect of options listing on the underlying asset market
is a hot topic in policy, industry and academia, and it has become extremely important since
the financial crisis of 2007-08.2 Although many empirical studies address this issue, findings
regarding options listing around the world are conflicting. As one example, in the U.S. mar-
ket, the effects of options listing on the underlying individual stocks over the last 30 years
are completely different from such effects 30 years ago.3 Indeed, for the period before 1980,
previous empirical studies find that options listing increased underlying stock prices, decreased
volatilities, and decreased price reactions to earnings announcements (Conrad, 1999, Detemple
and Jorion, 1990 and Skinner, 1989). However, for the period after 1980, recent studies find
the opposite effects (Sorescu, 2000 and Mayhew and Mihov, 2000). There are no plausible
explanations for these conflicting findings. Hence, they remain puzzling.
To our knowledge, few theoretical studies examine the effects of derivatives on their under-
lying assets with endogenous information acquisition. Among the few studies, Cao (1999) and
Massa (2002) show that introducing derivatives, including options, increases the underlying as-
set’s price, decreases volatility and decreases price reactions to earnings announcements. They
thus provide explanations to the empirical findings regarding options listing in U.S. before
1980, but offer little guidance on the effects after 1980.
In this paper, we exam the effect of an options market on investors’ incentive to collect
private information in a rational expectation equilibrium model. Following the canonical frame-
works of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), we have one risky asset and one
1Data Source: SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2013. Data is about all sales of options listed
on exchange and excludes options on indexes
2After credit crunch of 2007-08, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act , which
was signed into federal law on July 21, 2010, is considered to bring most significant changes to financial regulation
on derivative markets including interest rate option and currency option. Then there is a hot debate on whether
Dodd-Frank is enough to prevent systemic risk.
3Although most empirical studies are about U.S. market, there are some evidences to show that option listing
decreases price and increases volatility of underlying individual stocks in developed markets, such as Germany
(Heer et al., 1997), while it increases price and decreases volatility in developing markets, such as India (Nair,
2008).
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Figure 3.1.1: Trading Activity in the U.S. Options Market (in millions of dollars)
risk-free asset in our economy. We then introduce an options market that includes a set of call
and put options on the risky asset. Investors choose whether to acquire private information
before trading. We compare investors’ information acquisition decisions before and after the
options market opens. More important, we examine the effect of the options market on the
underlying asset through its effect on information acquisition.
We find that introducing an options market has two effects on information acquisition.
First, options act as substitutes for private information because both options and private
information are valuable in reducing risk.4 Investors can hence choose whether to acquire
information or use options. Thus, introducing an options market negatively affects investors’
incentive to acquire information. This first effect is a substitution effect. Second, options
are valuable for investors with imprecise information because such investors face high uncer-
tainty. Informed investors therefore have less need for options than uninformed investors. In
an equilibrium where the net supply of options is zero, informed investors earn profits by sell-
ing options to uninformed investors. Thus, introducing an options market positively affects
investors’ incentive to acquire information. This second effect is a profit-making effect. The
effect of an options market on information acquisition depends on these two effects. When the
4The intuition can be shown from the Black-Scholes model, which shows that the option price increases with
underlying asset value’s volatility
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information acquisition cost is low, the population of informed investors is high, which leads to
a lower demand than supply for options. Consequently, the option prices are low, affording in-
formed investors little opportunity to cover the information acquisition cost by selling options.
Meanwhile, investors can use cheap options instead of private information to reduce their risk.
Therefore, the two effects work in conjunction to decrease investors’ incentive to acquire infor-
mation. The price of the underlying asset then becomes less informative, resulting in a lower
price and higher volatility. With less precise private information, investors must rely more on
public information, which generates greater price reactions to earnings announcements. By
contrast, when the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high, the population of informed
investors is low, which leads to a higher demand than supply for options. Consequently, option
prices are high, offering informed investors large opportunity to cover the information acqui-
sition cost by selling options. Therefore, the profit-making effect exerts a larger counteracting
force against the substitution effect, leading to opposite effects on information acquisition and
asset pricing. Moreover, we show that our mechanism is robust for other derivatives, such as
straddles.
We also find that the effect of an options market on information acquisition depends on the
precision of public information. When public information is precise, the population of informed
investors is low before the options market opens. Consequently, the demand for options is
larger than the supply, affording informed investors large opportunity to earn profits. Thus,
introducing an options market increases investors’ incentive to collect private information,
increases the price of the underlying asset, decreases volatility, and decreases price reactions
to earnings announcements. When public information is imprecise, the population of informed
investors is high, leading to low option prices. Consequently, the opposite effects on the
underlying asset arise.
Moreover, we show that the introduction of additional trading rounds has similar effects
to the introduction of an options market. Brennan and Cao (1996) argues that additional
trading rounds, which can be interpreted as after-hour or round-the-clock trading, can improve
the welfare of all investors because both additional trading rounds and derivatives markets
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increase risk-sharing opportunities. However, their effect on information acquisition is unclear.
Following Brennan and Cao (1996), we extend our model to consider multiple rounds of trading,
where each round provides a new public information. Complementing to their study, we find
that additional trading rounds produce asymmetric benefits for different groups, which leads
to non-monotonic effects on information acquisition. Because risk sharing occurs between
different groups, the relative benefits depend on the competition within each group. For
example, when the population of informed investors is high, the competition within the group
of informed investors is high. Consequently, the benefit from more risk-sharing opportunities
is lower for informed investors than for uninformed investors, which reduces the marginal
benefit of information. Thus, when the population of informed investors is high because of
the low information acquisition cost, introducing additional trading rounds decreases investors’
incentive to acquire information, lowering the asset price and increasing volatility. When the
information acquisition cost is high, the opposite effects arise.
Our results indicate that the effects of options listing on the underlying assets depend on
the information acquisition cost. Our results therefore provide a unified explanation for the
conflicting findings regarding the effects of options listing on underlying individual stocks in
the U.S. market and international markets. For example, before 1980 when information ac-
quisition cost is conventionally believed to have been high, our results are consistent with the
findings in U.S. that options listing increased underlying stock prices (Branch and Finnerty,
1981, Conrad, 1999 and Detemple and Jorion, 1990), decreased volatilities (Hayes and Tennen-
haum, 1979, Skinner, 1989, Conrad, 1999, Ho, 1993 and Damodaran, 1991), and decreased price
reactions to earnings announcements (Jennings and Starks, 1986, Skinner, 1990, Damodaran,
1991 and Ho, 1993 ).5 After 1980 when information acquisition cost is conventionally believed
to be low, our results are consistent with the opposite empirical findings that options listings
decrease underlying stock prices (Detemple and Jorion, 1990, Sorescu, 2000 and Mayhew and
Mihov, 2000), increase volatilities(Freund et al., 1994, Bollen, 1998 and Mayhew and Mihov,
2000), and increase price reactions to earnings announcements (Mendenhall and Fehrs, 1999).
5Information acquisition cost is lower after 1980 than that before 1980 because the technology is developed
and it is easier for investors to search for information.
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Meanwhile, our results could also explain the empirical findings in international markets. For
example, according to the conventional belief, the information acquisition cost is high in emerg-
ing markets, but low in developed markets. Our results are consistent with existing empirical
findings: options listings increase the underlying stock prices and decrease volatilities in emerg-
ing markets, such as India (Nair, 2008), but decrease the underlying stock prices and increase
volatilities in some developed markets, such as Germany (Heer et al., 1997).
Related Literature Our study is related to several strands of literature. First, this study
is associated with theoretical studies on the effects of derivatives on underlying assets, such
as those by Grossman (1988), Biais and Hillion (1994), Huang and Wang (1997), Cao (1999)
and Massa (2002). Cao (1999) and Massa (2002) are the most relevant to the present study,
as they examine the effects of derivatives on information acquisition. Both authors find that
introducing derivatives increases the prices of underlying assets, decreases price volatilities and
decreases the price reactions to earnings announcements. The derivative examined in Massa
(2002) conveys new information, which leads to increased price informativeness. By contrast,
the derivatives examined in Cao (1999) and our study do not convey any additional informa-
tion by themselves. However, Cao (1999) finds only a profit-making effect for the examined
derivatives. Specifically, the author considers two groups of investors: inactive investors, who
are unable to acquire information, and active investors, who determine the precision of pri-
vate information. The author concludes that introducing derivatives increases the information
precisions for active investors. However, in his model, the inactive investors are not able to
acquire information, which hinders the substitution effect. Thus, derivatives have monotonic
effects on information acquisition. In contrast to Cao (1999) and Massa (2002), we find that
derivatives have two effects on information acquisitions: substitution effect and profit-making
effect. More important, we find that the effects of derivatives on information acquisition and
the underlying asset depend on the information acquisition cost and the precision of public
information.
Meanwhile, our approach takes a first step to model an explicit options market in an
economy with information asymmetry. AlthoughCao (1999) studies the effects of derivatives
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on their underlying assets, the derivatives in the proposed model take reduced forms and they
are interpreted as straddles. The most relevant paper to ours is by Cao and Ou-Yang (2009),
who also model a set of call and put options. However, the authors only conduct the analysis
in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs without any implications for information acquisition.
Our work is also related to the large strand of literature on financial innovation (Allen
and Gale, 1994, Brock, Hommes and Wagener, 2009, Dow, 1998, Dieckmann, 2011, Duffie and
Rohi, 1995, Simsek, 2013a,b, Weyl, 2007 and Chabakauri, Yuan, Zachariadis, 2014). However,
most studies in this literature stream examine the impact of financial innovations without
information asymmetry. For example, Brock, Hommes and Wagener (2009), Simsek (2013a)
and Simsek (2013b) emphasize the destabilizing effect of financial innovations due to hetero-
geneous beliefs. The most relevant paper to ours in this body of literature is by Dow (1998),
who proposes a hedge-more/bet-more effect in an economy with asymmetric information. The
author finds that a new asset induces risk averse arbitrageurs to hedge their positions in the
preexisting security, which affects the old market’s liquidity. This hedge-more/bet-more effect
may have a negative effect on all investors’ welfare. However, we show that options do not
have a direct effect on the underlying asset, which confirms the findings by Chabakauri, Yuan,
Zachariadis (2014). Moreover, we find that options affect the underlying assets through their
effects on information acquisition.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model setup in Section
2 and solve a model without an options market. In Section 3, we study the effects of an options
market on information acquisition and the underlying asset in a static model. Section 4 then
extends the static model to a dynamic model. Section 5 discusses more general derivative.
Section 6 concludes and discusses our empirical predictions.
3.2 Model
Based on the canonical frameworks with one risky asset and one risk-free asset by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), we introduce an options market. Our goal is to compare
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the equilibrium population of informed investors and asset pricing before and after an options
market is introduced into the economy. Before we solve the equilibrium in the economy with
the options market, we solve the equilibrium in the economy without the options market in
this section.
3.2.1 Timeline and assets
There are two periods in our economy, T = 0, 1. There is one risk-free asset and one risky asset.
The risk-free asset is in zero supply, and it pays off one unit of a consumption good without
uncertainty. The risky asset pays off D and has a positive supply of X, where D ∼ N(D, 1h).
There is an options market in our economy, and the underlying asset is the risky asset.
Following Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), we assume that the options market consists of a set of call
and put options. The strike price of one specific option is denoted by G. The call option with
strike price G then has a payoff as (D−G)+, whereas the put option with strike price G has a
payoff as (G−D)+ . The net supply of each option is zero. Because of the put-call parity, we
can only consider call options with positive strike prices and put options with negative strike
prices to simplify our analysis.6 We assume that informed investor i’s demand for risky asset
is Xi, that his demand for call options with strike prices G to G + dG is Xi,CG, and that his
demand for put options with strike prices G to G+dG is Xi,PG. Moreover, we assume that the
uninformed investors’ demand for risky asset is XU , that their demand for call options with
strike prices G to G+ dG is XU,CG, and that their demand for put options with strike prices
G to G+ dG is XU,PG. The price of the risky asset is denoted by P . The price of a call option
with strike price G is PCG and the price of a put option with strike price G is PPG. Our model
differs from that of Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) in that we introduce an options market into an
economy with asymmetric information, whereas they focus on the heterogeneous beliefs.
6If we introduce options with all strike prices, our results are robust because call options with negative strike
prices are redundant because they can be replicated by put options with negative strike prices and stock.
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3.2.2 Investors and information acquisition
There is one continuum of investors. The investors’ utility function over the final wealth at
T = 1 follows a standard CARA utility function with risk-averse coefficient γ:
− exp(−γW1) , (3.1)
where W1 is the wealth at T = 1 and is equal to W0 +Xi(D−P ). Each investor is indexed
by i, where i ∈ [0, 1]. Without a loss of generality, we assume that all investors have zero
endowment of the risky asset, and that they have the same initial wealth W0. The market
opens at T = 0. For informed investor i, he or she has a private signal about the risky asset’s
payoff before trading at T = 0:
Si = D + i , (3.2)
where i follows normal distribution N(0,
1
s ) and is independent of cross investors (corr(i, j) =
0 for i 6= j). We assume that the precision of private signals that investors acquire is the same.
Fruther, investors can only acquire one private signal. If the investors choose to acquire the
private signals, then they need to pay a cost C, which is called then information acquisition cost.
The population of informed investors is denoted by ω, which is endogenous in our economy.
At T = 1, the payoff is realised and all investors consume their total wealth.
In addition to these investors,some noisy traders exist in the market. We assume that the
total demand from noisy traders is n, which follows normal distribution N(0, 1q ).
3.2.3 Information acquisition without an options market
We first derive the equilibrium given the population of informed investors ω and then solve
the equilibrium ω. This section shows that the equilibrium ω decreases with the information
acquisition cost. In the analysis that follows, we compare the equilibrium ω in the economy
with and without an options market. This comparison demonstrates the effect of an options
market on the underlying asset pricing through the information acquisition channel.
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All of the investors submit their demand conditional on their information sets, and the
equilibrium price clears the market. Informed investor i’s information set is Fi = {Si, P},
whereas uninformed investors’ information set is FU = {P}. As shown by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), the following linear equilibrium exists:
P = D − γX
B
+
(ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
)(D −D + γωsn)
B
, (3.3)
Informed investor i’s demand:
Xi =
E(D|Fi)− P
γV ar(D|Fi) , (3.4)
Uninformed investors’ demand:
XU =
E(D|FU )− P
γV ar(D|FU ) , (3.5)
where
B = h+ ωs+
ω2s2q
γ2
, (3.6)
E(D|Fi) = D+
s(Si −D) + ω2s2qγ2 (D −D + γωsn)
h+ s+ ω
2s2q
γ2
and V ar(D|Fi)−1 = h+s+ ω
2s2q
γ2
, (3.7)
E(D|FU ) = D +
ω2s2q
γ2
(D −D + γωsn)
h+ ω
2s2q
γ2
and V ar(D|FU )−1 = h+ ω
2s2q
γ2
. (3.8)
We substitute the investors’ demand into their final wealth and the expected utility of in-
formed investors/uninformed investors is given by (where UI is the informed investors’ expected
utility, and UU is the uninformed investors’ expected utility):
UI = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )Bi
, (3.9)
UU = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )BU
, (3.10)
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where
Bi = h+ s+
ω2s2q
γ2
and BU = h+
ω2s2q
γ2
. (3.11)
The informed investors’ utility is clearly higher than the uninformed investors’ utility. Thus,
the informed investors gain from private information. In the equilibrium, the population of
informed investors ω should render the gain from private information and the cost C equal.
Then, we define the gain from information acquisition G as: 7
Definition 3.2.1. The Gain from information acquisition is G = (UU/UI)
2
Figure 3.2.1: The Relationship between the Population of Informed Investors and the Acqui-
sition Cost
The gain from information acquisition is BiBU . We can therefore show the results regarding
ω∗ as follows (see Figure 2).
7We set h=1,s=1 and q=1 in the Figure 2
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Proposition 3.2.1. In the equilibrium without an options market, the population of informed
investors renders the gain from information acquisition and its cost equal. Then, there are
three cases:
Case 1: If C ≥ Cd1, the equilibrium population of informed investors is ω∗ = 0.
Case 2: If Cd2 < C < Cd1, the equilibrium population of informed investors is ω
∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Case 3: If C ≤ Cd2, the equilibrium population of informed investors is ω∗ = 1.
where Cd1 and Cd2 are defined as in the Appendix.
Corollary 3.2.1. When Cd2 < C < Cd1, ω
∗ is monotonically decreasing with the information
acquisition cost C.
Based on the equilibrium population of informed investors, we examine the effect of intro-
ducing an options market on ω and the underlying asset in the following sections. Because we
have corner solutions in Case 1 and Case 3, we focus on the Case 2 to conduct the study.
3.3 Introduction of an Option Market
In this section, we analyze the effects an options market on investors’ information acquisition
decisions and the underlying asset. We study the role of the information acquisition cost in the
effects. We first solve a static model with an option markets, and then we extend this static
model to a dynamic model in next section. We demonstrate the robustness of the results.
After an options market in introduced, the investors’ information sets differ from before
the options market is introduced. For informed investor i, his or her information set is Fi =
{Si, P, PCG, PPG}, whereas uninformed investors’ information set is FU = {P, PCG, PPG}. Our
conjecture is that the underlying risky asset’s price is a linear function of fundamental payoff
D and the noisy traders’ demand n. The partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium
regarding P , PCG, PPG and the investors’ demands is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.1. There exists one equilibrium in T = 0. Equilibrium P and PG are given
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by:
P = D − γX
B
+
(ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
)(D −D + γωsn)
B
, (3.1)
PCG = (P −G)N(
√
B(P −G)) + 1√
B
exp(−B(P −G)
2
2
) , where G > 0 , (3.2)
PPG = (G− P )N(
√
B(G− P )) + 1√
B
exp(−B(G− P )
2
2
) , where G < 0 , (3.3)
Informed investor i’s demands for risky asset is:
Xi =
E(D|Fi)− P
γV ar(D|Fi) −
(B −Bi)
γ
P , (3.4)
Informed investor i’s demands for options is:
Xi,CG =
1
γ
(B −Bi) and Xi,PG = 1
γ
(B −Bi) , (3.5)
Uninformed investor’s demand for risky asset is:
XU =
E(D|FU )− P
γV ar(D|FU ) −
(B −BU )
γ
P , (3.6)
Uninformed investor j’s demands for options is:
XU,CG =
1
γ
(B −BU ) and XU,PG = 1
γ
(B −BU ) , (3.7)
where B = h+ ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
, Bi = h+ s+
ω2s2q
γ2
and BU = h+
ω2s2q
γ2
.
Several interesting features of Proposition 3.3.1 are notable. First, the option prices are
functions of the price of the underlying asset, and they do not convey any additional infor-
mation, in contrast to the derivative in Massa (2002), which carries additional information by
itself. Because options do not carry additional information, we can isolate the effect proposed
by Massa (2002) based on this feature. Second, BU and Bi represent information precisions
of information for uninformed and informed investors respectively, whereas B is the precision
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of the aggregate information. Following the intuition that the value of options depends on
investors’ conditional volatility regarding the underlying asset’s payoff, informed investors’ de-
mand for options is lower than uninformed investors’s demand. In the equilibrium where the
net supply of each option is zero, informed investors are on the short side of options. Thus,
introducing an options market provides an opportunity for informed investors to profit from
selling options. Following the same mechanism, the third feature is that the aggregate option
prices decrease with the precision of aggregate information B, which is shown in the following
Lemma 3.3.1. The analysis implies that options have a similar effect to information in reducing
risk. 8
Lemma 3.3.1. The aggregate price of options is
∞∫
0
PCGdG+
0∫
−∞
PPGdG =
1
2(
1
B + P
2).
In line with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the equilibrium population of informed investors
renders the expected utility of informed and uninformed investors equal. Before we perform
the comparisons, we must show that there is a unique equilibrium in information acquisition
with an options market. Otherwise, showing the effects of options would be difficult. To
demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium, we only need to show that the gain from
information decreases with the population of informed investors ω, which can be shown as
follows.9
Lemma 3.3.2. The gain from information G with an option market is exp( sB ).
The gain from information clearly decreases with the population of informed investors,
which implies that a unique solution exists for information acquisition. However, whether
the equilibrium population of informed investors in the economy with options is higher than
that without options is unclear. Because the information acquisition cost is constant, the
equilibrium population of informed investors is higher in the economy with options if exp( sB )
is higher than BiBU , and vice versa. Figure 3.3 shows that when the population of informed
investors is zero, exp( sB ) is higher
Bi
BU
. This result indicates that when the population of
8The aggregate payoff of options is: D2 = 2
∞∫
0
(D −G)+dG+ 2
0∫
−∞
(G−D)+dG.
9We set h=1,s=1, q=1 and γ = 0.5 in the Figure 3
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Figure 3.3.1: Gain from Information Acquisition: Effect of an Options Market
informed investors is close to 0, the gain from information is higher in the economy with
options than in the economy without options. Thus, introducing an options market increases
investors’ incentive to acquire information. When the population of informed investors is
1, exp( sB ) is smaller than
Bi
BU
. This result indicates that when the population of informed
investors is close to 1, the gain from information is lower in the economy with options than
in the economy without options. Thus, introducing an option market decreases investors’
incentive to acquire information.10 Because the population of informed investors depends on
the information acquisition cost, we obtain the following formal results with regard to the
effect of options on information acquisition.
Proposition 3.3.2. When C ∈ (Cd2, Cd1), cutoffs C3 and C4 exists, which satisfies the
10The analysis here uses the relations: x
1+x
< ln(1 + x) < x for x > 0
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following conditions:
(1) when C > C4, introducing an options market increases the population of informed
investors.
(2) when C < C3, introducing an options market decreases the population of informed
investors.
where C3 and C4 are defined as in the Appendix and C3 < C4.
Figure 3.3.2: The Relationship Between Population of Informed Investors and Acquisition
Cost: Effect of Option Market
Proposition 3.3.2(see Figure 4) shows that introducing an options market increases in-
vestors’ incentive to acquire information when the information acquisition cost is high and
decreases investors’ incentive to acquire information when the information acquisition cost is
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low.11 From the Proposition 3.3.1, we know that the supply of options is higher than the
demand when the population of informed investors is high. Meanwhile, as shown in Lemma
3.3.1, the aggregate option prices tend to be low. The selling profits of informed investors in
the options markets clearly depend on both the demand per supplier and the option prices.
Thus, the profits from selling options are low for informed investors, and they will not cover the
information acquisition cost when the demand is too low. Moreover, investors could use cheap
options instead of information to hedge their portfolios risk, which implies that introducing an
options market decreases investors’ incentive to acquire information. By contrast, the supply
of options is lower than then demand when the population of informed investors is low, leading
to high aggregate option prices. In particular, when the demand per supplier is sufficiently
large, information investors’ profits from selling options will cover the information acquisition
cost, which implies that introducing an options market increases investors’ incentive to acquire
information. Given its effect on information acquisition, the options market has a direct effect
on the price informativeness. To show the effect of options on price informativeness, we define
price informative as follows.
Definition 3.3.1. The price informativeness I: I = 1V ar(D|P ) .
Because the option prices do not convey any additional information, the above definition
of I captures all of the information that is conveyed by the market. Thus we can conveniently
show the effect of options on price informativeness. Price informativeness is clearly ω
2s2q
γ2
, and
it increases with the population of informed investors. Because introducing an options market
affects the population of informed investors, we obtain the following formal results regarding
price informativeness.
Proposition 3.3.3. When C ∈ (Cd2, Cd1),
(1) when C > C4, introducing an options market increases price informativeness I.
(2) when C < C3, introducing an options market decreases price informativeness I.
where C3 and C4 are defined as in the Appendix and C3 < C4.
11We set h=1,s=1, q=1 in the Figure 4
182
In addition to the effect of options on information acquisition, we also examine their effects
on the price and volatility of the underlying asset. Because uncertainty exists regarding the
asset payoff, the price is discounted. The expected difference between the asset payoff and
price is called the cost of capital: E(D−P ). The cost of capital E(D−P ) decreases with the
expected asset price. Thus the result for expected asset price is equivalent to the analysis on
the cost of capital. The expected asset price is given by:
E(P ) = D − γX
B
, (3.8)
and the volatility V (D − P ) is given by:
V ar(D − P ) = 1
B
+
ωs+ γ2q−1
B2
. (3.9)
The expected asset price clearly increases with B, and the volatility decreases with B. Thus,
we have the following results:
Proposition 3.3.4. When C ∈ (Cd2, Cd1),
(1) when C > C4, introducing an options market increases the expected asset price and de-
creases the price change volatility.
(2) when C < C3, introducing an options market decreases the expected asset price and in-
creases the price change volatility.
These results arise from the effect of options on information acquisition. When the in-
formation acquisition cost is high, introducing an options market increases the population of
informed investors. Because informed investors have information that is precise, they trade
more aggressively, and they are more willing to absorb noisy supply, which indicates that the
demand for the underlying asset increases, along with a higher expected price level. The price
then becomes less sensitive to noisy supply because increased price informativeness. Conse-
quently, the non-fundamental volatility decreases, leading to decreased total volatility. When
the information acquisition cost is low, a similar mechanism generates the opposite results. In
contrast to the findings of Cao (1999) and Massa (2002), these results imply that the informa-
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tion acquisition cost plays an important role in the effect of options on asset pricing.
We also examine the effect of the information acquisition cost on the trading volume of
options. The trading volume in the options market is calculated as follows:
Lemma 3.3.3. The trading volume in option market VO =
1
γ (
ω∫
0
|(Bi−B)|di+(1−ω)|B−BU |) =
2ω(1−ω)s
γ .
Because the short side comes from informed investors and long side comes from uninformed
investors in the options market, intuitively, the trading volume is zero when all investors
are informed or uninformed. When the information acquisition cost increases from zero, the
population of uninformed investors increases, which enhances the trading between the different
groups. When the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high, the population of uninformed
investors is high, which makes total total trading volume vanish.
Proposition 3.3.5. The trading volume in the options market exhibits a hump shape as a
function of the information acquisition cost: Vo decreases with the information acquisition cost
when C is higher than CM , and increases with the information acquisition cost when C is lower
than CM ,
where CM is defined as in the Appendix.
3.4 Dynamic Model with an Options Market
This section aims to demonstrate the robustness of the results in Section 3 are robust. More-
over, the dynamic model is helpful for studying the effect of an options market on the price
reaction to public information.
3.4.1 Dynamic model without an Options Market
To model dynamic trading, following Brennan and Cao (1996), we assume that there is an
approximate continuous trading time from T = 0 to T = 1. The trading ends at t, where t is
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between T = 0 and T = 1. To make the model tractable, we assume that investors can trade
only once in a small time interval z, which means that trading occurs only in the time intervals
[0, z), [z, 2z), [3z, 4z)....[(K − 1)z,Kz), where K is the largest integer satisfying Kz ≤ t. 12
We index the interval [(j − 1)z, jz) by trading round j. Before each trading round j, a public
signal is released. The public signal before trading round j is
Sc,j = D + c,j , (3.1)
where j = 1, 2....K and c,j follows normal distribution N(0,
1
cjz
). c,j is independent from
trading rounds and is independent from noise in investors’ private signal. We assume that
z tends to be zero throughout our analysis. This assumption guarantees that the public
information flow is sufficiently smooth and that the price change volatility tends to be zero
between two consecutive trading rounds when the time interval is close to zero. We further
assume that the precision of the aggregate public information until trading round j is Fj , where
Fj =
k=j∑
k=1
ckz. Therefore, FK is the aggregate precision of public information in this dynamic
model. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis, we assume that there are no additional noisy
traders after the initial trading round. 13
Investors submit their demand schedules conditional on their information sets. The infor-
mation set for informed investor i in trading session j is Fi,j = {Si, Sc,k, Pk, k = 1, 2....j},
whereas the information set for uninformed investors in trading session j is FU,j = {Sc,k, Pk,
k = 1, 2....j}. We assume that investor i submits optimal demand schedule Xi,j in trading
round j. Our conjecture is that the risky asset’s price function is a linear function of fun-
damental payoff D, the noisy traders’ demand n, and public signals. The partially revealing
rational expectations equilibrium is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.1. Given the population of informed investors ω, one partially revealing
12Here, z is similar to dt in continuous-time model and it captures the feature of fast trading in practice.
When z approximates to be zero, this model converges to the continuous-time model in Brennan and Cao (1996)
13Without additional noise traders, it is possible that there are two equilibria (Brennan and Cao, 1996).
As argued by Brennan and Cao (1996), one of the equilibria is fully revealing equilibrium and investors make
portfolio choices neither conditional on price nor private information, which is not appealing.
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rational expectations equilibrium exists, where investors’ demand schedule, investors’ beliefs
and equilibrium prices are given by:
Pj = D − X
Bj
+
(ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
)(D −D + γωsn) +
∑j
k=1 ckz(Sc,k −D)
Bj
, (3.2)
where j = 1, 2....K,K + 1, ...L.
Informed investors’ demand is:
Xi,j =
E(D|Fi,j)− Pj
γV ar(D|Fi,j) , (3.3)
where
E(D|Fi,j) = D +
s(D −D + i) + ω2s2qγ2 (D −D + γωsn) +
∑j
k=1 ckz(Sc,k −D)
h+ s+ ω
2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz
, (3.4)
V ar(D|Fi,j) = 1
h+ s+ ω
2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz
, (3.5)
Uninformed investors’ demand is:
XU,j =
E(D|FU,j)− Pj
γV ar(D|FU,j) , (3.6)
where
E(D|FU,j) = D +
ω2s2q
γ2
(D −D + γωsn) +
∑j
k=1 ckz(Sc,k −D)
h+ ω
2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz
, (3.7)
V ar(D|FU,j) = 1
h+ ω
2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz
, (3.8)
and
Bj = h+ ωs+
ω2s2q
γ2
+
j∑
k=1
ckz . (3.9)
Proposition 3.4.1 shows that the prices only reveal information through D − D + γωsn,
and that the investors behave myopically because there are no additional noisy traders. The
expected utilities of informed and uninformed investors are shown in the following Lemma
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3.4.1.
Lemma 3.4.1. The expected utility of informed investors in the economy with K trading rounds
is given by
UI = − 1√
V ar(D − P1)Bi,1
exp[−γW0 + γC − γX
2
2B20V ar(D − P0)
]×
j=K∏
j=2
1√
1 +
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
,
(3.10)
and the expected utility of uninformed investors is given by
UU = − 1√
V ar(D − P1)BU,1
exp[−γW0− γX
2
2B20V ar(D − P0)
]×
j=K∏
j=2
1√
1 +
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
. (3.11)
where Bi,j = h+ s+
ω2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz, BU,j = h+
ω2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz and Bj is defined as
above.
The gain from information G is obviously
Bi,1
BU,1
j=N∏
j=2
1+
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
, where
1+
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
is the additional gain generated by trading round j. To provide a further comparison, we
must show that there is a unique equilibrium of information acquisition. Thus, we must show
whether the gain from information decreases with the population of informed investors. We
obtain the following result regarding information acquisition:
Proposition 3.4.2. The gain from information G decreases with the population of informed
investors ω.
Proposition 3.4.2 shows that a unique equilibrium exists. Further, the equilibrium popu-
lation of informed investors decreases with the information acquisition cost, which is shown
below.
187
Corollary 3.4.1. In an economy with K trading rounds, the population of informed investors
renders the gain from information and the information acquisition cost equal. There are three
cases:
Case 1: If C ≥ C1, the equilibrium population of informed investors ω∗ = 0.
Case 2: If C2 < C < C1, the equilibrium population of informed investors ω
∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Case 3: If C ≤ C2,the equilibrium population of informed investors ω∗ = 1.
where C1 and C2 are defined as in the Appendix.
Corollary 3.4.2. When C2 < C < C1, ω
∗ decreases with the information acquisition cost
C.
Given the information acquisition cost C, we show how the precision of public information
FK affects the equilibrium population of informed investors ω in the following results.
Corollary 3.4.3. In an economy with K trading rounds, the population of informed investors
renders the gain from information and the information acquisition cost equal. There are three
cases:
Case 1: If FK ≥ F1, the equilibrium population of informed investors ω∗ = 0.
Case 2: If F2 < FK < F1, the equilibrium population of informed investors ω
∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Case 3: If FK ≤ F2,the equilibrium population of informed investors ω∗ = 1.
where F1 and F2 are defined in the Appendix.
Corollary 3.4.4. When F2 < FK < F1, ω
∗ decreases with the public information precision
Fk.
Corollary 3.4.3 intuitively indicates that investors’ incentive to acquire private information
decreases with the precision of public information owing to the decreasing marginal benefit of
information. Because there are corner solutions in Case 1 and Case 3, we focus on the Case 2
to perform the analysis regarding the public information.
188
3.4.2 Dynamic model with an options market
In this section, we solve a dynamic model with an options market to demonstrate that the
robustness of the results regarding the effects of options on information acquisition and the
underlying asset from the static model. Furthermore, we show the effect of an options market
on price reactions to public information.
We introduce an options market, that consists of a section of call and put options, as in Sec-
tion 3. Let Pk be the risky asset’s price in trading round k, PCG,k be the price for a call option
with strike price G, and PPG,k be the price for a put option with strike price G. The infor-
mation set for For informed investor i in trading round j is Fi,j = {Si, Sc,k, Pk, PCG,k, PPG,k,
k = 1, 2....j}, whereas the information set for uninformed investors in trading round j is
FU,j = {Sc,k, Pk, PCG,k, PPG,k, k = 1, 2....j}. We assume that investor i submits optimal de-
mand schedule Xi,j for the risky asset, Xi,CG,j for call option with strike price G, and Xi,PG,j
for put option with strike price G in trading round j. Our conjecture is that the underlying
asset’s price function is a linear function of fundamental payoff D, the noisy trader n, and
public signals. The partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium is described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.3. Given the population of informed investors ω, one partially revealing
rational expectations equilibrium exists, where investors’ demand schedule, investors’ beliefs
and equilibrium prices are given by:
Pj = D − γX
Bj
+
(ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
)(D −D + γωsn) +
∑j
k=1 ckz(Sc,k −D)
Bj
, (3.12)
PCG,j = (Pj −G)N(
√
Bj(Pj −G)) + 1√
Bj
exp(−Bj(Pj −G)
2
2
) where G > 0 , (3.13)
PPG,j = (G− Pj)N(
√
Bj(G− Pj)) + 1√
Bj
exp(−Bj(G− Pj)
2
2
) where G < 0 , (3.14)
where j = 1, 2....K.
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Informed investors’ demand for the underlying asset is:
Xi,j =
E(D|Fi,j)− Pj
γV ar(D|Fi,j) −
(Bj −Bi,j)
γ
Pj , (3.15)
Informed investors’ demand for options is
Xi,CG,j =
1
2γ
(Bj −Bi,j) and Xi,PG,j = 1
2γ
(Bj −Bi,j) , (3.16)
Uninformed investors’ demand for the underlying asset is:
XU,j =
E(D|FU,j)− Pj
γV ar(D|FU,j) −
(Bj −BU,j)
γ
Pj , (3.17)
Uninformed investors’ demand for options is
XU,CG,j =
1
2γ
(Bj −BU,j) and XU,PG,j = 1
2γ
(Bj −BU,j) . (3.18)
where Bj = ωBi,j + (1− ω)BU,j, Bi,j = h+ s+ ω
2s2q
γ2 +
∑j
k=1 ckz and BU,j = h+
ω2s2q
γ2 +
∑j
k=1 ckz
Proposition 3.4.3 shows that investors’ optimal demands for the underlying asset and op-
tions are similar to that found in the static model. An interesting finding is that option prices
only depend on the price of the underlying asset, and that they do not convey any additional
information. Regarding investors’ utility, we obtain the following lemma
Lemma 3.4.2. Informed investor i’s expected utility in trading round j is
EVi,j = − 1√
Bj
Bi,j
E{exp[−γWi,j − [E(D|Fi,j+1)− Pj+1]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,j+1) +
Bj −Bi,j
2
1
Bj
]} , (3.19)
and uninformed investors’ expected utility in trading round j is:
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EVU,j = − 1√
Bj
BU,j
E{exp[−γWU,j − [E(D|FU,j+1)− Pj+1]
2
2γV ar(D|FU,j+1) +
Bj −BU,j
2
1
Bj
]} . (3.20)
Lemma 3.4.2 shows that the gain from information is exp( sB ), where B = h+ ωs+
ω2s2q
γ2
.
Further, this gain decreases with the population of informed investors. Thus, a unique interior
solution exists to render the gain from information and the cost equal. To conduct the analysis
over the expected asset price and price change volatility, we know that the expected price is
given by
E(Pj) = D − γX
Bj
, (3.21)
The price change volatility is given by
V ar(Pj+1 − Pj) = 1
Bj
− 1
Bj+1
+
c2j+1
B2jB
2
j+1
(ωs+
γ2
q
), (3.22)
and the price informativeness is given by
I =
1
V ar(D|Pj) . (3.23)
We demonstrate the robustness of the effects of options on information acquisition and the
underlying asset in the dynamic model as follows.
Proposition 3.4.4. When C ∈ (C2, C1), cutoffs C3 and C4 exists, which satisfies the follow-
ing condition:
(1) When C > C4, introducing an options market increases the population of informed
investors, increases price informativeness, increases the expected asset price, and decreases
price change volatility.
(2) When C < C3, introducing an options market decreases the population of informed
investors, decreases price informativeness, decreases the expected asset price, and increases
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price change volatility.
where C3 and C4 are defined as in the Appendix and C3 < C4.
Findings regarding price reactions to earnings announcements in the U.S. market are also
conflicting, as previous studies suggest that options listing decreased earnings announcements’
surprise before 1980 (Jennings and Starks, 1986, Skinner, 1990, Damodaran, 1991 and Ho,
1993), but increases earnings announcements’ surprise after 1980 (Mendenhall and Fehrs, 1999).
The proxy for the price reactions to public information in trading round j is
cjz
Bj
, which decreases
with Bj . When investors have more information about fundamental value, intuitively, the
surprise to earnings announcements would be smaller. The result presented below shows
that the effect of options listing on the price reactions to public information depends on the
information acquisition cost. This result also differs from that by Cao (1999), who concludes
that options listing decreases price reactions to public information.
Proposition 3.4.5. When C ∈ (C2, C1),
(1) When C > C4, introducing an options market decreases price reactions to public infor-
mation.
(2) When C < C3, introducing an options market increases price reactions to public infor-
mation.
where C3 and C4 are defined as in the Appendix and C3 < C4.
As shown in Corollary 3.4.3, the precision of public information also affects investors’ incen-
tive to acquire information. Thus, we can expect the effect of an options market on information
acquisition and asset prices to depend on the precision of public information. According to
Proposition 3.4.6, the effects of options in the economy with precise public information are
similar to those with high information acquisition costs, whereas the effects of options in an
economy with imprecise public information are similar to those with low information acqui-
sition costs. The population of informed investors is low when public information is precise
before the introduction of options, which leads to a high demand for options and high option
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prices. Introducing an options market then provides informed investors with an opportunity
to earn profits from selling options to cover the information acquisition cost, which increases
investors’ incentive to acquire information. When public information is imprecise, the popula-
tion of informed investors is high, leading to low option prices. Thus, investors can use cheap
options instead of information to reduce risk, which lowers investors’ incentives to acquire
information.
Proposition 3.4.6. When FK ∈ (F2, F1),
(1) When FK > F4, introducing an options market increases investors’ incentive to acquire
information, increases price informativeness, increases the expected asset price and decreases
price change volatility.
(2) When FK < F3, introducing an options market decreases investors’ incentive to acquire
information, decreases price informativeness, decreases the expected asset price and increases
price change volatility.
where F3 and F4 are defined as in the Appendix and F3 < F4.
3.4.3 Effect of additional trading rounds
As argued by Brennan and Cao (1996), additional trading rounds have a similar effect to
derivatives in improving investors’ welfare. However, whether additional trading rounds have
similar effects to an option market in affecting investors’ incentive to acquire information is
unclear. This issue is important because it has important implications on the after-hour or
round-the-clock trading, which is associated high operational costs. This section formally
addresses this question.
We assume that introducing additional trading rounds increases trading time from t to s,
where s > t. The increase in trading time from t to s can be interpreted as after-hour or
round-the-clock trading. Additional trading time increases the number of time intervals and
the last time interval is [(L−1)z, Lz), where L is the largest integer satisfying Lz ≤ s.14 Before
14This modeling about after-hour or round-the-clock trading is similar to Brennan and Cao (1996). The only
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each trading round, a public signal is released. The public signal before trading round j is
Sc,j = D + c,j , (3.24)
where j = 1, 2....K,K+1, ...L and c,j follows normal distribution N(0,
1
cjz
). c,j is independent
cross trading sessions and is independent of noise in investors’ private signal. The analysis
follows the dynamic model without options. The expected utilities of informed investors and
uninformed investors in the economy with additional trading rounds are given by:
The expected utility of informed investors is:
UI = − 1√
V ar(D − P1)Bi,1
exp[−γW0 + γC − γX
2
2B20V ar(D − P0)
]×
j=L∏
j=2
1√
1 +
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
,
(3.25)
and the expected utility of uninformed investors is:
UU = − 1√
V ar(D − P1)BU,1
exp[−γW0− γX
2
2B20V ar(D − P0)
]×
j=L∏
j=2
1√
1 +
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
, (3.26)
where Bi,j = h+ s+
ω2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz, BU,j = h+
ω2s2q
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ckz and Bj is defined as
above
It is obvious that gain ∆G from additional trading rounds is
Bi,1
BU,1
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
. If
∆G is larger than 1, additional trading rounds provide a greater benefit to informed investors
than uninformed ones. Then, investors have a greater incentive to acquire information after
the introduction of additional trading rounds. If ∆G is less than 1, additional trading rounds
decrease investors’ incentive to acquire information. Proposition 3.4.7 shows that additional
trading opportunities encourage more investors to acquire information when the information
difference is that we assume there are approximate continuous trading times, while they assume discrete trading
sessions.
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cost is high, but discourage investors from acquiring information when this cost is low. Al-
though additional trading opportunities improve the welfare of all investors (Brennan and
Cao, 1996) owing to more risk-sharing opportunities, the benefits are asymmetric for different
groups. When the population of informed investors is high because of low information acquisi-
tion costs, this additional benefit is low for informed investors because of the high competition
within this group, whereas the benefit is high for uninformed investors. Thus, investors’ incen-
tive to acquire information is diminished and the equilibrium population of informed investors
is reduced. When the cost is high, the opposite effect arises.
Proposition 3.4.7. When C ∈ (C2, C1),
(1) When C > C4, introducing additional trading rounds increases the population of informed
investors, increases price informativeness, increases the expected asset price, decreases price
change volatility and decrease price reactions to public information.
(2) When C < C3, introducing additional trading rounds decreases the population of in-
formed investors, decreases price informativeness, decreases expected asset price, increases
price change volatility and increases price reactions to public information.
where C3 and C4 are defined in the Appendix and C3 < C4.
3.5 Discussion
The previous sections focus on the analysis of an options market. Considering some general
derivatives is also interesting. Thus, this section provides a further analysis of the derivatives
that are modeled by Cao (1999) and shows that our main mechanism is robust to the use of
derivatives other than options.
Following Cao (1999), we assume that a derivative asset’s payoff is a function of D and
P . The specific function is denoted by g(|D − P |), where g(·) is a monotonic function. We
assume that informed investor i’s demand for this derivative is XGi, and uninformed investors’
demand for this derivative is XGU . Moreover, the equilibrium price of this derivative is denoted
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by PG. Following Cao (1999), we obtain the following results regarding investors’ demand and
equilibrium prices:
P = D − γX
B
+
(ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
)(D −D + γωsn)
B
, (3.27)
Informed investor i’s demand is:
Xi =
E(D|Fi)− P
γV ar(D|Fi) , (3.28)
Uninformed investors’ demand is:
XU =
E(D|FU )− P
γV ar(D|FU ) , (3.29)
Informed investors’ demand for the derivative satisfies:
∫ +∞
0
(g(y)− PG) exp[−Biy2/2− γXGig(y)]dy = 0 , (3.30)
Uninformed investors’ demand for the derivative satisfies:
∫ +∞
0
(g(y)− PG) exp[−BUy2/2− γXGUg(y)]dy = 0 , (3.31)
The market clearing condition is:
ωXGi + (1− ω)XGU = 0 (3.32)
Then, the expected utility of informed investors is:
UGI = UI
√
2
piBi
∫ +∞
0
exp[−BIy2/2− γ(XGi − PG)g(y)]dy, (3.33)
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UGU = UU
√
2
piBU
∫ +∞
0
exp[−BUy2/2− γ(XGU − PG)g(y)]dy, (3.34)
We know the gain from information with this derivative is G = (UGU /U
G
I )
2. Because
obtaining analytical solutions is difficult, we rely on numerical studies. In the numerical studies,
we consider two special cases for g(·): first, g(y) = y; second, g(y) = y2. In particular, we
compare the gain from information in the economy with and without this derivative, given the
population of informed investors. The results are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6.15 The
gain from information is clearly larger in the economy with derivatives than in that without
derivatives when the population of informed investors is small. The opposite results is obtained
when the population of informed investors is large.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of introducing an options market on investors’ incentive to
acquire private information and the pricing behaviour of the underlying asset. As a novel find-
ing, this paper demonstrates that introducing an options market increases investors’ incentive
to acquire private information when the information acquisition cost is high, but decreases
their incentive to acquire private information when the cost is low. Consequently, when the
information acquisition cost is high, an options market increases the underlying asset’s price
informativeness, increases the expected asset price, decreases price volatility and decreases
market responses to earnings announcements. By contrast, when the information acquisition
cost is low, the opposite effects arise. These results can provide a potentially unified theory
for the conflicting findings on the effect of options listing in the U.S. market and international
markets.
15The detailed proof can be found in Cao (1999). We set h=1,s=1, q=1 and γ = 0.5 in the Figure 5 and
Figure 6
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Figure 3.5.1: Gain from Information Acquisition: g(y) = y
Figure 3.5.2: Gain from Information Acquisition: g(y) = y2
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Moreover, this paper also provides some innovative predictions: First, although we do not
formally study the effect of options listing on market liquidity, this paper predicts that an
options market increases the liquidity of the underlying asset market in an illiquid market and
decreases liquidity in a liquid market. When the population of informed investors is high,
price is less sensitive to noisy supply, reducing the price impact of the noisy supply. Thus,
the market has high liquidity. As shown above, a large population of informed investors leads
to a higher supply for options than demand, which is associated with low option prices and
low profits from selling options. Introducing an options market decreases investors’ incentive
to acquire information, which results in lower price informativeness. Consequently, the price
impact of the noisy supply increases and market liquidity deteriorates. Opposite effect of
options listing arises in illiquid market with a small population of informed investors. This
is consistent with the findings by Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992). Second, options listing
has stabilizing effect (increasing price informativeness, raising asset price, decreasing price
volatility and market reactions to earnings announcements) when the public information is
precise, but has destabilization effect (decreasing price informativeness, decreasing asset price,
increasing price volatility and market responses to earnings announcements) when the public
information is imprecise. third, introducing an options market and implementing after-hour
or round-the-clock trading have stabilizing effects (improving informational efficiency, decreas-
ing price volatility) on the underlying assets with high information acquisition costs, such as
small firms and firms with low analyst coverage; Fourth, introducing an options market and
implementing after-hour or round-the-clock trading have destabilization effects (harming infor-
mational efficiency, increasing price volatility) on the underlying assets with low information
acquisition costs, such as large or well-known firms and firms with high analyst coverage.
Although previous theoretical studies on derivatives find that introducing derivatives in-
crease asset prices and decrease price volatilities (Cao, 1999 and Massa, 2002), these studies
can not reconcile the findings: options listing increases asset prices, decreases price volatility
and decreases price reactions to earning announcements in U.S. market before 1980, but yields
the opposite effects after 1980. Further, these studies can not explain the findings: options
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listing tends to have stabilizing effects in emerging markets, such as India, but have desta-
bilization effects in some developed markets, such as Germany. Our results not only explain
these conflicting facts regarding the effects of options listing, but also shed new light on debates
about whether a derivative market has (de)stabilizing effects on the underlying asset market.
Because we aim to obtain tractable solutions, our model assumes that there are no addi-
tional noisy traders after the initial trading round in the dynamic model. However, extending
our model to consider time-varying noisy traders may provide an interesting future research
avenue. Such as extension would also be useful for studying market liquidity in a general dy-
namic model. In addition, future research may study the effect of other financial innovations
on investors’ incentive to acquire information, as in the study by Simsek (2013a,b). More
important, we notice that the options have no direct impact on underlying assets because
of the assumptions of CARA utility and normal distributions. Although this feature helps
to elucidate the effects of options on information acquisition, relaxing these assumptions and
analyzing the effects derivatives on asset prices under general utility functions may provide a
fruitful research avenue. We leave all of these to further studies.
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3.7 Appendix
This appendix provides all proofs omitted above.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1.
EVi = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )Bi
(3.1)
EVU = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )BU
(3.2)
The Gain G in the case without derivative security is BiBU . In the equilibrium, investors should
break even the gain from information acquisition and cost. If G(0) ≤ exp(2γC), the equilibrium
fraction of informed investors ω∗ = 0. If G(0) > exp(2γC) > G(1), the equilibrium fraction
of informed investors ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies G(ω∗) = exp(2γC). If exp(2γC) ≤ G(1),the
equilibrium fraction of informed investors ω∗ = 1.. Therefore, we can get the lemma. And
Cd1 satisfy G(0) = exp(2γCd1) and Cd2 satisfy G(1) = exp(2γCd2). Since G is a decreasing
function of ω, it is obvious that ω∗ is a decreasing function with C when Cd2 < C < Cd1
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1 and Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. To prove that price function and
demands are in the equilibrium, we should prove that the market is clearing in the equilibrium
and Euler condition holds for the demand of different assets. Given the informed investors and
uninformed investors’ demand of the risky assset and options, we have the following market
clearing condition:
for the stock, we have
ωXi + (1− ω)XU + n = X (3.3)
It is clear that the price in the proposition clears the market of the risky asset.
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for the options, we have
ω
γ
(B −Bi) + (1− ω)(B −BU ) = 0 (3.4)
Since B = h+ ωs+ ω
2s2q
γ2
+ c, it is clear that the option market is clearing.
Next we will show the Euler condition holds for the demand of different assets. For informed
investor i’s final wealth is given by:
Wi,1 = Wi,0+Xi(D−P )+
∞∫
0
Xi,CG[(D−G)+−PCG]dG+
0∫
−∞
Xi,PG[(G−D)+−PPG]dG (3.5)
Given the equilibrium Xi,CG and Xi,PG, we firstly prove that the proposed demand of risky
asset satisfies the first order condition for investors’ optimization problem.
Due to D2 = 2
∞∫
0
(D −G)+dG+ 2
0∫
−∞
(G−D)+dG, we have
Wi,1 = Wi,0 +Xi(D − P ) + B −Bi
γ
D2
2
− B −Bi
γ
(
∞∫
0
PCGdG+
0∫
−∞
PPG]dG) (3.6)
Informed investors maximize expected utility
−E{exp(−γWi,1)|Fi}
= −E{exp[−γ(Wi,0 +Xi(D − P ) + B−Biγ D
2
2 − B−Biγ (
∞∫
0
PCGdG+
0∫
−∞
PPG]dG))]|Fi}
= − 1√
1+(B−Bi) 1Bi
exp[−γWi,0 + (B −Bi)(
∞∫
0
PCGdG+
0∫
−∞
PPG]dG))] + γXiP − γXiE(D|Fi)
−B−Bi2 E2(D|Fi) + 12(γXi + (B −Bi)E(D|Fi))2 1Bi 11+(B−Bi) 1Bi
]
(3.7)
FOC, we have: γP − γE(D|Fi) + (γXi + (B−Bi)E(D|Fi)) γB = 0⇒ Xi = Biγ (E(D|Fi)−P )−
1
γ (B −Bi)P
This proves that the proposed demand of risky asset satisfies the first order condition for
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investors’ optimization problem. Now we show that proposed demands and prices for the
options satisfy the Euler conditions. This means that we need to prove that:
E[((D −G)+ − PCG) exp(−γWi,1)|Fi] = 0 E[((G−D)+ − PPG) exp(−γWi,1)|Fi] = 0
(3.8)
Since
∫ +∞
0 (P −G)N(
√
B(P −G))dG+ ∫ +∞0 1√B exp(−B(P−G)22 )dG+ ∫ 0∞(G− P )N(√B(G−
P ))dG+
∫ +∞
0
1√
B
exp(−B(G−P )22 )dG
=
∫ +∞
0 (P −G)N(
√
B(P −G))dG+ ∫ 0∞(G− P )N(√B(G− P ))dG+ 1B
=
∫ +∞
0 (P −G)
∫ √B(P−G)
−∞
1√
2pi
exp(−12x2)dxdG
+
∫ 0
−∞(G− P )
∫ √B(G−P )
−∞
1√
2pi
exp(−12x2)dxdG+ 1B
=
∫ P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
∫ P− x√
B
0 (P−G)dG exp(−12x2)dx+
∫ −P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
∫ 0
P+ x√
B
(G−P )dG exp(−12x2)dx+
1
B
=
∫ P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
(P
2
2 − 12Bx2) exp(−12x2)dx+
∫ −P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
(P
2
2 − 12Bx2) exp(−12x2)dx+ 1B
= P
2
2 N(P
√
B) + P
2
2 N(−P
√
B)− 12B
∫ P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
x2 exp(−12x2)dx
− 12B
∫ −P√B
−∞
1√
2pi
x2 exp(−12x2)dx+ 1B
= P
2
2 +
1
2B
This indicates that
∞∫
0
PCGdG +
0∫
−∞
PPG]dG =
1
2(
1
B + P
2). Then we put
∞∫
0
PCGdG +
0∫
−∞
PPG]dG =
1
2(
1
B + P
2) into final wealth, we have:
Wi,1 = Wi,0 + [
Bi
γ (E(D|Fi)− P )− 1γ (B −Bi)P ](D − P ) + B−Biγ D
2
2 − B−Biγ 12( 1B + P 2)
= Wi,0 +
Bi
γ (E(D|Fi)− P )(D − P ) + B−Biγ D
2
2 − B−Biγ 12( 1B + P 2)
= Wi,0 +
Bi
γ (E(D|Fi)− P )(D − P ) + B−Bi2γ [(D − P )2 − 1B ]
(3.9)
For the Euler Equation E[((D−G)+−PCG) exp(−γWi,1)|Fi] = 0, we have E[exp(−γWi,1)|Fi] =
− 1√
B
Bi
exp[−γWi,0 + B−Bi2B − Bi2 (E(D|Fi) − P )2]. Let x = D − P , µ = E(D|Fi) − P , Bi =
V ar(D − P |Fi)
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E[(D − G)+ exp(−γWi,1)|Fi] =
+∞∫
G−P
[x − (G − P )] exp[−γWi,0 + B−Bi2B ]
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−Biµx −
B−Bi
2 x
2 − Bi(x−µ)22 )dx
=
+∞∫
G−P
[x− (G− P )] exp[−γWi,0 + B−Bi2B − Bi2 (E(D|Fi)− P )2]
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−B2 x2)dx
=exp[−γWi,0+B−Bi2B −Bi2 (E(D|Fi)−P )2][
+∞∫
G−P
x
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−B2 x2)dx+
+∞∫
G−P
(P−G)
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−B2 x2)dx]
= exp[−γWi,0+B−Bi2B −Bi2 (E(D|Fi)−P )2][(P−G) 1√ B
Bi
N(
√
B(P−G))+
√
Bi
B exp(−B(P−G)
2
2 )]
(where
+∞∫
G−P
(P−G)
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−B2 x2)dx =
+∞∫
√
B(G−P )
(P−G)
√
Bi√
2pi
√
B
exp(−y22 )dy = (P−G) 1√ B
Bi
[1−
N(
√
B(G− P ))] = (P −G) 1√
B
Bi
N(
√
B(P −G))
+∞∫
G−P
x
√
Bi√
2pi
exp(−B2 x2)dx =
+∞∫
√
B(G−P )
y
√
Bi√
2piB
exp(−y22 )dy =
√
Bi
B exp(−B(G−P )
2
2 ))
From the Euler Condition, we have PCG = (P −G)N(
√
B(P −G)) + 1√
B
exp(−B(P−G)22 ).
This verifies the proposed the price function in the proposition. Following the similar proce-
dure, it is obvious that the price function of put option takes the form in the propositions.
Following the similar procedure, we can prove that uninformed investors’ demand functions of
risky asset and options take the forms in the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. In the case with derivative security, for the informed investors’ util-
ity, we put Xi =
E(D|Fi)−P
V ar(D|Fi) and Xi,G =
1
2γ (
1
PG
− 1V ar(D|Fi)) into
− 1√
1+2γXi,GV ar(D|Fi)
exp[−γ(Wi,0 −Xi,GPG)
+
V ar(D|Fi)[γXd−E(D|Fi)−PV ar(D|Fi) ]
2
2(1+2γXd,GV ar(D|Fi)) −
1
2
(E(D|Fi)−P )2
V ar(D|Fi) ]
(3.10)
⇔
− 1√
V ar(D−P )
PG
exp[−γ(Wi,0 + (1− ω)s
2B
− X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P )) (3.11)
we follow the same calculation, we can get the uninformed investors’ utility as
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− 1√
V ar(D−P )
PG
exp[−γ(Wi,0 − ωs
2B
)−− X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ] (3.12)
Therefore, the gain G in the case with derivative security is exp( sB )
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. Whether the introduction of derivative security increase the
fraction of informed investors depends on exp( sB )− BiBU . We can transform exp( sB )−
Bi
BU
into sB−
ln( BiBU ). From the proof of Proposition 3.4.2, we know that
T∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
=
1
B1∫
1
BT
(1−ω)2s2t
1+(1−ω)stdt = (1− ω)s( 1B1 − 1BT )− [ln(1 +
(1−ω)s
B1
)− ln(1 + (1−ω)sBT )]
when BT →∞, we have
∞∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 =
(1−ω)s
B1
− ln(1 + (1−ω)sB1 )
Furthermore,
∞∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−BU,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 =
−ωs
B1
− ln(1 + −ωsB1 )
It is obvious that
s
B1
− ln( BiBU )
=
∞∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 −
∞∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
(3.13)
If
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 >
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 , then exp(
s
B ) − BiBU > 0 and introduction of
derivative security will increase the fraction of informed investors.
If
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 <
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 , then exp(
s
B ) − BiBU < 0 and introduction of
derivative security will decrease the fraction of informed investors. Following the proof the
Proposition 3.4.7, we can get results in this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. Price informativeness I = ω
2s2q
γ2
. It is obvious that I is an
increasing function of omega. Following Proposition 3.3.2, this proposition can be derived
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directly.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. (a)The expected asset price is D − XBj . Since B = h + ωs +
ω2s2
γ2
q + c, thus B is an increasing function of ω and then we can conclude that expected asset
price is also an increasing function of ω. (b) The market response to public information is cB
which is a decreasing function of ω. (c) The price change volatility is
V ar(D − P ) = 1
B
+
ωs+ γ2q−1
B2
(3.14)
The derivative of V ar(D − P ) with ω is:
−
s+ 2ωs
2
γ2
q
B2
+
s
B2
− 2(ωs+ γ
2q−1)
B3
(s+
2ωs2
γ2
q) < 0 (3.15)
So we can conclude that first derivative of V ar(D − P ) with ω is negative and thus the
price change volatility is a decreasing function of ω. Therefore, we can get the results in the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.5 and Lemma 3.3.3 . As shown in the analysis, Vo =
ω∫
0
|(Bi −
B)|di + (1 − ω)|B − BU | = 2ω(1 − ω)s. When ω ≤ 12 , Vo is an increasing function of ω. As
proved in Lemma 4.1, in (Cd2, Cd1), the equilibrium fraction of
informed investors is a decreasing function of information acquisition cost and there is
unique corresponding information acquisition cost CM which induces the fraction of informed
investors to be 12 . This means that when C > CM , Vo is a decreasing function of C; when
C < CM , Vo is a increasing function of C. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 and Lemma 3.4.1 . We use backward induction to prove the
linear price function and investors’ demand. This means that we firstly prove that the Pj , Xi,j
and XU,j follows the proposition, and then we prove that Pj−1, Xi,j−1 and XU,j−1 follows the
212
proposition. In the economy of T trading sessions (where T = N or N+M), informed investor
i’s final wealth Wi,F = W0+Xi,1(P2−P1)+Xi,2(P3−P2)+ Xi,3(P4−P3) +....Xi,T (D−PT ) and
liquidity suppliers’ final wealth WU,F = W0 +XU,1(P2 − P1) +XU,2(P3 − P2)+ XU,3(P4 − P3)
+....XU,T (D − PT ) . We also have the dynamic of investors’ wealth as: Wi,j = Wi,j−1 +
Xi,j−1(Pj − Pj−1) and WU,j = WU,j−1 +XU,j−1(Pj − Pj−1).
At trading round T , informed investor i’s information set Fs,T = {si, sc,k, Pk k = 1, 2....T}
and the conditional distribution of D in their beliefs are
E(D|Fi,T ) = D +
s(D −D + i) + ω2s2γ2 (D −D + γωsn) +
∑T
k=1 ck(sc,k −D)
h+ s+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑T
k=1 ck
;(3.16)
V ar(D|Fi,T ) = 1
h+ s+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑T
k=1 ck
(3.17)
They try to maximize their utility over the final wealth:
EVi,T = max
Xi,T
− exp[−γ{Wi,T +Xi,T (D − PT )}] (3.18)
So informed investor i’s optimal demand is:Xi,T =
E(D|Fi,T )−PT
γV ar(D|Fi,T ) . We substitute Xi,T into
the above equation, we have liquidity demanders’ equivalent utility is:
EVi,T = − exp[−γ{Wi,T−1 + [E(D|Fi,T )− PT ]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,T ) }] (3.19)
Uninformed investors’ information set FU,T = {sc,k, Pk k = 1, 2....T} and the conditional
distribution of D in their beliefs are
E(D|FU,T ) = D +
ω2s2
γ2
(D −D + γωsn) +
∑T
k=1 ck(sc,k −D)
h+ s+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑T
k=1 ck
; (3.20)
V ar(D|FU,T ) = 1
h+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑T
k=1 ck
(3.21)
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They try to maximize their utility over the final wealth:
EVU,T = max
XU,T
− exp[−γ{WD,T +XU,T (D − PT )}] (3.22)
So uninformed investors’ optimal demand is:XU,T =
E(D|FU,T )−PT
γV ar(D|FU,T ) . We substitute XU,T
into the above equation, we have uninformed investors’ equivalent utility is:
EVU,T = − exp[−γ{WU,T−1 + [E(D|FU,T )− PT ]
2
2γV ar(D|FU,T ) }] (3.23)
In the market clearing condition:
ω∫
i=0
Xi,Tdi+ (1− ω)XU,T + n = X. We can get the price
function as the description in the proposition.
Now we turn to the trading round T − 1. Given the price and optimal demands in trading
round T − 1. For the informed investors, they maximize utility
EVi,T−1 = − max
Xi,T−1
exp[−γ{Wi,T−2 +Xi,T−1(PT − PT−1) + [E(D|Fi,T )− PT ]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,T ) }] (3.24)
Let Bj = h+ωs+
ω2s2
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ck, Ki,j = h+s+
ω2s2
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ck and KU,j = h+
ω2s2
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ck
In the conjecture price, PT =
BT−1PT−1+cT sc,T
BT
⇒ PT − PT−1 = cT (sc,T−PT−1)BT
E(D|Fi,T ) = Bi,T−1E(D|Fi,T−1)+cT sc,TBi,T
⇒ E(D|Fi,T )− PT = Bi,T−1E(D|Fi,T−1)+PTBT−BT−1PT−1Bi,T − PT
= ( BTBi,T − 1)(PT − PT−1) +
Bi,T−1
Bi,T
[E(D|Fi,T−1)− PT−1]
So in informed investor i’s belief:E(PT−PT−1|Fi,T−1) = cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)BT and V ar(PT−
PT−1|Fi,T−1) =
c2T (
1
Bi,T−1+
1
cT
)
B2T
=
cTBi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
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−maxXi,T−1 exp[−γ{Wi,T−2 +Xi,T−1(PT − PT−1)
+
Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
−1)2(PT−PT−1)2
2γ
+
Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
−1)(PT−PT−1)
Bi,T−1
Bi,T
[E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1]
γ
+
Bi,T
B2i,T−1
B2
i,T
[E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1]2
2γ }]
⇔ −maxXd,τT−2 1√
1+Bi,T ((
BT
Bi,T
−1)2 cT Bi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
exp[−γ{Wi,T−2
+(Xi,T−1 +
(
BT
Bi,T
−1)Bi,T−1[E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1]
γ )
cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)
BT
+
Bi,T
B2i,T−1
B2
i,T
[E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1]2
2γ
−12
[γXi,T−1 + ( BTBi,T − 1)Bi,T−1[E(D|Fi,T−1)− PT−1]
+Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
− 1)2 cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)BT ]2
γ(1+Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
−1)2 cT Bi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
)
∗ cTBi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
}]
(3.25)
FOC, we have:
cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)
BT
−
cT Bi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
1+Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
−1)2 cT Bi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
×{[γ(Xi,T−1 + ( BTBi,T − 1)Bi,T−1[E(D|Fi,T−1)− PT−1]
+Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
− 1)2 cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)BT ]}
= 0
(3.26)
⇒ γ(Xi,T−1 + ( BTBi,T − 1)Bi,T−1[E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1] +Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
− 1)2 cT (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)BT ]
=
(E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)Bi,T−1BT
Bi,T
(1 +Bi,T (
BT
Bi,T
− 1)2 cTBi,T
Bi,T−1B2T
)
⇒ Xi,T−2 = (E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1)Bi,T−1γ Since V ar(D|Fi,T−1) = 1Bi,T−1 . We have proved that
Xi,T−2 is the same as the proposition.
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Then we put Xi,T−1 into the utility function, we have:
EVi,T−1 =
− 1√
1+
cT (BT−Bi,T )2
Bi,T−1B2T
× exp[−γ{Wi,T−2 + [E(D|Fi,T−1)−PT−1]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,T−1) }]
(3.27)
For the uninformed investors’ demands, we can follow the same methodology and just re-
placeBi,j withBU,j . And we have the uninformed investors’ demandXU,T−1 =
(E(D|FU,T−1)−PT−1)BU,T−1
γ
Since V ar(D|FU,T−1) = 1BU,T−1 . We have proved that Xs,τT−2 is the same as the proposition.
The market clearing condition, we can get the price function P1,τT−2 as the proposition. We
can have liquidity suppliers’ expected utility is
EVU,T−1 = − 1√
1 +
cT (BT−BU,T )2
BU,T−1B2T
exp[−γ{WU,T−2 + [E(D|FU,T−1)− PT−1]
2
2γV ar(D|FU,T−1) }] (3.28)
Proceeding recursively, we can get the price functions and demands as the propositions.
This complete the proof of the proposition.
For the lemma, we proceed recursively and can get that:
EVi =
− exp[−γ{W0 + [ E(D|Fi,1) −P1]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,1) }]
×
j=T∏
j=1
1√
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
=
− exp[−γW0 − γX
2
2B20V ar(D−P0)
]
× 1√
V ar(D−P1)Bi,1
j=T∏
j=1
1√
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
(3.29)
EVU =
− exp[−γ{W0 + [ E(D|FU,1) −P ]
2
2αV ar(D|FU,1) }]
×
j=T∏
j=1
1√
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
=
− exp[−γW0 − γX
2
2B20V ar(D−P0)
]
× 1√
V ar(D−P1)BU,1
j=T∏
j=1
1√
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
(3.30)
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.2 .
ln(G) = ln(1 + s
h+ω
2s2
γ2
+c1z
) +
N∑
j=2
ln(1 +
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
)−
N∑
j=2
ln(1 +
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
)
= ln(1 + s
h+ω
2s2
γ2
+c1z
) +
N∑
j=2
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
−
N∑
j=2
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
(3.31)
In the above equation, we have
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
= ( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
Bj−1
Bj
=
= ( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 − ( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )2
(Bj−Bi,j)2
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
= ( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
(3.32)
Therefore,
T∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1 − 1Bj )
(Bj−Bi,j)2/Bj−1
1+(Bi,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1
=
1
B1∫
1
BT
(1−ω)2s2t
1+(1−ω)stdt
= (1− ω)s( 1B1 − 1BT )− [ln(1 +
(1−ω)s
B1
)− ln(1 + (1−ω)sBT )]
(3.33)
Similarly, we will have
T∑
j=2
( 1Bj−1− 1Bj )
(Bj−BU,j)2/Bj−1
1+(BU,j−1−Bj−1)/Bj−1 =
1
B1∫
1
BT
ω2s2t
1−ωstdt = −ωs( 1B1− 1BT )−[ln(1− ωsB1 )−ln(1− ωsBT )]
Therefore, ln(G) = s( 1B1 − 1BT ) + ln(1 + sBU,T ) and it is obvious that ln(G) is a decreasing
function of ω
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1 . In the equilibrium, investors should break even the gain from
information acquisition and cost. If G(0) ≤ exp(2γC), the equilibrium fraction of informed
investors ω∗ = 0. If G(0) > exp(2γC) > G(1), the equilibrium fraction of informed investors
ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies G(ω∗) = exp(2γC). If exp(2γC) ≤ G(1),the equilibrium fraction
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of informed investors ω∗ = 1.. Therefore, we can get the corollary. And C1 satisfy G(0) =
exp(2γC1) and C2 satisfy G(1) = exp(2γC2). Since G is a decreasing function of ω, it is obvious
that ω∗ is a decreasing function with C when C2 < C < C1
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3 . In the equilibrium, investors should break even the gain from
information acquisition and cost. If G(0) ≤ exp(2γC), the equilibrium fraction of informed
investors ω∗ = 0. If G(0) > exp(2γC) > G(1), the equilibrium fraction of informed investors
ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies G(ω∗) = exp(2γC). If exp(2γC) ≤ G(1),the equilibrium fraction
of informed investors ω∗ = 1.. Therefore, we can get the corollary. And F1 satisfy G(0) =
exp(2γC) and F2 satisfy G(1) = exp(2γC). Since G is a decreasing function of ω, it is obvious
that ω∗ is a decreasing function with Fk when F2 < Fk < F1
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 and Lemma 3.4.2 . There are several steps to prove that the
proposition holds.
Step 1: Following the similar procedure in the proof of Proposition 4.1, we know that
∞∫
0
PCG,jdG+
0∫
−∞
PPG,jdG =
1
2(
1
Bj
+ P 2j )
Step 2: We want to prove that the expected utility of informed investors and uninformed
are as shown in the Lemma 5.1 given the proposed equilibrium in the Proposition 5.1. Given
the equilibrium in Proposition 5.1, we have
Wi,j+1 = Wi,j + [
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)− 1γ (Bj −Bi,j)Pj ](Pj+1 − Pj)
+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ (
1
Bj+1
+ P 2j+1 − 1Bj − P 2j )
= Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(Pj+1 − Pj) +
Bj−Bi,j
2γ (Pj+1 − Pj)2
+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ (
1
Bj+1
− 1Bj )
(3.34)
where BT+1 = +∞ (because final payoff is realized and investors have infinite information
precision) and PT+1 = D
We can use backward induction to prove that
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EVi,j = − 1√
Bj
Bi,j
exp[−γWi,j − [E(D|Fi,j)− Pj ]
2
2V ar(D|Fi,j) +
Bj −Bi,j
2
1
Bj
] (3.35)
For last period, this is true following the proof of Proposition 4.1. Now we assume that
this holds for period j + 1, for period j, we have:
EVi,j = − 1√
Bj+1
Bi,j+1
E{exp[−γWi,j+1 − [E(D|Fi,j+1)− Pj+1]
2
2V ar(D|Fi,j+1) +
Bj+1 −Bi,j+1
2
1
Bj+1
]} (3.36)
As the proof the Proposition 3.1, we have: E(D|Fi,j+1) − Pj+1 = ( Bj+1Bi,j+1 − 1)(Pj+1 −
Pj)+
Bi,j
Bi,j+1
[E(D|Fi,j)−Pj ] , E(Pj+1−Pj |Fi,j) = cJ+1(E(D|Fi,j)−Pj)Bj+1 and V ar(Pj+1−Pj |Fi,j) =
cj+1Bi,j+1
Bi,jB2j+1
So we substitute them into EVi,j , we have:
EVi,j = − 1√
Bj
Bi,j
E{exp[−γWi,j − [E(D|Fi,j+1)− Pj+1]
2
2γV ar(D|Fi,j+1) +
Bj −Bi,j
2
1
Bj
]} (3.37)
The ex-ante expected utility for
EVi = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )Bi
(3.38)
EVU = − exp[−γW0 − X
2
2γB2V ar(D − P ) ]×
1√
V ar(D − P )BU
(3.39)
Step 3: to simplify the analysis, we want to prove that final wealth Wi,F = Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D − Pj) +
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(D − Pj)2 − 1Bj ]
Here, we use backward induction to prove that. For the final period T , this is true following
the proof of Proposition 4.1. We assume that this is true for period j+1. Then we would like to
prove this is true for period j. Wi,F = Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)−Pj)(Pj+1−Pj)+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(Pj+1−
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Pj)
2 + 1Bj+1 − 1Bj ] +
Bi,j+1
γ (E(D|Fi,j+1)− Pj+1)(D − Pj+1) +
Bj+1−Bi,j+1
2γ [(D − Pj+1)2 − 1Bj+1 ]
(Since E(D|Fi,j+1)− Pj+1 = ( Bj+1Bi,j+1 − 1)(Pj+1 − Pj) +
Bi,j
Bi,j+1
[E(D|Fi,j)− Pj ] )
= Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)−Pj)(Pj+1−Pj) +
Bj−Bi,j
2γ (Pj+1−Pj)2 +
Bi,j+1
γ [(
Bj+1
Bi,j+1
− 1)(Pj+1−
Pj) +
Bi,j
Bi,j+1
[E(D|Fi,j)− Pj ]](D − Pj+1) + Bj+1−Bi,j+12γ [(D − Pj+1)2 −
Bj−Bi,j
2γBj
= Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D− Pj) +
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(Pj+1 − Pj)2 + 2(Pj+1 − Pj)(D− Pj+1) +
(D − Pj+1)2]− Bj−Bi,j2γBj
= Wi,j +
Bi,j
γ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D − Pj) +
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(D − Pj)2 − 1Bj ]
Step 4: we now prove that Euler conditions hold for every period. We also use backward
induction to prove it. Euler conditions hold for the final period following the proof of Propo-
sition 4.1. We assume that Euler conditions is true for the period j + 1. This indicates that
the proposed demands and price functions take the forms in the proposition.
We need to prove that
E[(Pj+1 − Pj) exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = 0 (3.40)
E[(PCG,j+1 − PCG,j) exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = 0 (3.41)
E[(PPG,j+1 − PPG,j) exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = 0 (3.42)
Following Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), we have
Pj+1 exp(−γWi,j+1) = E[D exp(−γWi,F )|Fi,j ] exp(−γWi,j+1) = E[exp(−γWi,F )|Fi,j ]
(3.43)
PCG,j+1 exp(−γWi,j+1) = E[(D −G)+ exp(−γWi,F )|Fi,j ] (3.44)
PPG,j+1 exp(−γWi,j+1) = E[(G−D)+ exp(−γWi,F )|Fi,j ] (3.45)
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This means that we need to prove that:
E[Pj exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = E[Pj+1 exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ]
= E[D exp(−γWi,F )|Fi,j ]
= E[D exp(−γ(Wi,j + Bi,jγ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D − Pj)
+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(D − Pj)2 − 1Bj ]))|Fi,j ]
(3.46)
and
E[PCG,j exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = E[PCG,j+1 exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ]
= E[(D −G)+ exp(−γWi,F )Fi,j ]
= E[(D −G)+ exp(−γ(Wi,j + Bi,jγ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D − Pj)
+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(D − Pj)2 − 1Bj ]))|Fi,j ]
(3.47)
and
E[PPG,j exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ] = E[PPG,j+1 exp(−γWi,j+1)|Fi,j ]
= E[(G−D)+ exp(−γWi,F )Fi,j ]
= E[(G−D)+ exp(−γ(Wi,j + Bi,jγ (E(D|Fi,j)− Pj)(D − Pj)
+
Bj−Bi,j
2γ [(D − Pj)2 − 1Bj ]))|Fi,j ]
(3.48)
The above three equations take similar forms in the proof the Proposition 4.1. Following
the similar procedures, the above equations hold for period j. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4 . Following proof or Proposition 3.2, the gain of information
acquisition without options is ln(G) = s( 1B1 − 1BT ) + ln(1 + sBU,T ) . When there are infinite
trading periods, the aggregate information precision of public information goes to infinity. That
is BT →∞ and BU,T →∞, then ln(G)→ sB1 which is the gain of information acquisition with
options. This indicates that the gain of information acquisition with options is equivalent to
the gain of information acquisition with infinite trading periods (This is consistent with the
argument in Brennan and Cao (1996) ).
Following proof of Proposition 3.3, we know that the gain of information acquisition from
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additional one trading period for informed investors is higher than uninformed investors when
information acquisition cost C is higher than C4 and the gain of information acquisition from
additional one trading period for uninformed investors is higher than informed investors when
information acquisition cost C is smaller than C3. Following the same logic in Proposition 3.3,
we complete the proof of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 . Price reaction to public information in trading session j is
cjz
Bj
which is decreasing function of omega. Then this result can be directly derived.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.6 . Step 1: we characterize F3 and F4.
when ω > 12 , since
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
/(
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
) =
(1−ω)2BU,j−1
ω2Bi,j−1
< 1, then
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
<
1
when ω < 1
1+
√
1+ s
h
, since (1−ω)
2
ω2
> 1 + sh >
Bi,j−1
BU,j−1 , then
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> 1.
Since G is a decreasing function of ω, there exist F3 which satisfies G(
1
2 , F3) = exp(2γC)
and F4 which satisfies G(
1
1+
√
1+ s
h
, F4) = exp(2γC). When FK > F4, ω
∗ is smaller than
1
1+
√
1+ s
h
and thus
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> 1. Since G(ω∗, FK) = exp(2γC) in the case with K
trading sessions, G(ω∗) ∗
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> exp(2γC). It is obvious that the equilibrium
fraction of informed investors in the case with additional trading sessions is higher than ω∗.
When FK < F3, we can get the opposite conclusion following the similar logic.
Step 2: we study option market’s effects on asset pricing for different public information
precision (a)The expected asset price is D− XBj . Since Bj = h+ωs+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ck, thus Bj
is an increasing function of ω and then we can conclude that expected asset price is also an
increasing function of ω.
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(b) The market response to public information is ckBj which is a decreasing function of ω.
(c) The price change volatility is
V ar(Pj+1 − Pj) = c
2
j+1
B2j+1
V ar(sc,j+1 − Pj)
=
c2j+1
B2j+1
[ 1cj+1 + V ar(D − Pj)] = 1Bj − 1Bj+1
+
c2j+1
B2jB
2
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q ).
(3.49)
The derivative of V ar(Pj+1 − Pj) with ω is:
− cj+1
B2jBj+1
(s+ 2ωs
2
γ2
)− cj+1
BjB2j+1
(s+ 2ωs
2
γ2
) +
c2j+1s
B2jB
2
j+1
− 2c
2
j+1
B3jB
2
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q )(s+ 2
ωs2
γ2
)− 2c
2
j+1
B2jB
3
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q )(s+ 2
ωs2
γ2
).
(3.50)
since
− cj+1s
B2jBj+1
− cj+1s
BjB2j+1
+
c2j+1s
B2jB
2
j+1
< 0 (3.51)
So we can conclude that first derivative of V ar(Pj+1−Pj) with ω is negative and thus the
price change volatility is a decreasing function of ω.
Therefore, we can get the results in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7 . There are several steps:
Step 1: we characterize C3 and C4 and effects of additional trading opportunities on infor-
mation acquisition. When ω > 12 , since
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
/(
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
) =
(1−ω)2BU,j−1
ω2Bi,j−1
< 1, then
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cjz(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cjz(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
< 1
when ω < 1
1+
√
1+ s
h
, since (1−ω)
2
ω2
> 1 + sh >
Bi,j−1
BU,j−1 , then
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> 1.
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Since G is a decreasing function of ω, there exist C3 which satisfies G(
1
2) = exp(2γC3)
and C4 which satisfies G(
1
1+
√
1+ s
h
) = exp(2γC4). When C > C4, ω
∗ is smaller than 1
1+
√
1+ s
h
and thus
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> 1. Since G(ω∗) = exp(2γC) in the case with K trading
sessions, G(ω∗) ∗
j=L∏
j=K+1
1+
cj(Bj−Bi,j)2
Bi,j−1B2j
1+
cj(Bj−BU,j)2
BU,j−1B2j
> exp(2γC). It is obvious that the equilibrium fraction
of informed investors in the case with additional trading sessions is higher than ω∗.
When C < C3, we can get the opposite conclusion following the similar logic.
Step 2: we study effects on additional trading opportunities on asset pricing. (a)The expected
asset price is D − XBj . Since Bj = h+ ωs+ ω
2s2
γ2
+
∑j
k=1 ck, thus Bj is an increasing function
of ω and then we can conclude that expected asset price is also an increasing function of ω.
(b) The market response to public information is ckBj which is a decreasing function of ω.
(c) The price change volatility is
V ar(Pj+1 − Pj) = c
2
j+1
B2j+1
V ar(sc,j+1 − Pj)
=
c2j+1
B2j+1
[ 1cj+1 + V ar(D − Pj)] = 1Bj − 1Bj+1
+
c2j+1
B2jB
2
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q ).
(3.52)
The derivative of V ar(Pj+1 − Pj) with ω is:
− cj+1
B2jBj+1
(s+ 2ωs
2
γ2
)− cj+1
BjB2j+1
(s+ 2ωs
2
γ2
) +
c2j+1s
B2jB
2
j+1
− 2c
2
j+1
B3jB
2
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q )(s+ 2
ωs2
γ2
)− 2c
2
j+1
B2jB
3
j+1
(ωs+ γ
2
q )(s+ 2
ωs2
γ2
).
(3.53)
since
− cj+1s
B2jBj+1
− cj+1s
BjB2j+1
+
c2j+1s
B2jB
2
j+1
< 0 (3.54)
So we can conclude that first derivative of V ar(Pj+1−Pj) with ω is negative and thus the
price change volatility is a decreasing function of ω.
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Therefore, we can get the results in the proposition.
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